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Abstract
The actions of an autonomous agent are driven by its individual goals and its
knowledge and beliefs about its environment. As agents can be assumed to be self-
interested, they strive to achieve their own interests and therefore their behaviour can
sometimes be difficult to predict. However, some behaviour trends can be observed and
used to predict the future behaviour of agents, based on their past behaviour. This is
useful for agents to minimise the uncertainty of interactions and ensure more successful
transactions. Furthermore, uncertainty can originate from malicious behaviour, in the
form of collusion, for example. Agents need to be able to cope with this to maximise
their benefits and reduce poor interactions with collusive agents. This thesis provides
a mechanism to support countering deceptive behaviour by enabling agents to model
their agent environment, as well as their trust in the agents they interact with, while
using the data they already gather during routine agent interactions.
As agents interact with one another to achieve the goals they cannot achieve
alone, they gather information for modelling the trust and reputation of interaction
partners. The main aim of our trust and reputation model is to enable agents to select
the most trustworthy partners to ensure successful transactions, while gathering a rich
set of interaction and recommendation information. This rich set of information can be
used for modelling the agents’ social networks. Decentralised systems allow agents to
control and manage their own actions, but this suffers from limiting the agents’ view to
only local interactions. However, the representation of the social networks helps extend
an agent’s view and thus extract valuable information from its environment. This thesis
presents how agents can build such a model of their agent networks and use it to extract
information for analysis on the issue of collusion detection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Agent technology is a mature paradigm that allows computer systems to behave au-
tonomously within their environment, and act on it to influence their current and future
outcomes [136, 29]. Over the last 15 years, intelligent agents have become increasingly
popular with applications in various domains, such as industry and manufacturing (e.g.
control systems and supply chains) [63, 96], commerce (e.g. e-commerce, entertain-
ment, telecommunications and healthcare) [27, 6, 48, 87] and simulation (e.g. military
training, environmental changes and customer behaviour) [77].
Agent-based systems have enormous promise, but there are a number of chal-
lenges that must be overcome for them to fulfil their maximum potential. One important
challenge is that of managing the risk, and the inherent uncertainty involved when au-
tonomous agents interact. Trust is often considered to provide a means of managing this
risk. Luhmann [80, 79] views trust as an attitude that allows for risk-taking decisions,
hence the close relationship between risk and trust. Gambetta defines trust as the level
of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of
agents will perform a particular action [31]. In this thesis agents use the notion of trust
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for reasoning about other agents with whom they interact. Trust is especially important
in the context of open distributed systems, where malicious behaviour may affect the
actions of agents. The ability of agents to consider trust is also expressed as one of
the requirements for developing the reasoning capabilities of agents, especially those
situated in open environments [77].
1.1 The Problem
The way agents represent and assess trust in others is crucial for interactions, as decision
making ultimately relies on this trust assessment, and it needs to take into account the
environment in which agents evolve and the dynamic nature of behaviour. While trust-
based agent systems aim to tackle the issue of uncertainty, many of the individual
aspects related to trust have not been considered together. Consequently, we need trust
models that integrate these aspects, in order for trust to be relied upon for accurate
decision making. In this thesis, we concentrate on enhancing the ability of agents to
detect malicious behaviour, to better inform their decision making for future agent
interactions.
Research in agent technology, since the 1990s, has been driven by agent-related
technologies, such as Internet technologies, peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, service-oriented
technologies, pervasive computing, Web services and Grid computing, which provide
essential infrastructure for the development of agent systems. As part of the long-
term future of agent-based systems, it is projected that we will see the development of
open multi-agent systems (MAS) spanning multiple application domains, and involving
heterogeneous participants developed by diverse design teams [77, 78]. In the area of
trust and reputation, the long-term future will see trust techniques addressing the issue
of malicious agents [78, Figure 7.1], following the development of such technologies
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as reputation mechanisms. In our research, we aim to contribute to this aspect by
considering collusion as a deceptive behaviour.
Till now, most agent systems are not completely autonomous due to the numer-
ous barriers to the wider adoption of agent technology. For instance, in the e-commerce
domain, concerns about trust, privacy, security and legal issues are perceived as barri-
ers [27]. Users need to trust that agents will behave as expected, and provide protection
of privacy and the assurances similar to traditional trading practices. Subsequently, the
significant level of human involvement in agent-based systems suggests that solutions
should aim at improving human users’ understanding of the agent systems, besides en-
suring efficient and successful agent interactions. This thesis also addresses this concern
by looking at ways to assist the human designers and analysts of agent-based systems
in better understanding how these systems work, in terms of the relationships that exist
between agents, both to help towards minimising the uncertainty of interaction, and to
further develop agent systems towards increased automation.
1.2 Research Goals
The overarching aim of the research presented in this thesis is to enable agents to
detect malicious behaviour in decentralised agent-based systems. This capability helps
to minimise the interaction uncertainty among agents. If an agent is able to reduce
poor or sub-optimal transactions, it will benefit by achieving its goals more successfully.
In open, decentralised and heterogeneous systems, agents differ in their goals, and
levels of performance and honesty. A successful agent is one that is able to interact
successfully with others, while being able to detect and avoid dishonest or malicious
transactions, as well as recovering from poor interactions. The context of this research
lies at the individual level for agents in a multi-agent system. While there may be
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measures in place for secure communications and identity verification, for example, we
are concerned with the issue of trust in agent behaviour. We assume that agents have
their own management of trustworthiness and behaviour; reputations are shared but
there is no central system to reward or punish agent behaviour.
In pursuit of the overall aim of detecting malicious behaviour, we identify four
specific objectives on which we focus in this thesis.
• To identify and represent a rich set of information on agent interactions and
recommendations to support reasoning about agents, and to provide a mechanism
for using this information in assessing trust.
• To provide a means of reasoning about the information identified above to extract
further, previously unknown, information about trust, reputation, and the interac-
tions between agents (including third parties), in order to determine the various
social networks that exist between agents.
• To identify the types of collusion that exist in an agent’s domain by determining the
characteristics of interactions and recommendations between agents that define
each type.
• To investigate the use of information on interactions, recommendations and the
social networks between agents, in supporting collusion detection using existing
data mining techniques. The aim is to show that by using a rich set of information
to extract knowledge of the relationships between agents, along with having a clear
understanding of the types of collusion, we can provide a solid base for tackling
the challenging problem of collusion detection.
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1.2.1 Improved Trust Assessment
In trust-based agent systems, it is important for agents to be able to assess others’
trustworthiness when making interaction decisions, which is motivated by the need for
achieving high rates of successful interactions. However, agents are typically situated in
environments in which they have limited amounts of information. Therefore, the goal is
to maximise the use of the different forms of trust information that is available, namely
trust information from direct agent interactions and recommendations from third parties,
both direct and indirect, when the opinions are passed along a recommendation chain.
In different circumstances, different trust sources may be available and the agent would
improve its trust assessment by considering all the trust information sources available
and prioritising the most reliable ones. With this richer set of information on agent
interactions and recommendations, the agent is better equipped to assess trustworthiness
and take decisions accordingly.
1.2.2 Accurate Representation of an Agent’s Social Network
An agent may not have a global view of its environment, but an accurate representation
of the agents it has some form of interaction with is crucial. A better understanding of
how agents are linked to one another can provide valuable insight into agent behaviour,
leading to further reduction in interaction uncertainty as agents are better able to select
interaction partners. The goal is to enable agents to build and maintain an accurate rep-
resentation of their social networks, using the rich information gathered on interactions
and recommendations. Agents can extract valuable and potentially previously unknown
information about agent interactions. This will be useful for agent decision making, as
well as enable human analysts to better understand how agent-based systems work, with
respect to the relationships among agents.
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1.2.3 Identification of Collusion Types
Agents in a multi-agent system have different goals and priorities. A further challenge
for agents is to have successful interactions despite some agents behaving maliciously.
Malicious behaviour such as collusion, adds uncertainty to agent interactions due to the
covert nature of some forms of behaviour. This motivates the goal of enabling agents
to identify the various types of collusion which may occur in their domain. The iden-
tification of collusion types is essential as a preceding step to collusion detection. The
characteristics of interactions and recommendations of each type of collusion enables an
agent to differentiate between agent interactions and relationships that can be beneficial
or harmful to its own goals.
1.2.4 Supporting Collusion Detection
Collusion is a form of malicious behaviour, where two or more agents agree to behave
in such a way as to benefit the colluding group at the expense of other agents. For an
agent evaluating the trustworthiness of its potential interaction partners, it is important
to take potential collusion into consideration. We aim to support collusion detection
using the rich set of information gathered, as well as the representation of the agent’s
social network by applying known data mining techniques. Collusion detection will
enable both agents and human analysts to better inform their decisions as they have
information about the agents involved and the type of collusion concerned.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the field of multi-agent systems by providing a mechanism
that allows agents to make more informed decisions with the aim of minimising the
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uncertainty of agent interactions, while facing malicious behaviour. This mechanism is
motivated by the need to correctly assess the trustworthiness of agents, and make full
use of information that can be extracted from knowledge of the agent’s social network
to support this trust assessment. The contributions of this thesis can be summarised as
follows.
• An improved trust assessment technique is presented, based on a richer set of
trust-based agent interaction information and recommendations. Our trust model
ensures that agents collect sufficient information from different sources about
different aspects of services, as well as considering the recency and relevance of
the information for trust assessment and future partner selection. We extend
the use of multidimensional trust [36] and reputation, considering both direct and
indirect recommendations for trust assessment, and use the richness of the recency
and the relevance of interactions to achieve a greater accuracy of trust assessment
(Chapter 3).
• We provide a technique for obtaining an accurate representation of an agent’s
social network, based on the rich set of information gathered. Using agent graphs,
an agent represents the interaction information and recommendations gathered
for convenient reuse and analysis. Agent relationships, including the strength of
the links and the services exchanged are clearly represented in the agent graphs.
We describe how agents can use trust and reputation information to build and
maintain an agent network model (Chapter 4). The representation of an agent’s
network provides human analysts with the tools to better understand how such
agent systems work.
• We present a taxonomy of collusion types, together with their individual char-
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acteristics of interaction and recommendations. For the e-commerce domain, we
identify the types of collusion that exist (Section 5.4), and this forms an important
first step towards collusion detection.
• We show that we can support the detection of Persistent Target-Witness collusion
by applying the Cosine similarity measurement technique (Sections 5.5.3 and 5.6).
The approach makes use of the agent’s social network and information on agents’
interactions and recommendations, together with the knowledge of the types of
collusion in the domain.
Several trust and reputation models have been proposed to better inform the
agent selection process, such as Marsh’s trust formalism [81], Castelfranchi and Fal-
cone’s socio-cognitive view of trust [12, 25], ReGreT [106] and FIRE [46]. This thesis
contributes to the area by integrating and extending the important components from
existing models to improve an agent’s assessment of trust, by representing interaction
information and recommendations. The use of the different trust sources (direct in-
teractions, direct recommendations and indirect recommendations) depending on their
availability, and using the most recent and relevant interactions to assess agent trust-
worthiness, is a new technique that enables agents to accurately assess service provision
in various service characteristics important for the agent.
Social networks are popular for searching information, as discussed by Mil-
gram [84] and Kautz et al. [56] for example. In agent-based systems, ReGreT and
FIRE use social networks to link agents to their interaction partners or to make judge-
ments of neighbouring groups. However, these models do not detail how agents build
and maintain these networks. As well as presenting how agent graphs are built and
maintained, we also discuss the possible information that can be extracted from these
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networks (Section 4.3). Agents can use this information in their decision making to bet-
ter reflect agent behaviour in the environment. Furthermore, human users and system
designers can use this information to gain a better understanding of such systems.
Collusion contributes to interaction uncertainty for agents. This issue has been
tackled from various perspectives, such as Jurca’s incentive-compatible, collusion resis-
tant payment mechanism [52], and TrustGuard’s use of transaction proofs against fake
transactions [119]. Our contribution to this area is to enable individual agents in decen-
tralised systems to detect certain forms of collusion, from the trust information that they
have available and their social network. Trust and reputation information can be used
to extend the knowledge an agent has of its environment from its localised interactions,
through recommendation chains and indirect information sources. The representation
of the agent network aims to assist human analysts to visualise the agent relationships
and interactions that may indicate collusive behaviour.
Aspects of the work presented in this thesis have resulted in the following pub-
lications. Our trust and reputation model, based on both direct and indirect recom-
mendations, described in Chapter 3, has been published in [69, 70]. The manner in
which our model also takes into consideration the recency and relevance of interactions
and recommendations to assess the trustworthiness of agents was published in [71].
Our approach for using information about interactions and recommendations to extract
agent social networks was published in [72, 73], as described in Chapter 4.
1.4 Overview of Solution Approach
We present an approach to modelling trust, recommendations, and agents’ social net-
works, designed to capture the dynamic behaviours of agents and their interactions to
support decision making. The approach consists of three main components: (i) data
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collection, (ii) network model building, and (iii) analysis of interaction data. The data
collection component allows an evaluator agent to gather information about its own
interactions with other agents and also from recommendations. The selection of inter-
action partners is performed using trust, as well as direct and indirect recommendations
to better inform decision making [69]. With information gathered from interactions
and recommendations, an evaluator can build a representation of its agent network,
to include providers, witnesses, and the way they are linked and the strength of their
relationships. The third component makes up the analysis of the agent network and in-
teraction data to uncover knowledge of relationships and behaviours, that can be useful
for informing decision making.
AGENT
Data Collection and Storage
Network Building
and Maintenance
Analysis of Emergent Data
Decision Making
CUSTOMER ROLE SUPPLIER ROLE
Agents Agents
Ser
vice
inte
rac
tion
s
Recommendations
Service interactions
Rec
om
me
nda
tion
s
INDIVIDUAL ROLE
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Approach from the Perspective of a Provider Agent.
An overview of the approach from the perspective of an evaluator agent is shown
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in Figure 1.1. The agent, in the role of a customer, requires the services of provider
agents, and the opinions of witnesses can help in this regard. In the agent environment,
the agent also acts as a provider of services and recommendations, based on the analysis
of its past history of interactions, recommendations and decision making on interaction
choices. These activities are performed by the agent in its individual role, as it interacts
with others to guide its decision making on the most appropriate future transaction.
Collected data and data from the resulting analysis are transferred to and from the
different processes of the individual agent. This ensures that the agent keeps an updated
view of its environment with ongoing interactions with others.
1.4.1 Trust and Reputation Model for Data Collection
The evaluator stores a rich set of information to inform future interactions. This is
achieved by keeping a history of past interactions with agents, for each type of service
that the evaluator requires. When the evaluator needs to find a provider for a service,
it searches through its past history and evaluates the trustworthiness of relevant past
providers. If there is insufficient information, the evaluator requests the opinions of other
agents and bases its decision on their opinion and its own judgement of the witnesses’
trustworthiness in giving opinions. As shown in Figure 1.1, service interactions and
recommendations are the sources of the data collected by the agent. These are stored
in a suitable format for future use.
1.4.2 Agent Network Model Building
Agents are dealing with trust in other agents, similar to the concept of a web of trust.
As an evaluator interacts with other agents, including providers and witnesses, it gathers
information about interactions and relationships that will help it build a model of the
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network of agents to have a better understanding of its social network. Graph structures
are well suited to represent networks and in this thesis we investigate how they can be
used to represent agents’ social networks. The agent networks are built and maintained
as data is collected when agents interact with one another.
1.4.3 Collusion Detection
The collection of interaction data over the medium to long term enables an agent to make
decisions about numerous aspects, particularly with the view to increasing the success
of its interactions and maximising its benefits. Besides using trust and reputation to
efficiently select interaction partners and witnesses, interaction data, together with agent
network details, can bring more insight into other aspects of the agent environment. For
instance, agent network information helps in reinforcing trust in the roles of witnesses
to give accurate information. In our work, we explore the analysis of information that
can be extracted from the agent network to further improve an agent’s accuracy in
making decisions with regards to interactions with other agents in the environment. We
particularly focus on the issue of collusion and its detection.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the related work on trust-
based social mechanisms for countering deception; the use of trust and reputation for
agent selection in existing multi-agent systems; how agents can use their social network;
and the issue of deception in agent-based systems. The overall mechanism provides the
three components that an agent uses to gather trust and reputation information, build
a model of its agent network from this information, and analyse the network to extract
valuable information, such as details of potentially colluding agents. These components
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all help towards the agent’s decision making. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 detail the three
components and make up the core of the thesis. They introduce the mechanisms that an
agent uses to inform its decision making, and outcomes from each component feed into
the next component and thus form a cycle whereby the agent’s decisions affect its future
actions. Chapter 3 presents our trust and reputation model, based on multidimensional
trust and reputation, with extensions to provide increased accuracy of assessment, using
direct and indirect recommendations, as well as considering the recency and relevance
of interactions and opinions. In Chapter 4, the building and maintenance of the agent
network model is described, and the various types of information that can be extracted
are discussed. Chapter 5 then describes the identification and characterisation of differ-
ent types of collusion, as well as the collusion detection mechanisms that can be used.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the previous chapters and concludes with the open issues
in the detection of collusion, and discusses the limitations of the mechanism presented.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Introduction
As introduced in Chapter 1, our aim is to support collusion detection with the use
of a rich set of interaction and recommendation information, and knowledge of the
agents’ social networks. Collusion detection is further enabled by the identification
of the types of collusion and their characteristics. This chapter describes important
background research work and how it relates to our own research. We explore existing
models of trust and reputation in agent-based systems to assess how they handle the
trust assessment of other agents and how agents represent their social networks and use
them in analysis and agent selection. We then discuss collusion detection in agent-based
systems and in existing trust and reputation models.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces agent-based sys-
tems and the key agent and domain characteristics. It is important to highlight these
characteristics as the solutions we propose to help minimise the uncertainty of agent in-
teractions are geared towards these types of agents. We next present, in Section 2.3, the
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important characteristics that trust models should have to accurately assess the trust-
worthiness of others. Section 2.4 describes the different approaches to trust modelling
in the literature (socio-cognitive, computational and reputational views). In Section 2.5
we review the key trust and reputation models with respect to these trust model charac-
teristics, based on their widespread acceptance and their particular features. The review
of these models will be used to contextualise our own trust model. We next introduce
social networks, in Section 2.6, as an important element for understanding an agent’s
environment, especially with limited information. Our approach in Chapter 4 uses this
concept to help agents build a representation of their environment to better understand
how agents interact. Section 2.7 introduces malicious behaviour in agents and the dif-
ferent forms of deception. This section sets the scene for a particular type of deception
that we will be focussing on, namely, collusion. Relevant related work on collusion de-
tection is presented in Section 2.8. Finally, Section 2.9 identifies the weaknesses in the
related work that we address as part of the aims of this thesis.
2.2 Multi-agent Systems Characteristics
Multi-agent systems exist in a broad range of domains and can be applied to many
different applications, from simple agents used in information retrieval and information
filtering to more complex agents used in air-traffic control. In this section, we define
an agent and its behaviour by describing its key characteristics. We also define the
domain characteristics, which help to shape our understanding of agents, the type of
environment they exist in and the nature of their interactions.
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2.2.1 Agent Characteristics
The three key agent characteristics are autonomy, heterogeneity and communication.
For autonomy, we adopt the view of Luck and d’Inverno [76] that autonomous agents
derive their autonomy from motivations. In comparison, an agent is defined as an in-
stantiation of an object together with an associated goal or set of goals. Autonomous
agents pursue their own agendas for reasoning and behaviour in accordance with their
internal motivations. Based on Kunda’s work in the field of psychology [60], a motiva-
tion is defined as any desire or preference that can lead to the generation and adoption
of goals and which affects the outcome of the reasoning or behavioural task intended to
satisfy those goals. Thus, an autonomous agent is differentiated from an agent by the
goals it possesses and which are generated from its motivations, rather than adopted
from other agents.
Four types of agents can be identified [122], categorised according to the agent
characteristics of heterogeneity and communication: homogeneous non-communicating,
homogeneous communicating, heterogeneous non-communicating, and heterogeneous
communicating agents. The level of heterogeneity refers to how similar or different
agents are with respect to their internal structure, goals, domain knowledge and actions.
The other agent aspect of communication defines the degree to which the agents com-
municate with one another. We focus on heterogeneous communicating agent systems,
which can be complex and powerful, and consequently have a number of domain-related
issues that we are considering next. Based on the characteristics identified by Stone and
Veloso [122], we outline those we believe are most representative of the e-commerce
domain. Besides the autonomy, heterogeneity and communication characteristics, other
relevant ones are as follows.
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Deliberative Agents as compared to reactive agents are capable of adapting their
behaviour according to their internal state, past history and decision making.
Local Perspective in decentralised systems involves not having a global view of the
environment. From their local views, agents have a partial picture of the agent
system.
Modelling Other Agents’ State as even though agents are able to communicate with
one another, due to reasons such as privacy, agents need to model the state,
actions and knowledge of other agents. Modelling involves observation of agent
behaviour and interactions and predicting future moves.
Benevolence versus Competitiveness We consider agents to be primarily selfish, as
they look after their own interests and aim to achieve their individual goals. In
some situations, agents may choose to be altruistic and give recommendations to
others, in exchange for reciprocal behaviour.
Commitment/Decommitment Agents make commitments to one another when they
communicate and decide on how they are to cooperate on a particular task. The
commitments provide means for agents to trust that the committing agent will
do what it initially agreed to do.
Other characteristics may be expressed by agents, however in this work, we are
not focussing on them and we assume that if present, there are supporting mechanisms in
place. Examples include negotiation, resource management and communication method.
Negotiation is a process by which a group of agents communicate with one another to
try and come to a mutually acceptable agreement on some matter [75]. The role
of negotiation is to ensure that an agreement is reached for the tasks involved to be
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performed, ideally in such a way that all the parties involved benefit from the negotiation
outcome. Another characteristic is resource management, where agents may have some
interdependent actions due to limited common resources. Communication method is
also an important characteristic of the agent domain. Since heterogeneous agents are
built by different designers, there needs to be a common language and protocol for
agents to interact with. We assume that the method and format of communication has
been established in the later sections of this work.
2.2.2 Domain Characteristics
Population Size is the number of agents in the system, which varies according to the
domain and can range from a few, to several dozens and several hundreds in
electronic commerce, and electronic supply chains.
Time Dependency of Actions relates to whether the generation of actions is subjec-
tive to time pressures. The type of domains we are considering are real-time and
agents’ behaviours and actions are influenced by the behaviour of others in the
system, as well as environmental factors. For instance, customer agents in an
e-commerce system will stop buying from a supplier as it becomes increasingly
unreliable.
Dynamism of Agents involves agents entering or leaving the system at will, depending
on their goals at various points in the transaction period. Additionally, agents can
adapt their behaviour accordingly.
Communication Cost in the domains we are considering is assumed to be almost
free [127], as reciprocal behaviour benefits agents when they share information.
Failure Cost in the domains we are considering, such as e-commerce applications and
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e-supply chains are medium. In contrast, air traffic control is a domain with high
cost of failure.
User Involvement pertains to the degree of human involvement in the multi-agent
systems. We assume that humans are involved, for instance, to give user feedback
on the performance of its representative agents, whose behaviour can consequently
be updated.
Environmental Uncertainty can result from the domain itself, from agents not know-
ing the actions of other agents, and from the agents not knowing the outcome of
their own actions [17].
2.3 Trust Model Characteristics
Trust and reputation are popular mechanisms used to help in the selection of the
best suited interaction partners by reducing the issues related to uncertainty. Trust
is an assessment of the likelihood that an agent will cooperate and fulfil its commit-
ments [32, 81]. The reputation of an agent also contributes to its trust assessment
and is derived from third party opinions. Research on trust in the agent domain has
brought about many different approaches. Castelfranchi and Falcone [12, 25] view
trust as being composed of representations of beliefs, such as competence, disposition,
dependence and fulfilment. Marsh [81] looks at basic, general and situational trust,
which considers trust with regards to the agent itself, other agents and particular con-
texts respectively. Griffiths [35] introduces the notion of multidimensional trust (MDT),
which allows agents to model the trustworthiness of others according to various criteria.
The approach decomposes the beliefs, as viewed by Castelfranchi and Falcone, accord-
ing to the different dimensions of an interaction. Agents can model trust along any
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number of dimensions, according to their preferences and motivations. For the purposes
of illustrating MDT, Griffiths uses the four dimensions of success, cost, timeliness and
quality.
Reputation, a similar notion to trust, is defined as the information received by
agents about the behaviour of their partners from third parties, and they use that to
decide how they are going to behave themselves [11]. Due to its importance in social
and commercial relations, the study and modelling of reputation has attracted a lot
of interest from researchers in different fields: sociology, economics, psychology and
computer science. We agree with [11] on the definition of reputation and we note
that reputation includes recommendations from agents who have directly interacted
with the agents we are interested in, as well as indirect recommendations, based on the
propagation of reputation among agents.
A trust model should have certain key characteristics to allow an evaluator to
accurately represent another agent’s behaviour and assess its trustworthiness. It should
enable the gathering of a rich set of information for trust assessment and reasoning
about an agent’s social networks. These characteristics are based on the benefits and
limitations of a comprehensive set of trust models that we have studied and discuss them
in more detail later in this chapter. Although the trust model characteristics are not new
in themselves, and, feature in existing models individually or in combinations, the set
of characteristics we describe below has not been considered together in combination in
previous work.
2.3.1 Trust Information Sources
The first key characteristic concerns the gathering of trust data from third parties to
represent the reputation of an agent. An agent needs to be gathering trust information
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from a wide range of sources, and third party recommendations should be used together
with trust information from direct interactions. Service interactions with provider agents
are the most reliable source of direct trust as they most closely relate to the evaluator’s
requirements. However, direct interactions are not always available for a number of
reasons, including interacting with a new service provider, insufficient past interactions
to assess a provider accurately, and interactions relating to a new service required by
the evaluator. Even in these circumstances, an evaluator wants to have successful
interactions and the decision making process to select interaction partners needs to
include recommendations from reliable sources. An evaluator can assess the reputation
of another agent from a number of recommendations obtained from third parties, either
directly or indirectly.
Direct recommendations originate from agents having directly used an agent’s
services. Therefore, a principal witness will give its opinion of another agent only if
has itself interacted with that agent for service provision. A witness’s opinion can also
be valuable even if it is indirect. SIR [83], TrustNet [110, 111], SPORAS [142],
MDT-R [36] and TRAVOS [125] are trust models that feature direct recommenda-
tions. Indirect recommendations are provided by secondary witnesses which pass on the
recommendations of a principal witness along a chain of recommendation. The shorter
the chain, the closer the recommendation is likely to suit the requirements of the eval-
uator. This is mainly due to each subsequent witness recommending a suitable agent
from its known set of agents, which may be of relevance to the requesting agent. From
the literature, the following models use indirect recommendations as well as direct rec-
ommendations: Ntropi [1], ReGreT [106], Mui et al. [89], HISTOS [142], FIRE [46],
Walter et al. [130], L.I.A.R. [91] and Yu and Singh [141].
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2.3.2 Service-level Trust and Reputation
The second key characteristic of a trust model is to be able to assess the trustworthiness
of agents at a service level, as well as at a service characteristic level. At a service
level, the trust model needs to differentiate between the services provided by the agents.
The trustworthiness of agents needs to be modelled per service provided. At a more
granular level, an evaluator agent can assess the trustworthiness of another agent in the
individual service characteristics important to them.
The assessment at service characteristic level can be performed both for direct
trust and reputation. For example, the evaluator may consider timeliness as a fun-
damental service characteristic that a provider should have. In its assessment of the
trustworthiness of that provider, the evaluator will particularly take into consideration
its direct trust and reputation in the timeliness dimension. Models by Mezzetti [83] and
Griffiths and Luck [39] consider the multi-dimensionality of trust, while ReGreT [106]
and MDT-R [36] both also take multiple dimensions of recommendation into account.
2.3.3 Recency
Taking into account the recency of agent interactions is the third key characteristic that
a trust model should have. Agents use their history of past interactions in their trust
assessment of others. Recent interactions reflect the most up-to-date agent behaviours,
and are most likely to indicate future behaviour. Storing long histories of past interac-
tions provides a larger amount of data about an agent to evaluate its trustworthiness.
However, in a dynamic environment where agents can change their behaviour, using
older interactions may not be a good indication of future behaviour. Agents need to
balance the size of the history of interactions that they store about another agent, since
a small size may not be sufficient to accurately assess trustworthiness, while a large
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history would average out the agent behaviour over that long period of time, rather
than help predict immediate future behaviour. Therefore, a trust model should be able
to filter out the older agent interactions that are less useful in accurately assessing trust-
worthiness. Trust models in the literature that use the recency characteristic include
SIR [83], ReGreT [106], Witkowski et al. [134], SPORAS and HISTOS [142, 143],
MDT-R [36], and FIRE [46].
2.3.4 Relevance
Relevance is the fourth key factor that a trust model should take into account. It
concerns the recommendations received by the evaluating agent, and how useful they
are for trust assessment. Relevance is based on the recency of the recommendation
interactions, the experience of the witnesses and how trustworthy the evaluator believes
the witness is in giving recommendations, as well as the evaluator’s confidence in that
recommendation trust. These considerations ensure that the most relevant third party
recommendations are used for assessing the trustworthiness of other agents. Existing
trust models that take into consideration the relevance of recommendations include
Ntropi [1], HISTOS [142], FIRE [46], and Yu and Singh [141].
2.4 Approaches to Trust Modelling
Interest in trust and reputation has resulted in many models being developed for the
implementation and management of these notions in multi-agent systems. Researchers
have adopted approaches from different disciplines to support the development of their
models. The notions of trust and reputation have their roots in sociology, economics
and biology, and have been applied in areas as diverse as game theory, business ethics
and politics. Hence, to model them in agent-based systems, techniques from many of
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the above-mentioned fields have been used. The main approaches are socio-cognitive,
computational and reputational.
2.4.1 Socio-cognitive View
The term cognitive is defined in the Cambridge Dictionaries Online as “connected with
thinking or conscious mental processes” [97]. Thus, models following the socio-cognitive
approach are based on underlying beliefs about a society and its members and trust is
a function of the value of these beliefs [22]. Additionally, this approach involves the
mental states of an agent in relying on another agent and also the consequences of the
actual decision of reliance [25]. It is important to understand the mental ingredients
of trust in order to explain and predict the perception and decision about an agent’s
risk. A cognitive analysis of trust also forms the basis for the notions of reputation,
deception, and persuasion in the building of trust [13].
In the literature, only a few trust and reputation models are based on the socio-
cognitive view. The main model dealing with the cognitive approach to trust is that
of Castelfranchi and Falcone [12, 25], in which they define the different beliefs that
an agent must hold to build up trust and expects another agent to have in order to be
suitable to be relied on. Other models use the social aspect of MAS to closely represent
interactions in real situations. Mezzetti [83] stresses the ideas of trust variation with
time and context and the modelling of the properties that cause a reputation value to
be low or high.
2.4.2 Numerical View
In this view, trust and reputation are not reflective of the mental state of an agent, but
use numbers and mathematical techniques to represent and manipulate the trust value,
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in the form of probabilities and numerical aggregations and strategies. Within this view,
models can be roughly categorised as decision-theoretical or game-theoretical.
2.4.2.1 Decision-theoretical View
Classical decision theory consists of a set of mathematical techniques for making deci-
sions about which action to take when the outcomes of various actions are not known.
Probability theory is a subset of these techniques, where some aspect of the current state
of the environment is captured as a probability. Marsh [81] represents trust numerically
between −1 and +1. All the three aspects of trust — basic, general and situational
trust — lie within this range and he proposes a formula to calculate the situational trust.
Mui et al. [89] also propose a mathematical model based on probability to show the
link between trust, reputation and reciprocation. Models by Witkowski et al. [134, 135]
and Sen et al. [113, 114] also fall into this category.
Other models place trust values and agent behaviour into categories to make
them more meaningful in their utilisation. Fuzzy set theory is a means of specifying how
well an object satisfies a vague description [103]. Zadeh [144] defines a fuzzy set to
be a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership. Many objects in the
real world do not have precisely defined criteria for membership and although they are
ambiguous, they are important in human thinking, pattern recognition, communication
and abstraction. Fuzzy logic has emerged from fuzzy sets and is a method for reasoning
with logical expressions describing membership in fuzzy sets. It allows intermediate
values to be defined between conventional evaluations, such as ’yes’ or ’no’, ’late’ or
’on time’ in terms of the degree of truth. Notions like ’rather warm’ or ’slightly late’
can be formulated mathematically and processed by computers in an attempt to more
accurately represent the way systems behave in the real world.
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Wu and Sun [137] classify a seller’s behaviour in a bidding environment as
Random, Nice, Tit-for-Tat and Nasty, where each strategy outlines the way the seller
behaves in an interaction. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [2] also use classification in the
case of trust and for the adjustment of experiences. Trustworthiness is categorised into
four types, from Very Untrustworthy to Very Trustworthy, while experiences also exist
in four types, from Very Bad to Very Good.
The fuzzy approach is also adopted by Falcone et al. [26] for an implementation
of the socio-cognitive model of trust they have developed [12, 25]. Fuzzy logic has
been chosen for their model because trust is a graded phenomenon that can be difficult
to estimate. We consider the implementation of a socio-cognitive model to be both
computational and socio-cognitive. The implementation is based on Fuzzy Cognitive
Maps (FCM) [58], that allow the value of truthfulness to be computed from the belief
sources. An FCM is well suited for representing a dynamic system with cause-effect
relations, where nodes represent the causal concepts of belief sources, for instance, and
edges represent the causal power of a node over another one. Other work using fuzzy
logic includes that of Griffiths et al. [38], used in the context of P2P systems to select
interaction partners.
2.4.2.2 Game-theoretical View
Within the computational and numerical models, there is a sub-category of models and
mechanisms which are based on game theory, thus making use of utility functions and
strategies similar to Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem. Game theory has
arguably originated from the work by John von Newmann and Oscar Morgenstern [128],
where they define a game as any interaction between agents that is governed by a set
of rules specifying the possible moves for each participant and a set of outcomes for
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Prisoner A defects Prisoner A cooperates
Prisoner B defects 3, 3 0, 5
Prisoner B cooperates 5, 0 1, 1
Table 2.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma Options and Payoffs
each possible combination of moves. Game theory is applicable to almost any social
interaction where individuals have some understanding of how the outcome for one is
affected not only by its own actions but also by the actions of others [40].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) problem in game theory was described by Albert
Tucker while addressing an audience of psychologists, to explain the puzzles devised by
Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporation’s investiga-
tions into game theory due to its possible applications to global nuclear strategy [59].
As illustrated by Tucker, two prisoners are held for the robbery of a bank. They are
placed in separate cells and the prosecutor makes an offer to each of them while explain-
ing what is likely to happen. Table 2.1 summarises the options and payoffs proposed
to the prisoners, where the number pair represents the number of years in prison for
prisoners A and B respectively.
There is enough evidence to convict each of a minor offence, but there is not
enough evidence to convict either of them of a major crime unless one of them defects
(confesses), and thus acts as an informer. If both defect, they will each be given three
years in prison, due to there being no doubt over their guilt. If only one of them
confesses, that prisoner will be freed and used as a witness against the other, who will
spend five years in prison. If both cooperate and stay quiet, each will be convicted of
the minor offence and spend one year in prison. Given that the assumption is that each
prisoner cares only to avoid spending time in prison, the dominant strategy of each will
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be to defect. Yet, it yields a paradoxical result of making each worse off than they might
have been had they each chosen to cooperate and stay quiet and so to spend only one
year in prison [40].
Tit-for-Tat is an efficient strategy in game theory for the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, where a computer tournament is conducted. The strategy is one of cooper-
ating on the first move and then doing whatever the other agent did on the preceding
move. It is thus a strategy of cooperation based on reciprocity [4].
TrustNet [110, 111] uses an extension to the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the selection
of interaction partners. Wu and Sun’s [137] approach makes use of the Tit-for-Tat
strategy for the behaviour of its seller agent.
2.4.3 Reputational View
In their evaluation of trustworthiness, many models make use of reputation, in the form
of recommendations from other agents. Direct interactions with the agents of interest
are not always available as sources of information, especially when there have been no
previous interactions, or past interactions have occurred a long time ago. Many models
take into account reputation as a complement to trust in evaluating trustworthiness.
Ntropi [1, 2], ReGreT [106], TrustNet [110, 111], FIRE [46], and TRAVOS [125] all
make use of reputation.
The reputation mechanism by Braynov and Sandholm [8, 9] and FIRE [46]
use a form of reputation mechanism used by an agent for itself. It consists of revealing
their reputation value to other agents with whom they want to interact. Most of the
models mentioned use direct recommendations, that is, an agent requests the opinion
of others who have interacted with the agent of interest. Indirect recommendations,
that is, the opinions of other agents about an agent of interest even if they have not
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themselves interacted with it, are used by ReGreT [106] and FIRE [46]. The trust-
based recommendation system proposed by Walter et al. [130] also makes use of direct
and indirect recommendations from the agents’ neighbours in decision making.
2.5 Review of Trust and Reputation Models
A selection of trust and reputation models from the different approaches mentioned are
reviewed in this section. Table A.1 in Appendix A summarises the characteristics of the
different trust models with respect to the essential trust model characteristics described
previously. We have selected these models in our review based on the key trust model
characteristics for the selection criteria (Section 2.3).
2.5.1 Castelfranchi and Falcone
The model proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone [12, 25] is general and domain-
independent, and is based on the mental state of trust. It suggests that an agent can
trust another agent if it has an appropriate set of goals and beliefs. Trust is defined as
comprising three elements: ‘core trust’, which is a simple evaluation of the trustee, ‘re-
liance’, the decision to rely on the trustee and ‘delegation’, the actual action of trusting
the trustee. To build trust in another agent y , an agent x is required to have certain
beliefs corresponding to the three components of trust mentioned previously. The cog-
nitive analysis of trust is fundamental in the distinction between internal and external
attribution, which predicts different strategies for building trust. Internal attribution con-
cerns the characteristics of willingness, persistence, engagement and competence, while
external attribution involves the conditions of the environment, such as opportunities,
resources and interference.
Agent x must have two basic beliefs to trust agent y with core trust: competence
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belief and disposition belief. Competence belief is a positive evaluation of agent y ’s
usefulness in producing the expected result. Disposition belief occurs when x believes
that y will do the task that is required. In addition, for core trust and reliance to exist,
agent x must have the dependence belief, necessary for x to rely on y to do a task, out
of lack of alternatives or as the more advantageous option in comparison to not relying
on y . Supported by the previous beliefs, the fulfilment belief arises, which drives agent
x to think that the goal will be pursued and achieved.
Delegation, the last element of trust, can occur in two ways: weak and strong
delegation. In weak delegation, there is no agreement and no bilateral awareness of the
delegation, while in strong delegation, the trustee y is aware of the intention of the
truster x to exploit its action. The following three beliefs apply in weak delegation,
in addition to the other beliefs previously mentioned. The willingness belief models
y ’s mind in its intention to work towards a certain goal, while the persistence belief
occurs where x believes that y is serious in its intention of doing a task. With the
self-confidence belief, y knows that it can do the task. Strong delegation requires an
additional belief, the motivation belief, when x believes that y has some motives to help
adopt its goal.
Castelfranchi and Falcone present the concept of reciprocal trust [24], which
is a mutual understanding and communication between two agents that they will help
each other, at different points in time. They claim that the reciprocal trust is different
to bilateral trust, which occurs between two agents at the same time, but the agents
are not explicitly aware of this. They argue that the opposite is also true: agent x ’s
distrust in agent y induces distrust in y towards x . Another concept touched upon
is that of the diffusion of trust. The authors suggest that the trust agent x has in
agent y can influence agent z to trust y . The mechanisms suggested for this diffusion
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are pseudo-transitivity and conformism. Pseudo-transitivity depends on the cognitive
conditions that are present and diffusion of trust will most likely occur if the agent
whose trust decisions are followed is a figure of authority in the domain. Conformism,
on the other hand, is not based on any special expertise and is based on copying another
agent’s actions or decisions. In their socio-cognitive model, the authors do not make
any reference to the possibility of having dishonest agents or collusion in the system.
An overall framework of trust using the various concepts introduced has also not been
fully defined.
2.5.2 Marsh’s Formalism
In the trust model proposed by Marsh [81], trust is viewed as three different aspects,
as a result of direct interactions with other agents:
• Basic trust is derived from all the past experiences of an agent. It represents the
trusting disposition of the agent itself. The basic trust of an agent x is denoted
as Tx . This value is in the range [−1, 1), that is, −1 ≤ Tx < +1, where good
experiences increase the disposition of the agent to trust. A value of +1 is not
allowed as it implies blind trust, where an agent gives trust without hesitation,
and this behaviour is not part of the trusting behaviour in the formalism [82].
• General trust is the trust an agent has in another agent, irrespective of the situation
in which they are found. This is denoted as Tx (y) and the range of general trust
values is [−1, 1), that is, −1 ≤ Tx (y) < +1, where −1 is negative trust or
complete distrust and +1 is complete trust, while 0 means no trust.
• Situational trust is the amount of trust an agent has in another agent in a specific
situation. Thus, the notation for ‘x trusts y in situation α’ is Tx (y , α). The
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importance and utility of the situation, together with the general trust value, all
determine the situational trust value, which is also in the interval [−1, 1).
The understanding of trust and the trust values obtained allows agents to make
more informed decisions about which agents are trustworthy and who to cooperate
with. Thus, the competence of the potential interaction partner is assessed based on
the situation, its importance, and the risk involved. The basic formula to calculate
situational trust is:
Tx (y , α)
t = Ux (α)
t × Ix (α)t × ̂Tx (y)t (2.1)
where Ux (α)
t represents the utility x gains from the situation α; Ix (α)
t is the importance
of the situation α for agent x and ̂Tx (y)t is an estimate of the general trust after taking
into account all the relevant data with respect to situational trust in past interactions.
In order to calculate this estimate, the author proposes three statistical methods: the
mean, the maximum and the minimum. These are translated into realism, optimism
and pessimism respectively.
These notions of agent dispositions [81, 82] give an indication of how agents
will act in a given situation. Along a continuum, agents can range from optimists to
pessimists. Optimists are those agents who look for the best in those with whom they
interact, they are forgiving and their trust in another does not decrease by much, even
after being exploited by another agent. On the other extreme, pessimists see the worst
in the agents they interact with and are always in doubt of the resulting situation.
Even a small exploitation will result in drastic loss in trust, while continued cooperative
behaviour will not greatly increase trust. In between these two extremes lie the realists,
acting as a control point in studying the agent behaviours.
The formalism proposed also takes into account the notion of reciprocation,
where favours are returned to those who offered them. Reciprocation is used to modify
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trust; if an agent y helps another agent x , x ’s trust in y is likely to increase, while if y
defects, x ’s trust in y is likely to decrease.
Marsh’s formalism does not model reputation and thus does not consider third
party recommendations in the evaluation of an agent’s trustworthiness. This may limit
the amount of information for trust evaluation in cases where there is insufficient or no
direct interactions with the agents of interest. The formalism does not support the trust
evaluation of new entrants who have have not interacted before.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [2] consider the notions of risk and competence to be
abstract and thus difficult to represent as numbers, especially continuous values. They
also observe that Marsh’s model incorporates a large number of variables, considered
make the model large and complex. However, we believe that the use of environmental
variables in the model allows the expression of the reasoning behind the trust computa-
tion, and helps to preserve the separate elements that make up the trust calculation.
2.5.3 Ntropi
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1, 2] propose a trust and reputation model, which is appli-
cable to virtual communities. It is a numerical model with degrees of trust and is based
on social characteristics and reputation. Both direct experiences and recommendations
are used to form a trust opinion. Many properties of social trust are supported,
• Context dependence is similar to Marsh’s use of context in situational trust.
• Positive and negative degrees of belief are supported through a four-value scale.
• Prior experiences are taken into account so that agents can identify similar expe-
riences.
• Reputational information is exchanged among agents through recommendations.
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• Non-transitivity of trust is considered and all the evaluations of recommendations
take into account their source.
• Subjectivity of trust represents the varying perceptions of different observers with
regard to the same agent’s trustworthiness.
• Dynamism allows the level of trust in another agent to increase or decrease, ac-
cording to the experiences and recommendations obtained by the trusting agent.
• Support for Interpersonal Trust is the direct and contextual trust an agent has for
another agent.
The term ‘belief’ is used in a different sense to that of Castelfranchi [12].
The model deals with beliefs about trustworthiness, without considering risk, utility,
and beliefs about motivation. Here, the belief that an agent is trustworthy in giving
a recommendation is taken into account. Four degrees of direct trust are used: ‘Very
Trustworthy’, ‘Trustworthy’, ‘Untrustworthy’, ‘Very Untrustworthy’. A similar rating is
used for experience adjustments: ‘Very Good’, ‘Good’, ‘Bad’, ‘Very Bad’. Evaluations of
direct trust, recommender trust, semantic distance and the update of experiences con-
tribute to computing the final trust degree. An agent x may perceive its trustworthiness
in another agent differently from an agent y ’s recommendation. Agent x can adjust y ’s
recommendations in the future to close the distance between their respective opinions.
The model is thus intended to obtain trust on the information given by witnesses. Direct
experiences are used for comparison and adjustment [108].
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes recognise that the model is not recommended for
agents without any prior experience nor trusted witnesses. This is due to the high
level of uncertainty faced by new entrants who do not know whom to trust or distrust
and they can thus become the victims of malevolent agents. With this bootstrapping
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limitation, the model also does not address the situations when agents lie or collude. It
is also not possible to differentiate between truthful and lying agents on the basis that
they have different reasoning mechanisms [108]. In addition, the authors concede that
some aspects of their models, notably the trust degrees and the weightings used, are
ad hoc in nature and do not represent these metrics concretely. Although the model is
described as supporting context dependence of trust, this is not clearly described by the
authors.
2.5.4 ReGreT
The ReGreT system proposed by Sabater and Sierra [104, 105, 106] is a trust and
reputation mechanism based on three dimensions of reputation.
• The individual dimension models the direct interactions between two agents. It is
considered to be the most reliable dimension of reputation. From an interaction
between two agents, the outcome consists of an initial contract of a course of
action and the result of the actions taken, and of an initial contract to fix terms
and conditions of the transaction and the values of these terms. When calculating
an outcome reputation, a weighted mean of the outcomes is used while giving
more relevance to more recent outcomes.
• The social dimension looks at indirect interactions, especially when information
from direct interactions is not available. Three types of social reputation are used
in the ReGreT system.
– Witness reputation is based on information gathered from other agents who
have interacted with the agent of interest. There is the risk of false infor-
mation being provided in this case.
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– Neighbourhood reputation considers links that are created through interac-
tions, as the behaviour of neighbours can give some indication about the
possible behaviour of the target agent.
– System reputation makes use of common knowledge about the role played
by the target agent in society.
• The ontological dimension models a combination of reputational aspects relevant
to a particular situation. The properties give more information into the reasons
why an agent’s reputation is high or low. For example, the calculation of reputation
using the ontological dimension can consider two dimensions: the reputation of
an agent in delivering late, as well as that in over-pricing.
ReGreT also contains a credibility module to evaluate the truthfulness of infor-
mation received from third party agents. It also makes use of social network analysis
to improve knowledge of the surrounding society, especially in the absence of direct
experiences. Social network analysis is described by Scott [112] as having emerged as
a set of methods for the analysis of social structures, methods that specifically allow
an investigation of the relational aspects of these structures. Moreover, the ReGreT
system provides a degree of reliability for the trust, reputation and credibility values,
that helps an agent to decide whether it is sensible or not to use them in its decision
making process.
This model is based on the group to which an agent belongs. In looking at agent
groups, the model implies that information comes from trustful agents, who would not
deliberately manipulate information. However, the model does not consider agents that
can belong to more than one group at a time, where there may be potential issues of
conflict of group association and competition.
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The authors also do not specifically mention how to bootstrap the model and
how to deal with new agents who have never interacted before. The ReGreT system
makes use of up to three dimensions in calculating the reputation of agents. However,
the authors do not specify how the different reputation evaluations from the different
dimensions can be used together.
2.5.5 Mui et al.
The model proposed by Mui et al. [89] has four main characteristics. Firstly, the
difference between trust and reputation is explicitly made. Secondly, reputation is a
quantity relative to the particular social network of the evaluating agent and its encounter
history. Thus, reputation is defined as a “perception that an agent creates through past
actions about its intentions and norms”. The next characteristic concerns trust, defined
as “a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s future behaviour based on the
history of their encounters”, which can be inferred from the reputation of the trustee.
Lastly, a probabilistic mechanism is proposed for inference among trust, reputation and
the level of reciprocity, to identify a threshold for the number of encounters needed by
an agent to achieve a reliable measure of another agent’s trustworthiness.
Reciprocity is closely linked to trust and reputation. An increase in reputation
expects an increase in trust. An increase in trust in turn expects an increase in recipro-
cation, and an increase in reciprocation expects an increase in reputation. The model
handles the case of when two agents have no previous encounters by introducing an
ignorance assumption called the Complete Stranger Prior Assumption.
The model only addresses encounters involving two agents. Other choices made
in the model include the assumption that the environment in which agents evolve is
static, where no new agents join or leave. Moreover, the binary actions of cooperation
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or defection restrict the action space of the agents.
2.5.6 SPORAS and HISTOS
Zacharia et al. [142, 143] believe that online communities have specific problems which
must be addressed by reputation mechanisms for these domains. In online communities,
it is relatively easy for agents to change their identity.
SPORAS is a reputation mechanism for loosely connected online communities.
In this system the trusting agent bases its opinion of the reputation of its interaction
partner on the feedback the latter gives on the trustworthiness of their latest transaction.
Only the most recent ratings are stored for agents who have repeated interactions. A
new user will have the minimum reputation which is gradually built up as it interacts
with others. However unreliable an agent may be, its reputation value will nevertheless
be higher than that of a new agent. With this strategy, a user is always worse off when
it switches identities.
While SPORAS provides a global reputation value to each agent in the online
community, HISTOS is a more sophisticated approach, which takes into consideration
information about an agent’s peers when available. Agents in this system rely more on
recommendations given by agents they trust than those given by agents they have never
interacted with previously. HISTOS builds a social network from the pairwise ratings
it has previously obtained. This is represented as a directed graph with the nodes
representing the agents and the weighted edges representing the most recent reputation
rating given by one agent to another. The transitive trust relationships are thus applied
where there are directed paths between two agents.
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2.5.7 MDT-R
MDT-R [36] is a mechanism for multidimensional trust and recommendations. Agents
model the trustworthiness of others according to various criteria, such as cost, timeliness
or success, depending on which criteria the agent considers important. Agents use
their own direct experience of interacting with others, as well as recommendations.
Distinguishing trust and recommendations for individual characteristics is valuable in
identifying the service characteristics in which the providing agents perform well, or less
well. Trust information in multiple dimensions helps to maintain the original interaction
data. Trust values are represented numerically in this approach due to the benefits of
accuracy and the ease of comparisons and update of values. However, MDT-R stratifies
trust into levels (similar to Ntropi) for ease of comparison. The sharing of information
among agents often suffers from subjectivity, due to differences in interpretation. MDT-
R deals with this by sharing summaries of relevant past interactions, instead of explicit
values for trust.
2.5.8 FIRE
Huynh et al. [46] propose FIRE, a trust and reputation model that integrates many
different information sources to produce a comprehensive assessment of an agent’s likely
performance. FIRE is designed for open multi-agent systems, where agents can be
owned by several stakeholders and can join and leave the system at any time. The other
characteristics of agents in open MAS include the assumption that they are potentially
unreliable and self-interested. The agents also know a limited amount about their
environment and there is no central authority that controls all the agents. Due to the
incomplete knowledge about their environment and other agents, trust can facilitate the
interactions between agents.
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In order to meet the requirements of open MAS, the authors believe that a trust
model should possess the following properties.
• The model should take into account a variety of sources of trust information so
that the trust measure can be more precise and cater for cases when not all sources
are available.
• Every agent should be able to evaluate trust for itself.
• The model should be robust against possible lying agents.
FIRE makes use of four different types of trust and reputation sources: interac-
tion trust, role-based trust, witness reputation and certified reputation. These various
sources are important in the model as they ensure a combination of available information
sources and that a trust measure is obtained whenever it is needed for interaction.
Interaction trust models the trust that occurs as a result of direct interactions
between two agents. The individual dimension of the ReGreT system [106] is adopted
as it meets all the requirements for handling direct experiences. Role-based trust models
the role-based relationships between two agents and rules are used to assign values to
this particular type of trust. One benefit of using rules is that users can add new rules
to customise their applications. The witness reputation of an agent x is built on the
observations of its behaviour by other agents, acting as witnesses. For an agent y to
evaluate the witness reputation of agent x , y must find witnesses that have interacted
with x . Agents keep a list of acquaintances and query a number of them when a query
needs to be made. If the acquaintances cannot answer, they will send referrals pointing
to other agents they think will know the answer. The last kind of information source is
certified reputation, where ratings are presented by the rated agent about itself which
have been obtained from its partners in previous interactions. An agent is allowed to
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choose which ratings to show and because rational agents will always present their best
ratings, it should be assumed that certified reputation information is an over-estimate
of the agent’s actual performance. This type of information source is valuable due to
its high availability, and can hence be used even when the other three sources cannot
provide a trust measure.
The four trust and reputation measures are combined to generate a single com-
posite value, representing an overall picture of an agent’s likely performance. Using
the weighted mean method, a composite trust value and its reliability are calculated.
Through empirical evaluation, the authors show how FIRE helps agents to select more
reliable partners for interaction. In a simulated open MAS, FIRE helps agents to obtain
better utility and to quickly adapt to a changing environment while maintaining a high
performance.
FIRE, however assumes that agents report their trust and reputation information
truthfully, thus the model does not yet deal with lying agents. This model is deemed to
be ad hoc due to the hand-crafted formulae used to calculate trust [125]. Even though
the model differentiates between the concepts of trust and reputation, it is unclear how
the different trust and reputation measures are updated in the light of new information
obtained.
2.5.9 TRAVOS
The Trust and Reputation model for Agent-based Virtual OrganisationS (TRAVOS) [125]
models an agent’s trust in an interaction partner. The model uses probability theory to
calculate trust from information about the past interactions between agents. In addi-
tion, the model makes use of reputation information from third parties when the lack
of personal experience makes direct interaction information unavailable. Dealing with
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third party information has the risk of inaccuracy and the model handles this aspect.
The model aims to meet the following three requirements.
• A trust metric should be provided to represent the level of trust in an agent, both
in the presence or absence of personal experience. It will also be used to compare
the trustworthiness of different agents.
• An agent’s confidence in its level of trust in another agent should be reflected in
the model.
• The model should be able to cope with inaccurate information from other agents,
by discounting those opinions in the calculation of reputation.
For any two interacting agents, a history of interactions is recorded as the number
of successful and unsuccessful interactions. From this, the variable Batr ,ate is obtained,
which is the probability that the trustee ate will fulfil its obligations during an interaction
with the truster atr . Thus, using the history of past interactions, the expected value
of Batr ,ate at a particular time t is calculated using a probability distribution, and is
defined as τatr ,ate . If the truster has a low confidence level in its assessment of the
trustworthiness of a partner, it can seek the opinions of third party agents. Reputation
is modelled as a combination of the true and reported opinions of a source aop about a
trustee ate . The authors claim that two conditions must hold for the trust and confidence
levels from third party observations to be the same as it would be if all observations had
been observed by the truster itself. The first condition states that the behaviour of the
trustee must be independent of the identity of the truster with which it is interacting.
Secondly, the reputation provider must report its observations accurately and truthfully.
However, in a range of situations, these conditions cannot be expected to hold.
When either of the two conditions is broken, inaccurate reputation reports are
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obtained, due to malicious agents or inconsistent behaviour towards different agents.
In the literature, endogenous and exogenous techniques [51] have been used to assess
the reliability of reports. Endogenous methods attempt to identify unreliable reputa-
tion information by considering the statistical properties of the reported opinions alone.
Exogenous methods rely on other information to make a judgement, for example using
the reputation of the source or its relationship with the trustee. TRAVOS proposes an
exogenous method to filter out inaccurate reputation, where a witness is judged on the
perceived accuracy of its past opinions. In the first step, the probability that a witness
will provide an accurate opinion is calculated, given its past opinions and later observed
interactions with the trustees for which opinions were given. Secondly, based on this
value, the distance is reduced between a witness’ opinion and the prior belief that all the
possible values for an agent’s behaviour are equally probable. In having all the opinions
adjusted in this way, the witness’ influence on a truster’s assessment of a trustee is
reduced.
Empirical experiments demonstrate that TRAVOS allows reputation to signifi-
cantly improve performance despite the negative effects of inaccurate opinions. However,
the model assumes that the behaviour of agents does not change over time, but in many
cases this is not a suitable assumption. The representation of the interaction ratings is
considered to be oversimplified and too limited for this model to be suitable for a wide
variety of applications in open MAS [47].
The model makes use of a truster atr ’s estimate that a trustee ate will fulfil
its obligations and the confidence atr has in this value. The authors calculate the
confidence metric as the proportion of the probability distribution for the trust metric
that lies within the bounds of an error value estimate , that is, between (τatr ,ate − )
and (τatr ,ate + ). It is, however, unclear how this error  is determined and what is
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considered to be an acceptable error margin.
Third party recommendations are obtained from those agents who have directly
interacted with the agent of interest. TRAVOS does not consider indirect recommen-
dations where an agent obtains the opinion of another agent, who has obtained it from
some other agent. This source of information can be useful when not enough information
is obtained from agents who have directly interacted with the target agents.
2.5.10 Walter et al.
Walter et al. [130] propose a recommendation system on a social network, based on
trust. In their model, agents use their social network to gather information and they
use trust relationships to filter the information they require. Agents get recommenda-
tions from neighbours, which are agents directly or indirectly connected in the network.
Neighbours pass on queries to their own neighbours when they cannot provide a recom-
mendation themselves. Agents use trust in their decision making, to choose the most
appropriate recommendation from a set of recommendations obtained from a query.
Agents are connected in a social network and each agent is linked to a set of
neighbours. For example, a group of people recommending books form such a network.
Objects are the subject of recommendations and in the example, books are objects.
Objects can belong to one or more categories, for instance, books can be in the categories
’Computer Science’ or ’History’. Agents are also associated with a preference profile,
which maps a rating to an object. Trust relationships exist among agents when they
keep trust values of their neighbours. The model considers that trust is transitive
and trust propagates along a path in the network, with the appropriate discounting.
The trust value along a path is thus the product of the trust values of the links on
that path. When an agent makes a query, it receives a set of responses back from its
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neighbours. The agent must then choose the best recommendation for its purposes from
the set. The trust values provide a ranking of the recommendations and the selection
mechanism chosen in the model is random selection among all the recommendations.
The higher the trust of recommendations along a path, the higher its probability of
being chosen. Once the recommendation is chosen and an interaction occurs as a result
of this recommendation, the agent feeds the experience back into the trust relationship
with the recommender.
The authors claim that the system self-organises in a state with performance
near to optimum when the model is used. Despite the fact that agents only consider
their own utility function and without explicit coordination, long paths of high trust
develop in the network, allowing agents to rely on recommendations from agents with
similar preferences, even when these are far away in the network.
2.5.11 L.I.A.R.
Muller and Vercouter [90, 91] present L.I.A.R., a model of social control for agents con-
sists of several components. The model ensures the reliability of agent communications,
as well as provides a framework allowing agents to detect lies and update their decen-
tralised reputation values accordingly. A lie is defined as a wrong behaviour, whereby a
query is incorrectly answered, for the benefit of one party and at the expense of another.
One component models the agent interactions, while a model of norms defines which
interactions are acceptable. L.I.A.R. uses a model of reputation to assess the behaviour
of other agents and then enables agents to reason about trusting other agents or not,
and to apply sanctions. A sanction is normally associated to the violation of such a norm
in order to penalise the agents that do not respect it. However, due to the decentralised
nature of the systems under consideration, there is no central institution that applies the
45
sanctions to the violators of the rules-norms (which are norms that must be respected
by every agent in the system). The sanction can nevertheless be executed by the other
agents in the system through a local increase or decrease of the reputation value of the
violator.
The reputation model aims to estimate the compliance of other agents’ behaviour
with respect to the social norms. The model identifies seven roles that agents can play
and different types of reputations based on these roles. These seven roles are target:
the agent being judged; beneficiary: an agent that reasons and decides based on the
reputation levels; observer: an agent that observes a message and interprets it as a social
commitment; evaluator: an agent that generates social policies from social commitments
and norms; punisher: an agent that computes reputational levels from a set of social
policies; propagator: an agent that sends recommendations — messages about observes
messages, social policies or reputational levels; and participant: an agent that interacts
with the target. The L.I.A.R. model evaluates the reputation of agents with the detection
of fraud as a first step.
The L.I.A.R. model uses direct interactions, as well as direct and indirect recom-
mendations as trust information sources. Direct interactions include messages from the
target agent to the evaluator, and observations by the evaluator. Recommendations are
based on observed messages, social policies and reputation levels shared among agents.
Five kinds of reputations are defined, whose reputation values are ordered from most
reliable to least reliable:
Direct Interaction based Reputation is based on direct experiences between the ben-
eficiary and the target.
Indirect Interaction based Reputation is built from messages observed by the bene-
ficiary.
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Evaluation Recommendation based Reputation is built from social policies propa-
gated to the beneficiary by a propagator.
Reputation Recommendation based Reputation is built from reputational levels prop-
agated to the beneficiary by a propagator.
General Disposition to Trust represents the inclination of the beneficiary to trust an-
other agent if it does not have any information about its honesty.
The separation of reputation values is maintained as they represent different
points of view of agents about others and they are not all used in every situation.
This differentiates from the models [46, 70, 104] where different types of trust are
eventually merged into a single value for decision making. The reasoning process includes
a cascading process that works with thresholding and the ordering of reputations as
described previously.
2.5.12 Yu and Singh’s Referral System
The proposed approach to evaluate the trustworthiness of agents is based on referral
networks [139, 140]. The model represents trust as both the cognitive and the mathe-
matical views. The cognitive view considers trust as a function of the underlying beliefs.
Meanwhile, the mathematical view uses a metric to model the subjective probability
with which an agent will perform a particular action, without taking the beliefs into
account. Agents use their prior interactions as well as recommendations from witnesses.
The reputation management model, based on the Dempster-Shafer theory [115], as-
signs no reputation to an agent about which no information is available. Thus, there is
no causal relationship between a hypothesis and its negation, for instance, lack of belief
does not imply disbelief. Agents model their acquaintances and neighbours (subset of
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acquaintances, with whom the agents are in contact) as part of their referral network,
and this includes the agents’ abilities to be trustworthy (expertise) and to recommend
other trustworthy agents (sociability).
Agents propagate their direct interaction experiences with other agents, not their
combined opinion from direct interactions and recommendations. Agents propagate
opinions along a referral chain until a rating is obtained or the depth limit is reached.
Shorter referral chains are more likely to be successful and accurate [55].
The issue of deceptive agents is presented in [141], where the approach allows
agents to efficiently detect deceptive agents by using a weighted majority based tech-
nique to model the belief function (the sum of the beliefs committed to the possibilities
in the subset of propositions under consideration) and their aggregation. The weighted
majority algorithm (WMA) is used to improve the predictions based on a set of wit-
nesses. Weights are first assigned to the witnesses and a prediction is made based on
a weighted sum of the ratings provided. Then, the weights are tuned after an unsuc-
cessful prediction so that the relative weight of the accurate witnesses increases while
that of the inaccurate witnesses decreases. This algorithm is adapted to predict the
trustworthiness of an agent based on the opinions of witnesses. A variant of WMA is
WMA Continuous (WMC) that deals with predictions that are not scalar, as is the case
with belief functions, which are mapped to probabilities. Agents can make accurate
predictions despite the presence of lying witnesses due to the weights of different wit-
nesses being adjusted, such that the opinions of lying witnesses have less effect on the
aggregation of recommendations.
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2.5.13 Other Models
We now briefly overview some of the other trust models in the literature, which however
do not match our selection criteria closely enough to be discussed in detail.
Socially-Inspired Reputation (SIR) Mezzetti [83] proposes a reputation model,
where an agent, having authority in a particular context or situation, can be trusted in
providing reliable recommendations (direct and indirect) about other agents within that
context. SIR uses attributes to express the relevant properties in that context. Only the
more recent information are used by incorporating a decay rate for the trust degrees,
with the rate varying depending on the level of risk associated with the context. The
social reputation model updates trust and reputation values dynamically as a result of
the interaction outcomes.
TrustNet Schillo et al. [111] present a trust evaluation mechanism that allows agents
to cope in environments where both selfish and cooperative agents evolve. The approach
makes use of information from direct interactions, as well as from third party observa-
tions. In relying on recommendations, there is the possibility of noise in the information
obtained, due to lying and biased agents. TrustNet deals with unreliable witnesses by
using an estimation of how often witnesses have lied.
Braynov and Sandholm This approach [8] targets the non-enforceable contracts be-
tween a buyer agent and a seller agent. It shows that the seller should precisely estimate
the trustworthiness of the buyer in order to maximise its gains. An underestimation
leads to insufficient allocation of resources and thus causes losses to both agents. To
solve this problem, the buyer should reveal its actual level of trustworthiness to the seller
and untrusted buyers can make advance payments to the seller.
49
Wu and Sun A computational approach [137] is proposed to explore the emergence
of trust between agents in a multi-agent bidding setting. A seller can use four strategies
(Random, Nice, Tit-for-Tat and Nasty) to reflect the adopted behaviour. Interactions
in a friendly climate — where sellers use the Nice strategy — do not necessarily ensure
cooperation. Cooperation is considered between self-interested parties, who are most
concerned with their own utility. However, there is potential loss of utility early in the
interaction period, for example, when agents need to give away some resources [99].
Witkowski et al. This approach [134, 135] focuses on the agents’ direct experiences
for obtaining trust information. A trading scenario is used for evaluation, and the trust
calculation is simplified through measurable quantities of bandwidth allocation and use
for consumer and supplier agents. Agents tend to form strong partnerships rapidly and
these become more important as the demand and supply for the commodity become
mismatched. As demand exceeds supply, only the more successful partnerships are
sustained, whereas when the demand increases to exceed supply, supplier agents discard
less trusted customers first.
Sen and Dutta A probabilistic reciprocal mechanism [113, 114] is proposed to gener-
ate cooperative behaviour among self-interested agents. Reciprocity involves a predictive
mechanism, such that an agent who helps another agent will expect to get benefit from
the latter in the future. The reciprocative agent balances costs and savings for cooper-
ation decision. It can adapt to the environment and improve its individual performance
in the long run, as compared to a selfish agent.
Griffiths and Luck The approach [39] considers an extension to a Belief-Desire-
Intention (BDI) agent architecture, particularly to enhance plan selection. BDI agents
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are based around their beliefs, about themselves and others, their desires of what they
want to achieve, and their intentions, made up of actions, and subgoals are represented
as adopted plans. Plan selection involves choosing the plan that is most likely to succeed
in terms of the least cost in time, resources and risk. As risk increases when other agents
are involved in an agent’s plans, the latter needs to consider the following factors to
compare plans: the likely cost of a plan, the likelihood of finding the agents to execute
the plan, the likelihood of their cooperation, and once committed that they will actually
fulfil their commitments.
2.5.14 Synthesis on Views of Trust and Reputation Models
The trust and reputation models discussed all attempt to provide solutions to accurately
represent these notions in cooperation among agents. Nevertheless, they are limited and
deal with only some of the important considerations necessary when looking at open
and distributed multi-agent systems.
2.5.14.1 Socio-cognitive Models
The models based on the cognitive and social nature of trust among agents detail the
important aspects to consider, such as competence, willingness and motivation of the
agent in trust-building. However, they do not explicitly define how these aspects are to
be represented and used. Moreover, neither model reviewed [12, 83] models dishonest
agents and ways to deal with lying or collusion.
2.5.14.2 Numerical Models
Numerical models allow trust and reputation to be explicitly represented as values,
which can be used for further analysis and decision making. However, one concern is
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that some models tend to over-simplify those notions, and the important considerations
in obtaining those values tend to be blurred and are no longer readily available once
the trust value has been calculated. The values used in certain calculations also tend
to be ad hoc in nature and there is not full justification for the choice of calculation
method. Furthermore, with information being increasingly shared among agents, the
trust values and their meanings can prove to be an obstacle in the efficient propagation
of trust and reputation for other agents to use. While a particular number and formula
can be perfectly satisfactory for an agent’s sole use, their value on sharing can be very
much reduced.
2.5.14.3 Reputational Models
Most reputational models have used reputation as the complement of trust. In doing
so, they have reinforced the information from direct interaction with information form
third-party agents. Models that do not make use of indirect recommendations lack the
ability to obtain information about the trustworthiness of another agent when direct
recommendations and direct interactions are rare. Moreover, many reputational models
do not handle lying and dishonest agents or differentiate between mistakes in opinion
and malevolent behaviour.
2.6 Social Networks
In Section 2.1, we introduced the need to investigate how agents represent their social
network, with the aim to further analyse agent interactions. The search for relevant
information involves finding the right sources, for example, the agents who have the
desired information or expertise. The social network is important in discovering those
relevant information sources. An agent is only aware of a portion of the social network to
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which it belongs [56]. Additionally, due to issues such as privacy, agents will not list their
social relationships on a central repository. Agents can, however, gather this information
through distributed searches through referrals. Referrals are important for information
flow. Studies of the phenomenon of word-of-mouth found referrals to be very effective in
communicating product information among consumers and influencing their purchasing
choices [10]. Further evidence that referrals are effective in searching large social
networks has been demonstrated, for instance, by Milgram [84, 126], leading to the
concept of Six Degrees of Separation. Milgram examined the social connectivity among
people and his study involved asking participants to send a packet to a given individual
with some information about the person. The participants had to send the packet
through individuals they knew by their first name, hence the participants had to choose
the most likely intermediary in the chain. Milgram concluded that the individuals within
the study were separated by an average of six intermediaries, or six degrees of separation.
Milgram’s work was one of the first in academic research on the small world theory,
which suggests that any pair of entities in a seemingly vast random network can actually
connect in a predictable way through relatively short paths of mutual acquaintances [34].
The classic finding of six degrees of separation has been more recently confirmed by
Leskovec and Horvitz [64], who studied anonymised data capturing a month of high-
level communications activities within the entire Microsoft Messenger instant-messaging
system. They found that the shortest path length is 6.6.
2.6.1 Link Prediction
The high dynamism of social networks suggests the addition of new interactions and
deletion of old ones in the underlying social structure representation, thus making the
understanding of the mechanisms of evolution of social networks important. Liben-
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Nowell and Kleinberg [68] studied link prediction as a basic computational problem
underlying social network evolution. They described the problem as involving the accu-
rate prediction of the edges that will be added to the network, during the interval from
a time t to a given future time t ′. They researched the extent to which the evolution of
a social network can be modelled using features intrinsic to the network itself. The link
prediction problem is also relevant to the company environment, where the company
can benefit from the interactions occurring within the informal social network among its
members. These interactions serve to supplement the official hierarchy imposed by the
organisation [56, 98]. We view the link prediction problem to have parallels with the
discovery of information about an agent’s environment through the agents’ local views,
which can be overlapped to some extent to give a wider perspective of the other agents
in the system, their transactions and social links.
2.6.2 Trust Models using Social Networks
Several of the existing trust models use the notion of an agent neighbourhood, the more
relevant ones being ReGreT [104, 106] and FIRE [47]. The neighbourhood of an agent
refers to the links that it creates through interactions with other agents, rather than their
physical location. From neighbourhood reputation, the evaluator makes a judgement
about a target agent from the behaviour of the other agents to which it is associated.
In ReGreT, the neighbourhood of an agent is assumed to be a group of agents with
some common knowledge and neighbourhood reputation represents the behaviour of
the whole group. However, the way in which the agent builds up its neighbourhood is
not specified in ReGreT. The notion of neighbourhood is used by FIRE in its witness
reputation module for searching for relevant witnesses. This is based on Yu and Singh’s
referral system [141], described in more detail below.
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2.6.2.1 Referral Systems for Multi-agents
Yu and Singh [141] present a referral system for agents that enables them to share
referrals for the location of relevant information. Finding relevant information involves
finding the right information sources, for instance, the people or agents to ask, who
have the desired information or expertise. The social network is important in discovering
those relevant sources. Due to issues such as privacy, agents will not list their social
relationships on a central repository. Agents can, however, gather this information
through distributed searches through referrals. Focussing on the dynamics of social
networks and their effects in information flow, Yu and Singh seek to efficiently search
social networks with the help of agents and their local knowledge. Each agent maintains
a personal social network and queries other agents for information and these agents
may respond with a reply or with referrals to others. An agent’s personal social network
models its acquaintances, the closest ones are known as neighbours. As it is only allowed
a small number of neighbours, the agent periodically reviews its acquaintances and may
promote or demote some of them. This process is based on the answers to queries and
the expertise of the referring agent.
2.7 Deception
As we introduced in Section 2.1, the aim of this thesis is to support collusion detection.
In this section, we investigate deception in agent-based systems, as a more general form
of malicious behaviour. We look at the background work on collusion in more detail in
Section 2.8.
Whaley [133] defines deception as any attempt intended to distort another
person’s or group’s perception of reality, whether by words or actions. This differentiates
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it from misinformation and incomplete information. This definition also discards self-
deception, as the target of deception is seen as not oneself but always another. This
is depicted in a typology of perception, as shown in Figure 2.1. In particular, the
difference between deception and misrepresentation is similar to our view of agents
behaving maliciously compared to those who give an inaccurate opinion due to different
experience or unintentionally passing on incorrect information.
Perception
Misperception Pluperception
(acurately seen)
Other induced Self-induced
Deception
(deliberate)
Misrepresentation
(unintentional)
Illusion
(cannot see)
Self-deception
(can see but won’t)
(= delusion)
Figure 2.1: Typology of Perception [133].
Agents faced with deception are susceptible to a number of vulnerabilities. In
the following sections, we discuss some of these vulnerabilities in various domains of
agent-based systems. Collusion is another type of vulnerability, which we focus on later
in the chapter.
2.7.1 Strategic Oscillation in Behaviour
One characteristic of P2P networks is their dynamic nature and the high rate of peer
turnover when peers join and leave the application periodically. Reputation values gener-
ated are therefore from a small number of interactions, and the selection of peers based
on short-term reputations is not desirable. Therefore, reliable reputation values need to
be obtained, especially for unknown peers and newcomers. Malicious peers can exploit
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the short-term reputations to build a high reputation at the start and then periodically
fail to deliver the expected level of service. A variation of this behaviour is that of the
first time offender problem, or identity problem [102], where an agent only behaves
maliciously once it has built up a strong trust and reputation among other agents.
Swamynathan et al. [123] propose to augment a reputation system with proac-
tive reputations to make it less vulnerable to such strategic oscillation in behaviour.
Moreover, proactive requests are associated with first-hand observations, which are more
trustworthy and thus less vulnerable to false ratings and collusion. The approach is in-
tended to be integrated with a traditional global reputation system. The idea of proactive
reputation is to explicitly measure the reliability and trustworthiness of a target, by other
means than the passive evaluation that occurs after the target executes some task for
the evaluator. It aims to blend proactive requests with regular traffic to analyse the
target’s normal response. For this approach to be feasible, transactions must have a low
cost so that they do not create significant overhead, and they must also carry a uniform
value, to enable proactive transactions to have a similar priority to a typical transac-
tion. Additionally, the transactions need to be verifiable to test whether the transaction
was performed properly. Proactive reputation systems face the challenge of ensuring
that the proactive requests are indistinguishable from normal application requests and
that the originator of the requests remains anonymous. The authors investigated the
use of several similarity metrics that would allow a target to detect proactive requests
statistically, by observing and comparing the rate of messages against that of normal
traffic. These metrics include conditional entropy (measures the likelihood of predicting
the (N +1)th value given the last N values), relative entropy (a measure of dissimilarity
between two probability distributions), histogram similarity (includes metrics such as
weighted Euclidean distance and square distance). A distribution’s entropy is a measure
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of its randomness. Swamynathan et al. found that using histogram similarity performed
better than conditional entropy and relative entropy when two traffic streams as ob-
served by a target are compared: a normal request stream without proactive bursts and
the current request stream, which is possibly injected with proactive requests. Proactive
reputation also includes an anonymising scheme to provide sufficient cover for anony-
mous proactive requests. Changing the rate of anonymous transactions periodically and
randomising the number and rate of anonymous transactions appears to perform better
than a constant rate of anonymous transactions. The issue of determining how much
anonymity is required to evade detection remains. The way to integrate proactive repu-
tations with global reputations while avoiding collusion vulnerability is another issue to
be tackled.
2.7.2 False Ratings and Lies
We consider agents which give false ratings deliberately about other agents to behave
maliciously. For instance, if an agent is asked to provide a recommendation about an-
other, giving a higher or lower opinion than in reality would fall into this category of
deceptive behaviour. Excusable failures [120] are thus not the type of issue consid-
ered here, as these result from wrongly diminishing the trust in an agent, from bad
performance, rather than from deliberate malicious behaviour.
Agents can have numerous reasons to give false ratings. For example, if a
provider is good, an agent might want to deter competing agents from being able to
get access to this provider by deliberately decreasing the trustworthiness of the provider
when sharing opinions. Another example is when an agent increases the profile of another
agent, even if that agent does not perform as well as it is being claimed.
Yu and Singh [140] look at the problem of deception in the propagation of
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recommendations. In their model of reputation management, agents can obtain refer-
rals to potential witnesses, from whom direct recommendations are retrieved. Direct
recommendations are used to avoid the problem of double counting of evidence, which
can lead to rumours in a decentralised system, where agents hold opinions about others
just from having heard them from others. Moreover, the authors propose a mechanism
of aggregation of recommendations to also avoid the effect of rumours. They consider
three kinds of deception: complementary, exaggerated positive and exaggerated nega-
tive. These are compared to a normal rating, where the rating given by a witness is the
same as the true rating of the target agent. The weighted majority algorithm (WMA)
is used to assign values of importance to the witnesses and make a prediction based on
the weighted sum of the ratings provided by them. After an unsuccessful prediction, the
weights are tuned to increase the relative weight of the successful witnesses, while de-
creasing that of unsuccessful ones. The reputation management framework used by Yu
and Singh is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, which takes into account
belief functions. To cater for these belief functions, a variation of the weighted majority
algorithm, called WMA Continuous (WMC) is used, which also allows predictions to
be within an interval, rather than binary values. The evaluating agent builds a graph
of referral chains produced from the evaluator’s queries, and deception is detected by
applying WMC to the witnesses found.
Lies have also been studied in agent-based systems by Muller and Vercouter [90,
91]. They define a lie as a wrong behaviour, whereby a query is incorrectly answered,
for the benefit of one party and at the expense of another. L.I.A.R., introduced in
Section 2.5.11, is a social control approach to agent interactions, composed of a so-
cial commitment model that enables agents to represent and reason about interactions
and models of social norms and social policies that allow agents to define and evaluate
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the acceptability of the interactions. The L.I.A.R. model includes a reputation model
that enables agents to apply sanctions to their peers. The reputation model ensures
the reliability of agent communications, and provides a framework that allows agents
to detect lies and update their decentralised reputation values accordingly. Fraud de-
tection consists of monitoring contract execution, whether the contracts are implicit or
not. Since there is no contract established for communications between agents, a norm
is introduced to define the accepted communicative behaviours, so that contradictory
situations which might have been caused by lies, can be detected. The communicative
behaviours of agents can be defined according to the states of their commitment stores,
which are sets of commitments.
In the lie detection process of the L.I.A.R. model, an agent x observes some
messages that violate the norm. In situations of contradiction where an agent y is
suspected of lying, the agent that observed the contradiction, x , executes the following
steps to confirm that a lie occurred:
1. x sends a message to y containing copies of the contradictory messages to state
that x suspects y of lying;
2. If it can do so, y sends a message to x that cancels the contradiction;
3. If the contradiction still holds, x considers y as a liar and can update its trust
model of y with this information.
Argumentation processes also apply to reach a consensus about a given fact,
arising from diverging opinions. In the model, an agent has a trust model about another
agent through reputation values. As described in Section 2.5.11, there are different
types of reputation, depending on the roles fulfilled by agents and seven roles have been
identified, relevant to the lie detection process.
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The L.I.A.R. model evaluates the reputation of agents with the detection of
fraud as a first step. A separation of reputation values is maintained as they represent
different points of view of agents about others and they are not all used in every situation.
This differentiates it from other models [46, 70, 104] where different types of trust are
eventually merged into a single value for decision making. The reasoning process includes
a cascading process that works with thresholding and the ordering of the five kinds of
reputations (described in Section 2.5.11).
2.7.3 Shilling
In e-commerce systems, sellers aim to sell their products on the marketplace and one
way to accomplish this is by producing and selling quality goods that buyers will regard
highly. However, unscrupulous sellers may opt for the more deceitful route and try to
influence recommender systems in such a way that their products are recommended
more often to buyers, even though they might not be of high quality. One way to
influence recommender systems is to arrange for a group of users to enter the system
and vouch for the intended items. The users thus become shills whose false opinions
are intended to mislead others [62]. Other related work focussed on shilling attacks in
online recommender systems includes that of Chirita et al. [14], who propose the use
of statistical metrics to detect patterns of shilling attacks.
2.7.4 Sybil Attacks
P2P systems often rely on redundancy to reduce their dependence on potentially hostile
peers. A Sybil attack is the forging of multiple identities by a small number of peers in
a P2P network to compromise a disproportionate share of the system, by exploiting the
use of redundancy [19]. In reputation systems, a user may strategically create sybils
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or identities, for the purpose of boosting its own reputation. One example is the link
spamming attack to PageRank [94], where a single user attempts to boost his reputation
by creating a large number of duplicate identities, who all recommend him [5, 20].
P2P systems are susceptible to Sybil attacks if distinct identities cannot be es-
tablished by an explicit certification authority, such as VeriSign1 or implicitly, such as the
CFS cooperative storage system [16], which identifies each node partly by a hash of its
IP address. Douceur [19] claims that in the absence of an identification authority, local
entities in large-scale distributed systems cannot practically validate the identities of all
the other entities to ensure that they are distinct. This is due to the fact that a local
entity can make this discrimination, using the assumption that an attacker has limited
resources. Subsequently, entities can issue resource-demanding challenges to validate
entities and entities can collectively pool the identities they have validated separately.
However, this approach requires three conditions to hold, which are not justifiable or
practically realisable in large-scale distributed systems: (i) all entities operate under
nearly identical resource constraints, (ii) all presented identities are validated simultane-
ously by all entities, coordinated across the system, and (iii) when the accepting entities
are not directly validated, the required number of vouching entities exceed the number
of system-wide failures.
Sybil attacks may also be addressed by developing attack-resistant algorithms,
such as in work by Dellarocas [18] and Kamvar et al. [54], or by increasing the cost of
acquiring identities [30]. These techniques could also be used to defend against shilling
attacks [61].
1http://www.verisign.com/
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2.8 Collusion and Its Detection
Collusion is defined as a collaborative activity of a subset of users that grants its members
benefits they would not be able to gain as individuals [66]. It is a complex problem that
has gained interest in many domains. We look at some of the work that has been done
towards solving collusion issues, including collusion detection, from both an economics
and an agent-based perspective.
2.8.1 Economics Perspective
From an economics perspective, collusion occurs among firms and the main characteris-
tics affecting collusive activity have been studied by Asch and Seneca [3]. Motta [88]
has also considered collusion in industrial economics, and specifies that there are two
elements which must exist for collusion to arise: (1) the participants must be able to
detect in a timely way that a deviation has occurred (e.g. a firm setting a lower price or
producing a higher output than the collusive levels agreed upon), and (2) there must be
a credible punishment, which might take the form of rivals producing much higher quan-
tities (or selling at much lower prices) in the periods after the deviation, thus decreasing
the profit of the deviator. Collusion therefore, can only be sustained if the firms meet
repeatedly in the marketplace. Otherwise, a punishment cannot take place. Collusion
will not normally arise in one-shot games, therefore collusion should be modelled though
dynamic (repeated) games. The identification of the main factors that facilitate collu-
sion is important for two main practical reasons. Firstly, it allows anti-trust authorities
to intervene and prevent explicit or tacit collusion whenever possible. Secondly, in cases
such as merger analysis, it is crucial to evaluate whether a particular industry is prone
to a collusive outcome or not. Thus, studying the industry and assessing whether there
are factors that are likely to lead to collusion are important requirements.
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In the following sections, we describe the factors that affect collusion, from both
the work of Asch and Seneca [3], and Motta [88].
2.8.1.1 Structural Factors
With few sellers, it is easier to achieve agreement on price, and also easier to police the
agreement, as cheating by one participant is revealed by a loss of sales by the others
(concentration factor [88]). Another factor is the presence of many non-expert buyers,
which makes it easier to escape detection as any one buyer can only deal with a few
sellers. Additionally, high entry barriers make it difficult to accommodate new entrants,
for instance, the prerequisite of few sellers is likely as it makes it easier to sustain a
cartel. Another factor is cross-ownership and links among competitors [88], where the
scope for collusion is enhanced if a firm has some form of participation in a competitor,
even without controlling it. For instance, with a representative sitting on the board
of directors of a competitor, it might be easier to coordinate pricing and marketing
policies. Even without representation on the board, there is less incentive for the two
firms to compete in the marketplace, as any profit or loss will affect both. Finally,
symmetry among firms [88], in dimensions such as market shares, variety of products,
and technological knowledge, is seen to facilitate collusion. This is explained by the fact
that a more equal distribution of assets relaxes the incentive constraints of small and
large firms and would help collusion.
2.8.1.2 Product Characteristics
For products where price is the most important aspect of competition, it is easier to
organise a cartel where there is limited scope for competition in quality, service, and
delivery. Moreover, intermediate products make it easier to sustain an agreement as
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buyers pass on increases in the cost of intermediate products in their own selling price.
Another characteristic takes the form of trade buyers, who use price signalling to inform
the trade in advance of price changes. The regularity and frequency of orders also give an
indication of collusion, with regular and high frequency orders facilitating collusion [88].
Regular orders ensure regular collusive profits, compared to an unusually large order,
while a high frequency of orders allows for a timely punishment in reaction to a deviation.
Buyer power [88] is a factor that affects the sustenance of collusive prices, which
depends on the concentration of buyers and their bargaining power. For instance, a
strong buyer can stimulate competition among sellers and by concentrating its orders
into large infrequent orders, it can also break collusion.
2.8.1.3 Demand Conditions
When the market demand price is inelastic, profits can be increased if the price can be
raised to the monopoly level by agreement. This condition, where the seller’s brands have
close substitutes results in price reductions by one seller, and may have retaliatory effects
on other competitors, eliminating any advantage. Thus, an agreement between sellers
may organise and sustain a cartel. If the demand is discontinuous or volatile, suppliers
are encouraged to share out business, in order to avoid bouts of severe price competition,
also leading to collusion. A closely related factor, demand evolution [88], can affect
collusion depending on the demand movements, especially if they are observable or not.
A stable demand might help to sustain collusion as it helps increase the observability of
the market.
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2.8.1.4 Cost Conditions
Similar technological and input costs can facilitate agreement among firms since price
differences are less explicable by differences in costs. Another factor is to incur fixed
costs on a high proportion of the total costs. If the demand is discontinuous, high fixed
costs increase the riskiness of price competition and hence increases the incentive to
collude. The stability of costs also facilitate the making, policing and sustaining of a
cartel agreement.
2.8.1.5 Organisational Conditions
Agreements are more easily reachable in a hierarchical organisation. It may also be
possible to have collusion due to local operations, when it may be easier for local man-
agement to organise local cartels without the knowledge of top management. Other
cooperative activities, such as the participation of industry-wide committees on stan-
dards and other technical matters, including market forecasting, may move to cartel
agreements. Another factor concerns the multi-market contacts [88], where the same
firms meet in more than one market, viewed as facilitating collusion. One example is the
evidence of airline fares being significantly higher on routes where there exist a number
of carriers that have contacts on several routes [23].
2.8.2 Agent-based Perspective
We view collusion as occurring in centralised and decentralised systems, and within each,
various solutions have been proposed to address collusion issues.
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2.8.2.1 Collusion in Centralised Systems
Centralised systems include centralised reputation systems, such as eBay2 and Amazon3,
where reputation values about individual agents are collected and managed by a central
system and every user in the system sees the same reputation value for another user.
In these centralised systems, members have a global view of the entire system and this
view is unique to all.
Jurca [52] proposes a method for designing incentive-compatible, collusion-
resistant payment mechanisms, by using several reference reports. The idea behind
deterring lying coalitions is to design incentive-compatible rewards that make honest
reporting the unique or at least the “best” equilibrium. Meanwhile, Lian et al. [66]
report on the analysis and measurement results of user collusion in Maze, a large-scale
P2P file-sharing system. Their aim is to observe user collusion in P2P networks that
use incentive policies to encourage cooperation among nodes. They search for colluding
behaviour by examining complete user logs and incrementally refine a set of collusion
detectors to identify common collusion patterns. They found collusion patterns that are
similar to those found in Web spamming.
Wang and Chiu [131, 132] propose to use social network analysis in online auc-
tion reputation systems to analyse the underlying structure of the accumulated reputa-
tion score and its corresponding transactional network. They demonstrate that network
structures formed by transactional histories can be used to expose underlying oppor-
tunistic collusive seller behaviours. Transaction logs and social relationship structures
are used to reconstruct the relationship profiles to supplement the lack of demographic
data in the online environment. In using social network analysis, there is a need to
2http://www.ebay.com
3http://www.amazon.com
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identify ill-intended users, who leave interaction footprints when forging their credibility
with additional information process resources and activities. Wang and Chiu have used
real world blacklist data, consisting of suspended fraudulent accounts collected from
the Yahoo Taiwan Inc. online auction site. However, they have found that the lack
of cooperation from online auction hosts is a limitation to data collection and predic-
tion capability as the hosts would have more detailed information to help verification of
information.
2.8.2.2 Collusion in Decentralised Systems
In decentralised systems, such as P2P systems, trust and reputation information for
members is collected and stored across the network by each individual member to help
in predicting their future interactions. Moreover, individual members do not have a
global view of the whole system.
TrustGuard [119] is a framework designed to provide a dependable and effi-
cient reputation system that focuses on the vulnerabilities of the reputation system to
malicious behaviour, including strategic oscillation of behaviour, shilling attacks, where
malicious nodes submit dishonest feedback and collude with one another to boost their
own ratings or bad-mouth non-malicious nodes, and fake transactions, which can lead to
fake feedback. The main goal of TrustGuard’s safeguard techniques is to maximise the
cost that the malicious nodes have to pay in order to gain advantage of the trust system.
The behaviour of non-malicious and malicious nodes is defined using game theory. The
problem of fake transactions is tackled through having feedback bound to a transaction
through the exchange of a transaction proof, such that feedback can be successfully
filed only if the node filing the feedback can show the proof of the transaction. To deal
with the problem of dishonest feedback, a credibility factor is proposed that acts as a
68
filter in estimating reputation-based trust value of a node in the presence of dishonest
feedback.
In the domain of grid computing, Staab and Engel [121] propose a collusion
detection algorithm based on correlated outcomes in votes. In this context, a master
assigns computational tasks to resources, known as workers, which are expected to
execute those tasks and return the results. The approach uses information about the
frequencies of pairs of workers appearing together in the majority/minority of votes and
how often they appear in opposite groups. The concept of majority voting views the
majority of a vote to be the strictly largest group of workers that returned identical
results. They found that correlation can be used to differentiate between honest and
malicious workers. They also propose an algorithm based on graph clustering to discover
the division between honest and malicious workers. From their experimental study, the
performance of the Markov Cluster Algorithm is good for unconditional colluders, which
are those workers who always try to collude, every time they are involved in a vote.
2.8.3 Synthesis
Open issues, such as collusion, still need to be resolved in decentralised multi-agent
systems. The main strategy to detect collusive behaviour, as used in centralised systems,
is to have a global view of the system in order to identify the possible colluding agents.
However, such a global view is not available to individual agents in a decentralised MAS,
as there is no central management of agent information. Despite the limitations of an
agent’s local view of its environment, we believe that the local view can be complemented
by recommendation information about other agents to form an extended view, so that
individual agents can have access to a relevant set of information concerning their own
transactions. Trust and reputation information, together with the agent network, can
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build and maintain the extended localised view of the agent environment.
2.9 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed the relevant work related to our aim in this thesis of
supporting collusion detection using rich interaction and recommendation information
to analyse agents’ social networks. The most relevant trust models in the literature
have some limitations with respect to the thesis aims. Ntropi [1, 2] gathers interaction
information from a range of trust sources, including indirect recommendations. However,
it does not gather information within the multiple dimensions of trust and reputation
at a service-level, nor does it consider the recency of interactions for trust assessment.
Ntropi does not represent agents’ social networks from the interaction information and
thus does not use that information in further reasoning about issues such as collusion.
MDT-R [36] considers trust information from direct interactions and recommendations,
except for indirect recommendations. It also fulfils the other trust model characteristics,
despite the relevance characteristic being only partially considered through the use of
a trust threshold by witnesses. Like Ntropi, MDT-R does not represent the agents’
social networks to tackle the issue of deception. The next model relevant to our work
is ReGreT [106, 104], which fulfils most of the trust model characteristics except for
the relevance characteristic. Although ReGreT represents the social networks of agents
through agent neighbourhoods, the building and maintenance of those networks are not
specified and are not used for collusion detection. None of these models use the trust
model characteristics together, to reason about their social networks for detect collusion.
We address this issue by proposing a trust and reputation model that takes into account
all the trust model characteristics to form a solid base for reasoning and analysing the
agents’ social networks.
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Agents in multi-agent systems evolve in a social environment where they interact
with others for the execution of tasks and exchange of information. Some trust models
have tapped into the agents’ social network to help understand their interactions and
relationships [46, 106, 142]. We improve the use of these networks by describing how
agents can build and maintain a network model of the agents in their environment from
the interaction and recommendation data they gather. Additionally, we explore how
agents can use this agent network model to help them in their decision making for
selecting interaction partners, and information sources.
Deception is a complex issue that agents face as they compete in an environment
where individuals seek their own benefits. Various forms of deception have been the
subject of research in various domains, including lies in agent communication [91],
collusion detection [119, 121] and prevention [52]. In our research, we seek to address
some of the limitations of these solutions, which are application-specific and often require
more information to be available to the agents in order to counter deception. Thus, we
aim to enable agents to counter deception, specifically collusion, by using information
they already gather for deciding on their interactions and applying it to discover collusive
agents in their environment.
The next three chapters look in detail at each of the aims of this thesis, with
respect to the limitations of the trust models and existing approaches in resolving the
issues we are focusing on. Chapter 3 introduces our trust and reputation model, aimed to
improve trust assessment as well as to enable individual agents to enhance their decision
making by using trust, reputation, and social relationship information to extract useful
information, for collusion detection, for example. Our model is based on the trust model
characteristics described in Section 2.3.
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Chapter 3
Trust and Reputation Model
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we discussed existing trust models and their limitations with respect to our
aims of supporting collusion detection using routine interaction and recommendation in-
formation, represented by agents’ social networks. In response to this need, we present
a model of trust and reputation that aims to improve the accuracy of an evaluator’s
assessment of the trustworthiness of other agents for each of the specific services they
provide. The model also ensures that agents gather a rich set of interaction and recom-
mendation information for further reasoning of agent relationships. We make two key
contributions that build on and extend existing approaches to trust and reputation. The
first contribution is a trust model that evaluates trustworthiness for individual services in
different service characteristics, and utilises a broad range of trust information sources
in a flexible manner. Independently assessing agent services allows evaluator agents to
accurately predict the future behaviour of potential interaction partners with respect to
the specific service being considered. Additionally, while agent-level trust indicates how
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trustworthy an agent is as a whole, trust at the level of service characteristics conveys
the reliability of an agent with respect to characteristics such as timeliness, cost and
quality for each service type offered by the agent. Using a wide spectrum of trust infor-
mation sources, such as direct interactions, direct and indirect recommendations, in a
flexible manner allows an agent to assess the trustworthiness of another using all avail-
able trust information sources, without causing the assessment to fail if some sources
are unavailable.
Our second contribution is to combine the recency of interactions and the rel-
evance of recommendations in a single model for trust assessment. The more recent
agent interactions ensure that the most up-to-date agent behaviour is modelled so that
future behaviour can be accurately predicted. The recency of recommendations is one
of the elements that makes third party opinions relevant. The other elements that de-
termine the usefulness of recommendations are the experience of the witnesses and how
trustworthy the witness is in giving recommendations. Recency and relevance further
improve the accuracy of trust evaluation, when used together with trust assessment
in individual agent services and service characteristics that is flexibly based on a wide
spectrum of trust information sources.
We have taken into account the key trust model characteristics, as discussed
in Section 2.3 while developing our model. The aim of the model is also to allow
agents to gather a richer set of interaction and recommendation information for future
analysis. Our trust model does not consider collusion in the agent environment as part
of its decision making. However, it supports collusion detection by providing sufficient
information to help in the reasoning process. In the remainder of this chapter, we will
first give an overview of our proposed trust and reputation model and the related trust
models. We then describe the features of our model and how they can be used. In
73
Section 3.5, we present the implementation and the evaluation of our model. Finally, in
Section 3.6.2 we conclude the chapter.
3.2 Overview
The data collection component of our trust-based social mechanism consists of our
trust and reputation model, which builds on and extends several existing trust models.
We now present the features of our model and describe the base models that have
influenced their inclusion in our model. As first presented in Section 2.3, the four
main characteristics of a trust model are the use of a wide range of trust information
sources, the assessment of trust in individual service characteristics, the consideration of
the recency of interactions and taking the relevance of recommendations into account.
3.2.1 Model Features
These essential characteristics of a trust model allow agents to accurately assess the
trustworthiness of potential interaction partners. Following the survey of relevant trust
models presented in Section 2.5, we describe the trust model characteristics with ref-
erence to the most relevant trust models.
3.2.1.1 Wide Range of Trust Information Sources
Trust models, including FIRE [46], Ntropi [1], ReGreT [106], HISTOS [142], and
L.I.A.R. [91] support the use of a wide range of trust information sources to help assess
trustworthiness. Trust information is gathered from direct interactions with the service
providers. When this type of information is insufficient, recommendations are requested
from third party agents, whether they have directly interacted (direct recommendation)
or indirectly interacted (indirect recommendation) with the agent under consideration.
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With a wide range of information sources, the evaluating agent can make a more accurate
evaluation of the trustworthiness of the target agent. For this reason, our trust model
also allows agents to use their history of past interactions and direct, as well as indirect
recommendations from trusted parties to assess trustworthiness.
3.2.1.2 Trust Assessment at Service Level
Being able to assess trustworthiness not only at agent level, but also at service level
gives an agent additional information to base its decisions on. Provider agents do
not necessarily perform tasks to the same standard and for a particular task, their
performance in different dimensions may also vary. Among the trust models reviewed,
only a handful consider trust assessment at service level, namely ReGreT [106], MDT-
R [36], and SIR [83]. We believe that agents will be able to react more appropriately
to changes in their environment, due to agents changing their behaviour and they way
they provide services.
3.2.1.3 Recency of Interactions
Past interactions are valuable for informing future ones as they indicate how agents have
behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. However, agents
can also change behaviour and older interactions do not reflect this. For this reason,
taking into account the recency of interaction is important to ensure that agents get the
most up-to-date information about the dynamic behaviour of their interaction partners.
ReGreT [106], SIR [83], SPORAS and HISTOS [142], MDT-R [36], and FIRE [46]
include recency, while L.I.A.R. [91] and Mui et al. [89] only partly consider it in their
solutions.
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3.2.1.4 Relevance of Recommendations
Recommendations are a valuable source of information about the trustworthiness of
other agents in the environment. However, not all recommendations received by an
agent will be as useful for better assessing other agents. Relevance is dependant on
other aspects, such as recency and recommender trust. Ntropi [1] and the referral
system by Yu and Singh [140] make use of relevance, while MDT-R and L.I.A.R. [91]
partially consider it.
3.2.2 Base Trust Models
Our trust and reputation model is broadly based on MDT-R [36], introduced in Sec-
tion 2.5.7, as it already features many of the characteristics that we require in a trust
model. Multidimensional trust, direct recommendations and recency are used, together
with the partial use of relevance. The next base model is Ntropi [1, 2], introduced in
Section 2.5.3. Ntropi also uses trust and reputation, including indirect recommendations.
The relevance characteristic is applied to recommendations and although the technique
used is different to ours, the similarity resides in taking into account the context of the
recommendation and the reliability of the witnesses along the recommendation chain.
3.2.2.1 MDT-R
MDT-R [36] represents multiple dimensions of trust and reputation, the nature and
number of these dimensions depending on the priorities and motivations of the agents
using that model. The trust in a particular dimension d for the agent at , denoted as
T dat , is defined as the likelihood in dimension d of at executing the task such that expec-
tations are met. Information is shared among agents in form of interaction summaries
which retain a maximum amount of original information to minimise the subjectivity
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of interpretation. Our model adopts the multidimensionality of trust and recommenda-
tions, as well as the sharing of interaction summaries from MDT-R. The trust value in
each dimension is updated after an interaction, and even when interactions do not occur,
over time, the value is reduced through the use of a decay function that brings the trust
value to its original value, when the agent was first interacted with. The recency of
interaction information is reflected by the decay of trust over time. We use the recency
of interactions in a similar way to give more weight to more recent interactions. We
extend MDT-R by including information on the experience of witnesses when sharing
interaction summaries. This allows an evaluator to more accurately select witnesses,
and thereby providers, as it further reduces the subjectivity of interpretation.
While Ntropi uses discrete trust levels, MDT-R supports trust in a continuous
level, represented by real numbers as the subjective probability values. While continuous
values of trust allows updates to be more easily calculated, MDT-R also uses stratified
trust for simplified trust comparisons, which are especially useful to reduce the risk of
misinterpreting insignificant numerical differences as important. The use of a number
of strata classifies trust values into groups for easier trust comparisons but with the
flexibility of adjusting the precision of comparisons by increasing the number of strata
to represent trust values. We stratify trust in our model in a similar way. Our model also
adopts the way the parameters involved in trust assessment are combined in MDT-R.
We extend this approach to indirect recommendations, which are not used in MDT-R.
Recommendations are requested from trusted agents and each witness aw pro-
vides its experience of interacting with the target at via the number of interactions that
have met expectations (I d+awat ) and the number that have not (I
d−
awat ). The performance
of the target agent is then calculated by combining the direct trust and recommenda-
tions using a number of weights for the factors that influence the interaction. These
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performance values for the potential interaction partners are then compared to select
the most trustworthy agent.
3.2.2.2 Ntropi
As introduced in Section 2.5.3, Ntropi [1] models trust through discrete levels, which
have loosely defined semantics. Agents refine these semantics with experience and time
since they are influenced by the nature of the agent relationships. Trust relationships
exist in four phases: unfamiliar, fragile, stable and untrusted. Each phase underpins
a number of policies whereby agents provide services or not depending on the trust
level. The transition between the levels is based on thresholds, that is, the number of
interactions at a phase before moving to another phase.
Ntropi uses the semantic distance between an evaluator’s opinion and that of a
witness to adjust future recommendations from that witness if needed. Thus, recom-
mendations are always translated to match the recommendations with the experience
the evaluator has with regards to the witness. Our model considers the relevance of rec-
ommendations, in a similar way to improve the selection of witnesses and to assign them
appropriate weights when calculating reputation. Recommendations in Ntropi include
indirect recommendations along a recommendation chain. We also consider indirect
recommendations as a source of trust information in our model, to gather a richer set
of information about the agents involved in the evaluator’s interactions.
3.2.3 Application Example: Supply Chain Management
In the ideal case, a supply chain facilitates the availability of the right amount of the
right product at the right place with the minimal amount of inventory across the net-
work [21]. Most supply chains are associated with several firms and these can be
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viewed as being represented by software agents in an e-supply chain. Each agent has
its own goals and objectives and makes decisions based on the available information
in its environment. A supply chain configuration consists of the selection of services
based on their characteristics, such as cost, profit, and timeliness, in order to achieve
a certain objective, for instance, that of delivering a product and minimising cost. For
each order, there are a number of possible supply chain configurations that can deliver
the product, the number of configurations depending on many factors, including the
number of products, suppliers, and supply chain stages. In most real world situations,
it is not possible to evaluate every single configuration, due to limits on the resources
available.
We have taken the example of a supply chain to illustrate the use of our mech-
anism in partner selection. For example, in some environments, agents need to rely
more on reputation information, and this can be reflected in the weights each source of
trust information is allocated for trust evaluation. Another example is the decay rate for
trust values. In peer-to-peer systems where agent behaviours can change very quickly,
it might be beneficial for an evaluator’s trust in another to decay quickly towards its
initial trust value.
3.2.3.1 Computer Hardware Supply Chain Scenario
The personal computer (PC) industry is a dynamic industry that faces short product
life cycles [65]. PC manufacturers design, manufacture and market a range of com-
puter systems, including desktops and notebooks. They source their components from a
number of suppliers and can also outsource the assembly of components to other com-
panies. We will consider the case of an computer hardware e-supply chain, where the
component suppliers provide products to customers, which include computer systems
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manufacturers, computer shops and computer parts resellers.
In a two-stage supply chain, a customer obtains components directly from the
supplier, for instance the RAM card and hard disk. A customer typically needs to
purchase different types of components and there are several suppliers that can do
the job. In an e-supply environment, many computer manufacturers and resellers need
to interact with various suppliers to source the necessary components to build or sell
their systems. Customers can also act as suppliers for partly-assembled components,
for example, a computer shop sells partly-built computers, to which components, such
as hard disks and memory chips, need to be added on. In this competitive industry,
there are many stakeholders and they each try to get the most benefits and attain their
individual goals and objectives.
For illustration purposes, we consider the case of a small e-supply chain, consist-
ing of 30 computer parts customers and 20 component suppliers. Some customers can
also be suppliers for part-assembled components and together, they form a population
of 50 agents in the e-supply chain environment. Suppliers and customers are assumed
to be of variable reliability and performance, for example, a supplier for monitors can
produce defective monitors half of the time. Similarly, a customer may be late in pay-
ing the supplier. Agents exchange goods as well as information. Information exchange
includes order specifications and opinions about products and suppliers. In the agent
population of 50, not all agents interact with one another, as agents only need to deal
with those agents whose services they need and vice versa.
In an environment where suppliers have variable performance and reliability, a
customer needs to ensure that it interacts with the most trustworthy supplier for the
required product to minimise costs and production times. Suppose that a computer
systems manufacturer, denoted as customer C1, needs to purchase computer monitors
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and there are 3 suppliers, S1, S2 and S3, with different offers. The cheapest supplier is
not necessarily the best choice as it might also be the one providing the worse quality
products. Using trust and reputation, C1 can make the decision on which supplier to
use, based on previous interactions and recommendations from other agents.
3.2.3.2 Terminology
Evaluator
C1
Provider
S3
Provider
Principal Witness
Provider
Target
S4
S2
Provider
Secondary Witness
S5
Provider
Principal Witness
S1
Figure 3.1: Representation of Agent Terminology.
We now define the terminology that we will use throughout the thesis to de-
scribe the different agents and their roles with reference to the supply chain scenario in
Section 3.2.3.1 and Figure 3.1. An evaluator is the agent assessing the trustworthiness
of potential interaction partners. A provider agent is one which offers some services and
could potentially become one of the evaluator’s interaction partners. The target is a
particular provider agent that the evaluator is interested in assessing. In gathering trust
information from agents, the evaluator can request for the opinions of witnesses who
have interacted with the target, or know someone who has. In Figure 3.1 the evaluator,
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C1, has directly interacted with three providers: S1, S2, and S3, as shown by the solid
lines linking the agents. It is currently assessing the target agent S4, the dashed line
indicating that there has been no interaction yet. To help with this assessment, C1 re-
quests the opinions of S1, who is a direct witness, having interacted with S4, and of S2,
who is the indirect witness linked to the witness S5 who has interacted with the target.
In this recommendation chain, S2 is known as the principal witness, as the evaluator
has made the request to S2. Agent S5 is the secondary witness as it is a witness but is
not the agent that has been approached by the evaluator. If the recommendation chain
is longer than two, the witnesses along the chain who are not the principal witness are
referred to as intermediate witnesses.
3.3 Model Description
We propose a trust and reputation model that has four main properties. The first prop-
erty is the combination of direct past interactions with third party recommendations
for trust assessment, with the distinction between direct and indirect recommendations.
This allows the evaluator agent to accurately assess trustworthiness in different situa-
tions, using as many trust information sources as are available. The second property is
that the trustworthiness of agents is assessed in their individual service characteristics.
This level of granularity allows the accurate trust assessment in the service characteris-
tics that the evaluator deems important. Next, the third property concerns the recency
of interactions. Recency plays an important part in the accuracy of trust assessment as
more recent interactions tend to predict more accurately the future behaviour of those
agents. Finally, the fourth property is the relevance of interactions, which ensures that
the evaluator takes into account all the factors that cause the trust information source
to be reliable. As our model is based on MDT-R, many of the algorithms for calculat-
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ing trust and reputation are similar. Differences appear where our model uses indirect
recommendations and the relevance of recommendations in the assessment. Indirect
recommendations result in the recommendation trust of the principal witness being up-
dated and this changes only minimally from MDT-R. We now describe how the trust
model properties are used in the assessment of agent trustworthiness.
3.3.1 Service-Level Assessment
Past service interactions give a good indication of the reliability of a provider. Past
interactions with the provider for a particular service allow more accurate assessment
for that particular service. However, taking into account all the services interactions
enables the evaluator to assess the agent as a whole.
3.3.1.1 Direct Service Interactions
Direct service interactions occur between a provider and a consumer. Referring to the
application example introduced in Section 3.2.3, let us suppose customer C1 is the
evaluator and wants to assess which of the three suppliers is the most trustworthy for
future transactions. C1 has interacted with two of the suppliers previously, S1 and S2.
From its history of past interactions, C1 can assess how trustworthy each supplier has
been, based on service characteristics, such as successful delivery, timeliness and cost.
For a similar number of interactions, suppose that supplier S1 has been trustworthy in all
the important service characteristics 90% of the time, compared to 50% for supplier S2.
From this comparison, C1 can decide to use supplier S1 for its next order of computer
monitors.
Trust information is captured in multiple dimensions, as in MDT-R [35, 36]. The
separation into several dimensions enables information about specific service character-
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istics to be preserved. The subjectivity of trust, especially from recommendations, is an
obstacle to making full use of the information obtained from witnesses. Sharing multi-
dimensional trust information within interaction summaries [36], instead of calculated
trust values decreases subjectivity. The dimensions correspond to the necessary char-
acteristics that define a service. Multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) describes a
collection of formal approaches which seek to take explicit account of multiple criteria
in helping individuals or groups explore decisions that matter. In our model, agents do
not use MCDA to choose the service dimensions to represent. Human analysts may use
MCDA to decide on the dimensions the agent should use to define service character-
istics. The trust an evaluator ae has in a provider ap about a particular service s in
a dimension d , is denoted as T sdaeap . Any number of dimensions can be used, but for
the purpose of illustration, we consider that an evaluator ae models trust in provider ap
along four dimensions [36]:
• success (T sSaeap ): the likelihood that ap will successfully execute the task,
• timeliness (T sTaeap ): the likelihood that the task will be performed no later than
expected,
• cost (T sCaeap ): the likelihood that the cost of performing the task will not be more
than expected, and
• quality (T sQaeap ): the likelihood that the quality requirements of the task performed
by ap will be met.
These trust values are derived from the past interactions of ae and ap . The
evaluator stores information about each interaction in which ap has performed a task on
its behalf. Information about each interaction includes the service characteristics offered
by ap , as well as the actual values obtained on completion. The derived trust values
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refer to a specific task and so this is a type of situational trust. A successful interaction
is one where ap delivers results, irrespective of whether the other three characteristics
are met. Meanwhile, a positive interaction with respect to the dimensions of timeli-
ness, cost and quality refers to ap performing as expected or better, and conversely for
negative interactions. Trust values are calculated when the evaluator needs to make a
decision about whom to interact with. The range of the trust values in each dimension
is [−1,+1], where −1 means complete distrust and +1 means complete trust. The
evaluator stores a history of past interactions with each provider for each task type.
We denote the set of interactions in the history for the service type s as His . The size
of the history corresponds to the number of interactions that the evaluator stores for
future reference. The history size is determined by the system architect depending on
the amount of resources available, or by the number of interactions that are useful for
analysis. In future work, evaluators should be able to change the size of the history on a
per-target basis to enable agents to store only the required information to assess trust.
In our model, we consider three types of trust, as in Marsh’s formalism [81].
Firstly, an agent has an initial trust, initialT , in another agent when it first starts
interacting and has no previous interactions. It is based on the agent’s disposition to
successfully interact with another agent and is denoted as initialT = dispositionpass .
The term dispositionpass represents the success disposition of the evaluator, which is an
indication of its behaviour as a result of a successful interaction.
Another type of trust is situational trust, ST , is the trust in the target about
a particular service. The situational trust value ST sdaeap is a function of the history
of interactions of evaluator ae with target ap : Trust in another agent for a specific
service type is referred to as situational trust (ST), and it is the proportion of successful
interactions compared to the negative interactions the consumer has experienced with
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the provider. When the assessment is done in individual service characteristics, this is
denoted by the letter following the service type s, for example sQ refers to the quality
characteristic of the service.
f (Interactions) = ST sdaeap
=
countsd+aeap − countsd−aeap
countsd+aeap + count
sd−
aeap
(3.1)
where countsd+aeap is the number of positive interactions the evaluator ae has experienced
with provider ap , of service s, in dimension d , and count
sd−
aeap is the number of negative
interactions. Equation 3.1, adapted from [37], is used to calculate trust, and interaction
summaries are shared with other agents to preserve the components of the equation,
which are the number of positive and negative interactions in each service dimension.
When there are insufficient or no past interactions for a particular service, it
is useful to assess the trustworthiness of the provider as a whole. This type of trust,
general trust (GT) is the average of all interaction experiences in the different service
types. The following equation is used in MDT-R and originates from Marsh’s notion of
general trust [81].
f (Interactions) = GTaeap
=
counts∑
s=1
ST sdsaeap
counts
(3.2)
where counts is the count of all the service types. We use only the success dimension
to simplify calculation, since completing a interaction successfully has overriding priority
when obtaining an agent’s overall trustworthiness, in the cases where past experience in
specific service types are not available.
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Coming back to our example scenario presented at the beginning of this section,
suppose that customer C1 wants to assess the trustworthiness of the computer monitor
suppliers before selecting the most trustworthy. Since C1 has previously purchased
monitors from both suppliers S1 and S2, the customer can calculate their situational trust
concerning the service of selling monitors. Assuming that C1 has had 20 interactions with
supplier S1 about monitors before, of which 90% were successful, the situational trust of
S1 in say, the success dimension is calculated as ST
sS
C1S1
= 18− 218 + 2 = 0.8. Similarly, if C1
has had 6 interactions in the past with supplier S2 concerning monitors, the situational
trust in the success dimension based on 50% success rate is ST sSC1S2 =
3− 3
3 + 3 = 0.
C1 has however, never interacted with supplier S3 for monitors, but it has previously
purchased two other products, optical mice and SD memory cards. Let’s suppose that
STC1S3 for optical mice is 0.2 and that for SD memory cards is 0.3. For the supplier
S3, C1 can calculate its general trust as GTC1S3 =
2∑
1
ST sSC1ap
2 =
0.2 + 0.3
2 = 0.25.
3.3.1.2 Direct Recommendations
The reputation of a provider is calculated from a number of recommendations. Di-
rect recommendations originate from witnesses which have directly interacted with the
provider for service provision. These agents, referred to as principal witnesses, share
their history of interactions concerning that provider, with the evaluator. For each
recommender, the function of the interactions it shares is presented as:
f (Interactions) =
I sd+iap − I sd−iap
I sd+iap + I
sd−
iap
(3.3)
where I sd+iap is the number of interactions of the witness ar with the target ap for service
type s, for which ap has met expectations for the dimension d , and I
sd−
iap
is the number
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where expectations are not met. The Equation 3.3 is similar to the one for situational
trust.
3.3.1.3 Indirect Recommendations
The model allows agents to provide indirect recommendations to requesting agents.
The evaluator does not distinguish between direct and indirect recommendations for the
evaluation of recommendation trust. This is due to the evaluator assessing the trust-
worthiness of the principal witness in giving recommendations, and not the secondary
witnesses. Therefore, it is assumed that the principal witness will give recommendations
from further along the recommendation chain with care, as its reputation as a witness
depends on it.
3.3.2 Recency
The recent interactions and recommendations indicate the most likely future behaviour
of agents. This is especially the case in dynamic environments, where agents tend
to change behaviour and the recent interactions will be the most relevant. For this
reason, the trust model allows evaluator agents to take the more recent interactions
into consideration by using a trust decay function that gives higher importance to the
more recent interactions.
3.3.2.1 Direct Service Interactions
Direct service interactions occur between a provider and a consumer and the recency of
the interactions is highlighted in the decay of the trust value towards the initial trust
value initialT . The Equation 3.4 is from the MDT-R model. In our model, we expand
on this to give Equation 3.5, to demonstrate that the trust decay rate is a function of
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several parameters.
f (Recency) = decay(ST sdaeap )
= ST sdaeap − (ST sdaeap − initialT )× ωtd (3.4)
= ST sdaeap − (ST sdaeap − initialT )×
f (dispositionpass , tnow , tlast , frequency(is), ωHis ) (3.5)
where tnow is the current time, tlast is the time at the last interaction, frequency(is) is
the average frequency of interactions of that service type. The weight ωHis is assigned
to an interaction according to recency; the more recent the interaction, the more weight
it has, since more recent interactions give a more accurate reflection. In Equations 3.4
and 3.5, the general trust can be used if the situational trust is not available. Trust in
ap decays towards the initial trust value of ae , rather than the actual agent behaviour
because the lack of recent interactions does not allow the evaluator ae to have an
accurate picture of the agent ap . It therefore relies more on its own disposition to trust
another agent. The lack of recent interactions may have several reasons, including the
provider being unavailable, the evaluator not requiring the types of services offered by
the provider, or the evaluator having the opinion that the trustworthiness of the provider
is too low for interaction. When the evaluator does not interact for a period of time with
that provider, it might be missing out on the benefits of interacting with it, especially
if the provider’s behaviour has changed for the better. The decay of trust towards the
initial trust allows the evaluator to attempt to interact again with the provider.
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3.3.2.2 Direct and Indirect Recommendations
The recency of recommendations can be used in the evaluation of reputation if available.
The recency will be a function of the weight of the recommendations relating to their
recency.
f (Recency) = ωHir (3.6)
3.3.3 Relevance
The relevance property of the trust model concerns the relevance of service interactions
and recommendations for the assessment of trustworthiness. For accurate evaluation of
trustworthiness, only the most relevant interactions should be taken into account.
3.3.3.1 Direct Service Interactions
For direct service interactions for the evaluation of direct trust, the recency of service
interactions ensures that the most recent interactions are used to predict the future
behaviour of agents. Evaluator agents also use interactions in the service type required
first to assess the trustworthiness of a potential provider (situational trust). If these are
not available or insufficient, the evaluator can use other service interactions it had with
the provider for decision making (general trust).
3.3.3.2 Direct and Indirect Recommendations
The relevance of recommendations from third party agents is an important factor to
take into consideration. Witnesses share their experiences with the evaluator, but they
do not guarantee that if the evaluator chooses to use the services from that particular
provider, it will have a similar experience as the witness. For this reason, the evaluator
needs to assess which recommendations are most appropriate for its purposes.
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Recommendation trust estimates the accuracy of recommendations and the
trustworthiness of witnesses in giving recommendations. The relevance of recommen-
dations is a function of the recency of recommendations, the experience of the witness
and the trustworthiness of the witness in giving recommendations. Relevance is a novel
aspect of our model and this is not used in MDT-R.
f (Relevance) = WRR
=
(
tcurr − tmedian(His )
tcurr
)
+
maxWI
totalWI
+ RTaear + ωRTc (3.7)
where WRR stands for witness reputation relevance, tcurr denotes the current time and
tmedian(His ) is the recorded time of the median interaction as provided by the witness
ar for interaction with target ap . The inclusion of time in the calculation indicates
the recency of the interactions on which the recommendation is based. The maximum
number of interactions that the witnesses have used when giving recommendations is
maxWI , and totalWI is the total number of interactions actually used in that recom-
mendation. The confidence of the evaluator ae in its recommendation trust RTaear in
the witness ar is denoted as RTc and the confidence weight ωRTc shows the amount of
influence of this recommendation confidence. This equation is used in our model as a
way of handling the relevance of reputation.
3.3.4 Aggregation
This section describes how the different sources of trust information are aggregated to
evaluate the trustworthiness of agents.
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3.3.4.1 Direct Trust
Direct trust from direct interactions is calculated by the evaluator ae as a function of
its direct interactions with the target at , and is a function of the freshness of these
interactions.
f (Trust) = f (Interactions)× f (Recency)× f (Relevance)
= ST − (ST − initialT )× dispositionpass
×
(
tnow − tlast
frequency(is)× (ωHis × 10)
)
(3.8)
As proposed in MDT-R [37], trust values in our model are stratified at the
time of comparison. When using numerical values, there is a risk of considering even
insignificant differences in values to be important, and stratifying trust reduces this risk.
Stratified trust is only used for comparisons and is not communicated to others. In
our model, the number of strata used can be specified to allow for different levels of
sensitivity. For example, if the number of strata is 10, then trust values in the range
[0.8, 1] are taken to be the same. Thus, if two agents aβ and aγ are being compared
by situational trust in the success dimension, then if ST saαaβ = 0.85 and ST
s
aαaγ = 0.95
both agents are taken to have similar trust values. A larger number of strata ensures a
smoother transition between different strata, especially at the boundary between positive
and negative trust [37].
3.3.4.2 Reputation
Reputation is the trust of a target as communicated by third parties and can be built
from either direct or indirect recommendations. The reputation of a target is sought
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when the evaluator has insufficient information from its own past experience to make
a decision about whether to cooperate. A lack of information may occur for several
reasons. For example, consider an evaluator ae who wants to consider agent ap for
interaction, to perform a service of type s1. In the first case, suppose ae has never
interacted with ap before and thus has no experience of ap ’s behaviour. Alternatively,
suppose ae has previously interacted with ap but for a different service type, such as s2.
Another case is when ae has had too few interactions with ap , or they are too outdated.
In all these cases, ae can ask the opinions of others who have interacted with ap , in
order to get a more accurate assessment of ap ’s trustworthiness. Direct and indirect
recommendations can provide useful information about the trustworthiness of the target
in meeting its commitments.
In our running example, suppose customer C1 also requires supplies of hard
disks, a recent addition to the component parts it needs. Furthermore, suppose that
there are 2 suppliers for this component, namely S3 and S4, such that C1 has purchased
from S3 once before and has not interacted with S4 previously. With insufficient past
interactions to reliably assess the trustworthiness of either supplier, C1 can complement
information from direct trust with recommendations from agents that have previously
interacted with S3 and S4. In our example, suppose that C1 has a regular customer C2,
a computer shop, which resells computers and computer parts. Since C2 stocks hard
disks for resale from both suppliers, C1 can obtain its opinion about these suppliers.
Considering our scenario, suppose that C1 wants to assess the trustworthiness
of suppliers S3 and S4, but has insufficient direct interactions with them to make an
informed decision about whom to approach for the next order. This time, customer
C2 has not interacted with either supplier, but it knows another agent C3, which has
interacted with both S3 and S4. C2 therefore gives an indirect recommendation about
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the suppliers to C1, based on C3’s experience.
When an evaluator requires recommendations for an agent, it must decide which
agents to ask. Such agents might have different kinds of experience with the target,
and their opinions might not be useful to the evaluator. To decide whom to ask, the
evaluator can use recommendation trust, which estimates the accuracy and relevance
of a witness’ recommendation for the evaluator’s purposes. Accuracy measures the
similarity between the evaluator’s own experience and the opinion given by the witness.
Meanwhile, relevance relates to how useful the recommendation is based on the recency
of the interactions, the experience of the witness, and how trustworthy the witness is in
giving recommendations.
FIRE [46] considers whether the witness has sufficient information about the
target to give an opinion. An extension to FIRE [45] considers the credibility of the
witness in providing opinions about other agents. This enables the evaluator to identify
the accuracy of the recommendation by comparing it with its own experience, after an
interaction occurs. However, the model does not consider the relevance of a witness’
trust information for the evaluator’s purposes. In MDT-R, an agent selects witnesses by
considering its most trusted interaction partners. However, it does not select witnesses
based on the relevance of recommendations and there is no validation of whether the
witness has given accurate information. The uncertainty lies in the possible difference
in behaviour of the target towards different evaluators. Ntropi [1] considers two factors
when dealing with recommendations: (i) the closeness of the witness’ recommendation
and the evaluator’s own judgement about the target, and (ii) the reliability of the witness
in giving accurate opinions over time.
Our approach to reputation is influenced by Ntropi’s consideration of accuracy
and relevance when selecting witnesses. The relevance of recommendations is calculated
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by taking into account their recency, the experience of the witness, as well as the
evaluator’s recommendation trust and confidence in the witness. The same mechanism
applies to direct and indirect recommendations as the evaluator does not differentiate
between the two sources of recommendation. The evaluator’s recommendation trust
in the principal witness relies on how reliable it is in providing accurate and relevant
opinions. As for the accuracy of opinions, this is done for interactions that have taken
place following positive recommendations. The evaluator compares the outcome of
the interaction with the recommendation previously obtained to assess how accurate it
was. The evaluator does not distinguish between direct and indirect recommendation
trust and therefore the recommendation trust value represents the trustworthiness of the
witness in providing any type of recommendation. Recommendation trust is updated for
each agent that has given recommendations. Initially, witnesses have a recommendation
trust value equal to their general trust. This is later updated if the evaluator interacts
with the recommended provider. The update functions are outlined in Equations (3.9)
to (3.12). The evaluator keeps a record of all the witnesss for a task and it updates its
recommendation trust in each of them after the interaction with the target.
Equation 3.9 shows the evaluator ae ’s update of its recommendation trust RT
in witness ar when STdiff < τ . The difference between the new situational trust value
resulting from the interaction and the value recommended by witness ar is referred to as
STdiff . For small differences, for instance, τ = 0.2, the recommendation trust increases
as it suggests that the recommendation is accurate and reliable enough.
update(RTaear ) = RTaear + increment
+ if STdiff < τ (3.9)
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increment+ =
(
RTmax − STdiff
| STdiffmax |
)
× ωHir
× dispositionpass × (RTmax − RTaear )
(3.10)
where RTmax is the maximum recommendation trust, and STdiffmax is the maximum
difference in value between the resulting situational trust and the recommended value.
The threshold τ can be varied according to how close the actual trustworthiness is to
the recommended trust for the recommendation to be considered as accurate enough
for the evaluator’s purposes.
The next two Equations (3.11) and (3.12) show how the recommendation trust
is updated if the recommendation is further from the actual interaction.
update(RTaear ) = RTaear − increment− if STdiff >= τ (3.11)
increment− =
(
STdiff
| STdiffmax |
)
× ωHir
× dispositionfail × (RTmin − RTaear ) (3.12)
where dispositionfail is the failure disposition of the evaluator, which is an indication of
its behaviour as a result of a failed interaction.
Witnesses provide the evaluator with interaction summaries for a specific task
type where available. The summaries contain information such as the number of in-
teractions the recommendation is based on, the recency of these interactions, and the
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proportion of positive and negative interactions in each trust dimension. If the witness
does not have situational trust information, it provides its general trust in the target.
The use of interaction summaries is similar to that in MDT-R with the additional shar-
ing of information about recency and experience, which can improve the evaluator’s
adaptation to changes in the behaviour of target agents. The evaluator combines the
different recommendations by applying weights according to how relevant the witness’
experience is, compared to the evaluator’s. The weight ωWRR is the weight of the wit-
ness reputation relevance WRR of witness ar in providing a recommendation for target
ap .
Thus, the witness reputation WR of target ap for a service type s in the dimen-
sion d , as viewed by evaluator ae , is a function of the opinions received from witnesses
and their respective weights:
f (Reputation) = f (Interactions)× f (Recency)× f (Relevance)
= WRsdaeap
=
∑
i=γ
I
sd+
iap
− I sd−iap
I sd+iap + I
sd−
iap
× ωWRR
 (3.13)
where γ to  are the set of selected witnesses for target ap . The term I
sd+
iap
is the number
of interactions of the witness ar with the target ap for service type s, for which ap has
met expectations for the dimension d , and I sd−iap is the number where expectations
are not met. The weight ascribed to a witness recommendation is dependent on its
experience and its relevance. Thus, the evaluator can include the recommendations in
each trust dimension of success, timeliness, cost and quality.
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3.3.4.3 Performance Evaluation
The performance value for each potential provider ap is calculated in a similar way as
in MDT-R, with the exception that our model uses the relevance of recommendations
WRR, which has been added to the equations below.
PV (ap) =
n∏
i=1
(fapi )
µi (3.14)
where there are n factors and fapi is the value for agent ae in terms of the i
′th factor and
µi is the weighting given to the i
′th factor in the selection of the agent’s preferences.
To assess trust using only direct trust, the values are stratified and the perfor-
mance value is given below. The values are stratified or are placed into ranges of values
such that small differences in values are not mistaken for being significant.
PV (ap) = (maxC + 1− aCp )µC × (aQp )
µQ
× stratify(ST sSaeap )µtS × stratify(ST sTaeap )µtT
× stratify(ST sCaeap )µtC × stratify(ST sQaeap )µtQ (3.15)
where aCp and a
Q
p are ap ’s advertised cost and quality respectively, maxC is the maximum
advertised cost of the agents being considered, µC and µQ are the weightings given to
the advertised cost and quality, and µtS , µtT , µtC , µtQ are the weightings for the trust
dimensions of success, timeliness, cost and quality respectively. The general trust is
used if the situational trust is not available.
The calculation of the performance value, considering both direct trust and
witness reputation is as follows:
PV (ap) = (maxC + 1− aCp )µC × (apQ)µQ
98
× stratify(ST sSaeap )µtS × stratify(ST sCaeap )µtC
× stratify(ST sTaeap )µtT × stratify(ST sQaeap )µtQ
× stratify(WRsSaeap )µrS × stratify(WRsCaeap )µrC
× stratify(WRsTaeap )µrT × stratify(WRsQaeap )µrQ (3.16)
where WRsdaeap is the evaluator ae ’s witness reputation for target ap for service type s in
the dimension d , and µrS , µrC , µrT , µrQ are the weightings for the witness reputation
in the dimensions of success, timeliness, cost and quality respectively (note that the
weights µi must sum to 1). The performance values are what an evaluator uses to
select among a number of potential interaction agents. The highest performance value
suggest the most trustworthy agent.
3.4 Recommender’s Perspective
The previous sections have described our model from the point of view of an evalua-
tor. The evaluator builds the reputation of a target agent in the same way, whether
the recommendations provided are direct or indirect. It assesses the principal witness
on its reliability and accuracy of providing recommendations, using recommendation
trust, irrespective of the source. In future work, we will consider using two separate
recommendation trust values for direct and indirect recommendations from the principal
witness.
The principal witness is the agent from whom the evaluator requests information
about a target and it is selected from the evaluator’s trusted witnesss or providers. It
first searches for any direct task interactions with the target in its interaction history.
Past experience with the target is shared with the evaluator in the form of an interaction
summary. If there are insufficient or no direct task interactions, the principal witness
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requests the opinion of its most trusted witness. In this version of our model, we
consider one level of indirection as this reduces the possibility of inaccuracies. Future
work will look into how to apply an efficient way of obtaining indirect opinions along a
recommendation chain, whilst maintaining accuracy and relevance.
The secondary witness returns direct task interaction information with the target
to the principal witness as an interaction summary. If it has had interactions about
different task types, the secondary witness shares its overall agent recommendation about
the target. If the principal witness has interacted with the target in a different task type
as requested by the evaluator, it will return its own agent recommendation, rather than
the indirect agent recommendation from the secondary witness. The principal witness
does not update its recommendation trust in the secondary witness as it is only passing
on the indirect opinion and there has been no effect on its own tasks.
We have described our trust and reputation model and seen how agents use this
model to assess the trustworthiness of other agents. In the next section, we set out
to evaluate our model to show how it performs compared to other agent assessment
methods.
3.5 Evaluation of Trust and Reputation Model
In order to assess the performance of our trust and reputation model, we have built a
simulation environment and conducted a number of experiments. In all the experiments,
the evaluation is done from the point of view of an evaluator agent. The implemen-
tation was written in Java using the NetBeans IDE 1. The aim of our evaluation is to
compare the performance of the evaluator in different types of agent populations when
it uses a number of interaction partner assessment approaches for selecting the most
1http://netbeans.org/
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reliable provider agent. In our experiments, we will compare the performance of the
evaluator when using our trust and reputation model and when it uses other agent as-
sessment methods, such as using service characteristics, trust only and trust with direct
recommendations only.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
Firstly, we define the agent population parameters, which determine the characteris-
tics of agents’ behaviour. The range of population configuration parameters reflect the
heterogeneity of the agent populations being represented. Secondly, we describe the
population configurations we use in our experiments. Next, we specify the changes in
agent behaviour in the population throughout the experiments. Agents may exhibit dy-
namic behaviours and we want to assess how our trust model copes with such changes
in behaviour. Finally, we specify the metrics for the trust model evaluation and experi-
mental results.
3.5.1.1 Agent Population Parameters
The agent population parameters describe the behavioural aspects of agents, in terms
of their honesty, disposition, success and other service dimensions, as well as the weight
of those parameters in their assessment of other agents. An example of an agent
population file is shown in Figure 3.2. This generated agent population file is then used
by our simulation program to build the agent objects and to start transactions. For each
population configuration, 50 different populations are generated and we perform 5 runs
per population. The population parameters are further detailed below.
1. Population size (PopulationSize) defines the total number of agents in the popu-
lation. In our experiments, the population size ranges from 10 to 100. The range
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Figure 3.2: Sample Agent Population File.
and incremental steps will be specified for each set of experiments later in the
chapter.
2. Behaviour configuration describes a set of parameters that characterise how agents
behave when interacting with other agents and their service provision. These
parameters are grouped in three categories (high, average, low), represented as
Xh, Xa, Xl in Figure 3.2, where X denotes the service characteristic. Agents
with a high service quality can have different quality rates within that category.
For example, on a scale from 1 to 50, high quality range qh is (41,50), while
low quality ql has range (1,10) and average quality qa has range (11,40). We
considered the following parameters.
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• Honesty determines how accurately an agent executes a service (in terms of
the service dimensions) compared to the advertised service characteristics.
• Disposition is the general willingness an agent has to trust another agent,
especially when it has not interacted with it before.
• Success measures the ability of an agent to complete a task.
• Cost of a service.
• Timeliness of execution or delivery of the service.
• Quality of the service.
3. The assessment approach indicates how agents assess the reliability of other agents
in their environment.
(a) The possible assessment types are:
• Service characteristics, illustrated by Cost (C) in our experiments.
• Trust only (T).
• Trust with Direct Recommendations (TRD).
• Our trust assessment method using Trust with Direct and Indirect Rec-
ommendations, as well as the recency of interactions and the relevance
of recommendations (TRID).
(b) Parameter weights are the importance of the parameters for the evaluating
agent when assessing other agents. The weights used in our experiments
consider service characteristics only, i.e. cost in our experiments (cWeights),
trust-related parameters (trustOnlyWeight) and equal weights for service di-
mensions, trust and reputation (equalWeights).
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Figure 3.2 illustrates an example agent population file, which specifies the pop-
ulation parameters. Each row corresponds to the specification for one agent in the
population. This example file is for a population of size 20, where the evaluator agent
(first row) is using our trust and reputation model for assessing other agents in the
population. Let us consider the shaded row in the diagram. The agent in that row has
average honesty, low disposition to trust, high success, low cost, average timeliness and
high quality aspects of service. It assesses other agents using the TRID approach and
considers the service, trust and reputation parameters equally.
In our implementation, there are several population parameters that we have
kept constant as we wanted to evaluate the effects of the parameters presented above.
Among those parameters that we keep constant is the trust threshold used by the trust
models, namely the value below which an evaluator considers that another agent is too
untrustworthy to interact with. We have also assumed that the agent behaviours and
the service characteristics offered apply to all the services offered by an agent.
3.5.1.2 Experimental Population Configurations
We consider four different agent population configurations to highlight the performance
of our trust and reputation model in different circumstances. These configurations are
indicative examples of the characteristics of the agent population, as the sample space is
too large to be considered in its entirety. For each population, we specify the proportion
of agents with each behaviour category (high, average, low). As an example, consider
a population composed of 80% high honesty agents and 100% high cost agents. With
80% of agents having high honesty, this population has a very high proportion of agents
that deliver their services according to expectations. The remaining 20% of agents have
either low or average honesty. Moreover, all the agents in the population have services
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with high cost. In this example, two service characteristics have been specified, honesty
and cost. For the remaining service characteristics, the agents have behaviours which
are randomly selected from the three behaviour categories (high, average or low).
1. Population 1 consists of 70% low honesty agents, 50% low cost agents and 50%
low timeliness agents.
2. Population 2 is made up of 70% high honesty agents, 70% high success agents
and 40% high cost agents.
3. Population 3 is composed of agents with each of the honesty, disposition, success,
cost, timeliness and quality parameters in the proportions of 20% low, 60% average
and 20% high categories.
4. Population 4 consists of 70% high success agents and 100% average cost agents.
For Population 1, while 70% are agents with low honesty, the remaining 30% of
agents are of either high or average honesty. The sum of the proportions of agents in the
three categories amount to 100%. In our experiments, each population configuration
is used to generate 50 different populations and each population will be run 5 times
for each of the four assessment types C, T, TRD and TRID. The agent population file
shown in Figure 3.2 is from Population 1. As 70% of the population have low honesty,
there are 14 out of the 20 agents with low honesty. Of the remaining 6 agents, 4
have average honesty while 2 agents have high honesty. This follows from the random
allocation of the remaining 6 agents to the remaining categories of reliability (average
and high). Similar calculations of population proportions have been applied for the other
parameters.
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3.5.1.3 Experimental Agent Behaviour Profiles
Agents in a population may have dynamic behaviour, whereby they can have different
honesty and service characteristics at different times. Changes in agent behaviour are
reflected in changes in the corresponding properties in the agent population parameters.
We consider four types of agent behaviour profiles in our experiments.
1. Behaviour Profile A involves all agents with static behaviours. Agents do not
change their behaviour during the simulation period.
2. Behaviour Profile B includes all agents with high honesty, which change to low
honesty half way into the simulation period.
3. Behaviour Profile C involves all agents with high success changing to low success
a quarter of the way into the simulation period.
4. Behaviour Profile D causes all agents with high honesty and high success to
change to low honesty and low success a quarter of the way into the simulation
period.
The runs for each generated population are repeated for each of the 4 behaviour
profiles, such that we can compare the results when the evaluator uses different types
of assessments to decide on agent selection for future interactions. Therefore, for each
of the behaviour profiles (A to D), the experiment is run 1000 times. The experiments
comparing these different behaviour profiles have been performed for population con-
figurations Population 1, Population 2, Population 3 and Population 4. The population
sizes used in each run are 10, 30, and 50.
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3.5.1.4 Metrics for Trust Model Evaluation
The experiments aim to assess the performance of the evaluator in selecting agents,
when faced with heterogeneous agents of different capabilities as well as changes to
agent behaviours. Performance assessment is measured by failure ratio and the ratio of
services that were over the advertised price. A number of information elements about
the population, the services requested and executed are gathered as explained below.
1. Population configuration number (Px), with values in the set 1, 2, 3, 4 due to the
four types of agent populations we are considering in our evaluation.
2. Model type (My), the type of assessment used by the agent C, T, TRD, TRID.
3. Population index (PIz), the index of the population generated for a population
configuration 0-49.
4. Population run number (PRr), which specifies the run for a particular population
1-5.
5. Number of tasks requested (iT) by the evaluator during the simulation period.
6. Number of successfully completed tasks (S) among the tasks requested by the
evaluator.
7. Number of tasks failed due to providers declining (FD). The evaluator considers a
task has failed in this way when providers have declined to execute the task three
times.
8. Number of failed tasks due to providers not successfully completing tasks (FU)
among the tasks accepted to be executed by providers.
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9. Number of remaining uncompleted tasks (R) after the end of the allocated simu-
lation period.
10. Number of tasks whose cost was higher than advertised cost (OC).
11. Number of agents whose behaviour changed in the simulation (cA), this is based
on Section 3.5.1.3 and is from a system perspective, not from that of the evaluator.
Figure 3.3: Extract from Results File for Population 1, Behaviour Profile A, using as-
sessment model TRID.
An example extract of a results file is shown in Figure 3.3. It is a comma-
separated file for Population 1 and Behaviour Profile A, when the evaluator is using
the TRID assessment model. Considering the shaded row, this is the simulated interac-
tion results for the evaluator, based on population configuration Population 1 where the
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evaluator is using the TRID assessment model. This row entry concerns the second pop-
ulation generated (of the 50) and is on run number 2. During the interaction period, the
evaluator requested 739 service tasks to be executed on its behalf. Among those tasks,
152 were successfully completed, 106 failed due to being declined for execution, 210
failed due to the providers unsuccessfully completing them and 271 remained uncom-
pleted at the end of the period. Among the tasks that completed, 133 of them resulted
in an overspend. As this example concerns Behaviour Profile A, no agent changed its
behaviour during the interaction period.
Following the gathering of data, we analyse the performance of the evaluator
using the different assessment models under various conditions (different population
configuration and behaviour change). We calculate two further values for analysis.
• The failure ratio due to unsuccessful completion of tasks by the providers (FU ratio).
This is given by:
FU ratio =
FU
iT − R (3.17)
where iT − R is the number of tasks that were completed.
• The overspend ratio (OC ratio) of completed tasks that incurred an overspend
(the actual cost being higher than the advertised cost). This is given by the
equation below.
OC ratio =
OC
iT − R (3.18)
The total number of tasks requested to be executed consists of the following
elements:
iT = S + FD + FU + R (3.19)
where S is the number of successfully completed tasks, FD is the number of tasks that
have failed due to having found no providers, FU is the number of failed tasks due
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to unsuccessful completion by the providers, and R is the number of remaining tasks
not completed at the end of the simulation period. We focus on FU as it is a better
indication of whether agents are able to avoid interacting with untrustworthy agents,
as we assume that the loss of utility from not interacting is less than that of a failed
interaction.
3.5.2 Experimental Results
The evaluation of our trust and reputation model involves comparing the performance
of the evaluator when using different agent assessment models under the same environ-
mental conditions. We run experiments for each of the population dynamics, Behaviour
Profile A, Behaviour Profile B, Behaviour Profile C and Behaviour Profile D, described
in Section 3.5.1.3. For each behaviour profile, we run four experiments according to the
assessment model used by the evaluator, namely service dimension (C), trust (T), trust
with direct recommendations (TRD), or trust with direct and indirect recommendations
(TRID). This is repeated for each of the four population configurations Population 1,
Population 2, Population 3 and Population 4 (described in Section 3.5.1.2). Since we are
comparing the different assessment models, we have grouped the results per behaviour
profile (described in Section 3.5.1.3). Each of the four behaviours consists of 3000 result
entries per model type.
We present two sets of results. Firstly, the ratio of failed tasks is compared
for each of the four assessment models (C, T, TRD and TRID) in all four behaviour
profiles (A, B, C and D). A larger ratio of failed tasks indicates that the assessment
model copes less well with changes in agent behaviour that are caused by unsuccessful
service provision. Therefore, the assessment models with a smaller failed task ratio
are better at coping with changes in agent behaviour throughout the interaction period.
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Secondly, the overspend ratio is compared for the assessment models in all four behaviour
profiles. Each service has an expected cost, and dishonest agents or poor performing
agents can cause the actual cost to be higher than expected. Agents that use trust
and reputation as well as service characteristics for assessing partner agents should be
better able to manage the uncertainty of interactions, compared to agents that only use
service characteristic, such as cost. An agent that has a large overspend ratio cannot
cope appropriately with changes in agent behaviour, when it does not concern only the
service characteristic.
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Figure 3.4: Mean Failed Task Ratios Per Behaviour Profile for Each Assessment Model.
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Figure 3.4 shows the evaluator’s mean failed task ratio for each of the four
behaviour profiles when using each of the four assessment models. We can observe
that the ratio of failed tasks is significantly larger for the Cost assessment model (C),
compared to the three trust models. The differences in ratio for the three trust models
are small. However, we can observe that our TRID model (unshaded fourth bar from
the left in each cluster) performs slightly better than the other two trust models, and
that the failed task ratio is smaller, especially for behaviours profiles A and B.
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Figure 3.5: Mean Overspend Ratios Per Behaviour Profile for Each Assessment Model.
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Figure 3.5 shows the evaluator’s mean overspend ratio for each of the four
behaviour profiles when using each of the four assessment models. Again, we can observe
that the evaluator incurs the most overspend when it relies on the cost dimension of the
service to select partner agents (assessment model C). There are only small differences
in overspend ratio among the three trust models, but in behaviour profiles A, C and D
using the TRID model results in a smaller overspend ratio, suggesting that the TRID
assessment model can better cope with changes in the agent environment, including the
decrease in honesty of a number of agents.
3.5.3 Approach to Statistical Significance Testing
The main aim of the evaluation is to assess the differences when using different assess-
ment models for agent selection. From the results in Section 3.5.2, we have seen that
there are some differences in performance of the different assessment models. In order to
assess whether we can generalise these results, we test them for statistical significance.
We apply paired t-tests on pairs of assessment models we want to analyse. Paired t-tests
are appropriate since we adhere to the following assumptions.
• The value pairs are independent and the experiments have been set up to run with
the same configurations, with only the assessment model used by the evaluator
changing. The two sets of experiments have also been run separately.
• The sample data is drawn from a normal population of agents according to the
selected population configurations. The t-test would also perform well if this
assumption is violated [44].
The test procedure involves the analysis of the differences between the failed
task ratio (FU ratio) when two different assessment models are used. Similarly, we also
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analyse the differences between the overspend ratio (OC ratio) between two assessment
models as used by the evaluator. The mean of the differences should be 0 if there is no
difference between the respective ratios.
Let (X11,X21), (X12,X22), . . ., (X1n ,X2n) be a set of n pairs where we assume
that the mean and variance of the population X1 are µ1 and σ
2
1, and the mean and and
variance of the population X2 are µ2 and σ
2
2. The difference between each pair of ratios
is defined as Dj = X1j − X2j , where j = 1, 2, . . . ,n. Hypotheses for the failed task
ratio F and overspend ratio O take the following forms.
HFαz : µD = µF1 −µF2 = 0
HOαz : µD = µO1 −µO2 = 0
where α is the hypothesis identifier and z is 0 or 1 for null or alternative hypothesis. F
and O are the failed task ratio and the overspend ratio respectively. Each population
XAM1 represents the set of failed task ratios for assessment model AM1, and population
XAM2 represents the set failed task ratios for assessment model AM2. Our list of null
hypotheses for precision are as follows.
HFa0: µD = µC −µTRID = 0
HFb0: µD = µT −µTRID = 0
HFc0: µD = µTRD −µTRID = 0
HFd0: µD = µC −µT = 0
HFe0: µD = µC −µTRD = 0
HFf 0: µD = µT −µTRD = 0
Similarly, our null hypotheses for overspend ratios are listed below.
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HOa0: µD = µC −µTRID = 0
HOb0: µD = µT −µTRID = 0
HOc0: µD = µTRD −µTRID = 0
HOd0: µD = µC −µT = 0
HOe0: µD = µC −µTRD = 0
HOf 0: µD = µT −µTRD = 0
The alternative hypotheses for failed task ratio and overspend ratio are now described
and these indicate that there is a difference between the ratios when different assessment
models are used. This is the set of hypotheses that we will be investigating. The
alternative hypotheses for the failed task ratios are as follows:
HFa1: µD = µC −µTRID 6= 0
HFb1: µD = µT −µTRID 6= 0
HFc1: µD = µTRD −µTRID 6= 0
HFd1: µD = µC −µT 6= 0
HFe1: µD = µC −µTRD 6= 0
HFf 1: µD = µT −µTRD 6= 0
Similarly, the alternative hypotheses for the overspend ratios are:
HOa1: µD = µC −µTRID 6= 0
HOb1: µD = µT −µTRID 6= 0
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HOc1: µD = µTRD −µTRID 6= 0
HOd1: µD = µC −µT 6= 0
HOe1: µD = µC −µTRD 6= 0
HOf 1: µD = µT −µTRD 6= 0
3.5.4 Discussion of Statistical Significance Tests
The statistical software package PASW Statistics (SPSS Statistics) 182 has been used
to calculate the paired t-tests. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the summary of hypotheses
results for the four behaviour profiles A, B, C, and D. The full details of the results are
presented in Appendix B.1.
Mean P Mean P Mean P Mean P
HFa1 0.084 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.085 0.000
HFb1 0.023 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.519 0.002 0.358
HFc1 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.489 0.001 0.556 0.003 0.116
HFd1 0.061 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.084 0.000
HFe1 0.068 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.082 0.000
HFf1 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.957 -0.001 0.498
A B C DHypothesis
Table 3.1: Summary of Hypotheses Results for Failed Task Ratio for 4 Behaviour Profiles
Table 3.1 shows that in most cases, the assessment models that use a richer
set of data perform better. This is shown by the positive mean differences in the
failed task ratio. Taking into account the four assessment models (C, T, TRD, TRID),
these are ordered in increasing richness of data used for agent assessment. For the
hypotheses where P < 0.05, we can reject the null hypotheses and can conclude that
2http://www.spss.com/software/statistics/
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there is a significant difference between the failure ratios between the corresponding
assessment models. Some of the mean differences are not statistically significant, but
we can nevertheless observe the performance trend. We note that for the hypothesis
HFc1 there is no significant difference between the failed task ratio when using TRD and
our model TRID, except for Behaviour Profile A, which represents a static environment.
Although not statistically significant, TRID results in fewer failed tasks than TRD.
Mean P Mean P Mean P Mean P
HOa1 0.057 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.036 0.000
HOb1 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.663 0.001 0.390 0.001 0.269
HOc1 0.001 0.324 0.000 0.749 0.001 0.509 0.002 0.090
HOd1 0.053 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.035 0.000
HOe1 0.056 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.035 0.000
HOf1 0.003 0.020 0.001 0.451 0.000 0.850 -0.001 0.539
A B C DHypothesis
Table 3.2: Summary of Hypotheses Results for Overspend Ratio for 4 Behaviour Profiles
The next set of statistical tests concerns the difference in the ratio of tasks
that resulted in overspending when the evaluator uses different assessment models.
Overspending occurs when the cost of a service is higher than what the provider initially
advertised it for. It relates to the honesty of the provider in giving the correct information
about its services. From Table 3.2, we can observe that the differences in overspend
ratios are significant, mainly for comparisons involving the Cost assessment model. For
all the statistically significant differences in ratio, the evaluator has overspent for a larger
proportion of tasks when it used the Cost model compared to using either of the three
trust models. The alternative hypothesis HOc1 states that there is no difference in the
mean overspend ratio between using the TRD and the TRID models. As P ≥ 0.05
in all four cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and cannot conclude that there
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is a significant difference between the two ratios. Despite the differences not being
significant, we observe that the mean differences are positive, suggesting that the failed
task ratio when using TRID is less than when using the TRD model.
3.5.5 Summary of Results
The results in Section 3.5.2 show that agents using assessment models based on trust
perform better than those that only consider service characteristics (assessment model C
compared to models T, TRD and TRID). Agents using our assessment model TRID had
fewer failed tasks compared to those using the other two trust assessment models. We
tested the differences in performance between pairs of models for statistical significance.
The test results show that with our TRID model, agents have fewer failed tasks compared
to models C and T, and these results are significant. Although the difference between
models TRID and TRD were not significant, agents using TRID tended to have fewer
failed tasks than those using TRD.
In terms of the overspend ratio, from the graph in Figure 3.5, agents using the
TRID assessment model perform at least as well as agents using trust and reputation
in their assessment. The statistical test results show that in the large majority of tests
conducted, TRID enables agents to manage their costs better than the other assessment
models. This trend is also reflected for agents that use trust and reputation information
in increasing richness. Despite only part of the result set being statistically significant,
the differences between models is mainly positive, indicating that agents perform better
when they use a rich set of information about interactions and recommendations.
In Section 2.9, we summarised the limitations of certain existing trust and rep-
utation models (namely MDT-R, Ntropi and ReGreT) with respect to the trust model
characteristics that we believe they should possess. Our TRID model is designed to
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use a wide range of trust information sources, including direct interactions and direct
and indirect recommendations, along with information at the level of service character-
istics to ensure availability and quality of the information used for reasoning. Existing
approaches do not include all of these features. For example, MDT-R [36] does not
use indirect recommendations to reason about the trustworthiness of agents. Similarly,
Ntropi [1] does not enable agents to assess agent trustworthiness in as many service
characteristics as they deem necessary. In dynamic environments, agents tend to change
behaviour rapidly and the freshness of interaction information is important for an evalu-
ator to rapidly identify and respond to such changes. This is achieved by using recency
as a characteristic in our TRID trust model, while other models, such as Ntropi, do
not include this feature. Recommendations are an important source of information for
trust assessment. However, not only should witnesses be known to the evaluator, but
their opinions should be relevant, such that only reliable witnesses are approached for
useful recommendations. Again, other models, such as ReGreT [104], do not use this
approach to witness selection. These benefits ensure that our model can reliably support
agents in assessing the trustworthiness of agents, as well as enabling the gathering of a
rich set of interaction and recommendation information for further reasoning.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
3.6.1 Related Work
Using trust together with reputation taps into various sources of trust information to
assess agents’ trustworthiness. Our model uses both sources of information, as do
existing models, including ReGreT [106], FIRE [46], Ntropi [1], and MDT-R [36].
The trust information from direct interactions is the most reliable and least prone to
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subjectivity, as it it the evaluating agent’s own experience. In certain circumstances
when direct interactions are few or outdated, the evaluator supplements direct trust
information with reputation information obtained from third parties. This allows the
evaluator to still make an accurate assessment of the target agent’s trustworthiness.
The multiple dimensions of trust and reputation based on MDT-R [36] aim to
further improve the accuracy of trust assessment and reduce the subjectivity of trust
information via recommendations. Separating trust and reputation information into the
important service characteristics allows decisions to be made based on the priorities of
the evaluator.
ConvenienceTimeliness
Delivery
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Quality PriceDelivery
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0.3
Figure 3.6: Ontological Structure in ReGreT.
In our model, agents have weights associated with the relevance of each service
dimension, trust and reputation in the computation of the final performance value that is
used to compare several potential interaction agents. ReGreT [104, 107] also assumes
the use of weights by agents when considering the various behaviours in combining
the different sources of trust and reputation in their ontological dimension. Figure 3.6
illustrates an ontological structure of the reputation of a good seller, as used in ReGreT.
The reputation of a good seller is related to the reputation of its delivery, the price and
quality of its product. As illustrated in the diagram, the delivery aspect can be further
broken down into the aspects of timeliness and convenience. In ReGreT, the calculation
of the reputation of each aspect involves calculating the reputation of the related aspects
which can be in subgraphs [106]. Although the model handles complex behaviours of
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agents, changes in the weights in any of the subgraphs would involve a recalculation
of the reputation in the related aspects, in order to obtain the highest reputation value
that reflects the agent’s current behaviour.
The mechanism used to apply different weights to witnesses, as used by Yu and
Singh [140], is similar to the use of recommendation trust in our model. In both cases,
agents are able to detect those witnesses which are not giving accurate ratings. However,
neither is able to detect whether the differing ratings are a result of errors, collusion, or
other type of deception. Our model is also different from Yu and Singh in that we allow
indirect recommendations.
Service
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Figure 3.7: Model Overview From Provider’s Perspective.
In our approach, agents agree on a fixed set of dimensions that characterise
the services in the domain. For example, as illustrated in Figure 3.7, a service can
be characterised in four dimensions, each of which has a weight associated with it
to represent its importance. Even if the agents update the weights of the different
dimensions to reflect their preferences, this does not affect how the trust and reputation
values are calculated. Furthermore, the agreed set of dimensions makes the sharing
of information more flexible among agents as all agents use dimensions within the set.
The values for each dimension are still subjective, but the sharing of information about
the aspects of a service is easier, as compared to ReGreT, where the ontology used
can vary among agents and for different aspects that they represent. The different way
of expressing these aspects in ReGreT makes the translation of the meanings among
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different agents more difficult and is more prone to the subjectivity problem.
3.6.2 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented our model of trust and reputation, which is has
four main characteristics. Firstly, it is based on a number of trust information sources,
including direct interactions, as well as direct and indirect recommendations. Secondly,
trust assessment is done at a service level, enabling services to be individually assessed
as well as at the level of their separate characteristics. Thirdly, the model considers
recency for an accurate trust evaluation. Finally, the relevance of recommendations is
taken into account for assessing recommendations. These trust model characteristics
have been identified from a review of trust models in the literature and having analysed
their contributions and limitations.
Combining these sources of trust information aims to ensure that the evaluator
can more accurately assess the trustworthiness of a potential interaction partner in
different situations. Insufficient direct interactions and direct recommendations can
be complemented by including indirect recommendations from trusted agents. Our
approach also represents trust and reputation in multiple dimensions to maintain the
richness of the original information so as to make more accurate decisions based on the
various service characteristics and agent behaviour. From our review of trust models in
Section 2.5, ReGreT is the only model to use a number of trust sources and considers
the service characteristics in its ontological dimension of reputation. However, ReGreT
does not look at trust and the other dimensions of reputation (individual and social) as
pertinent to individual service characteristics that are important to the evaluator agent.
Some existing trust models consider either recency or relevance, but not both. Our
model therefore uniquely brings together these four key characteristics to improve trust
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assessment and to allow for a richer set of data for future analysis.
In our evaluations (Section 3.5), we have shown that our trust and reputation
model (TRID) has a good performance compared to the other trust models. From the
results, we observed that although the difference between failed task ratios using our
model and a comparison model was not always statistically significant, the sign in the
difference value showed that our model performed slightly better than the TRD model,
for instance. The results also showed the trend of the failure ratio decreasing as the
assessment model used richer data for its agent assessment. One important issue to
consider in future work is how agents can dynamically adapt to changes in agent be-
haviour to maintain their performance rates. In the present model, recommendation
trust is used to assess the trustworthiness of a witness in giving recommendations for
interactions similar to those of the evaluator. One limitation of using only one rec-
ommendation trust value is the non-differentiation of the trustworthiness of direct and
indirect witnesses. The recommendation trust could be further subdivided into direct
and indirect recommendation trust if it is important for the evaluator to specifically
choose among witnesses based on the type of recommendation they give. Additional
open issues that would need to be considered are the optimal length of recommendation
chain to use and the confidence in the indirect recommendation at different points in
the chain.
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Chapter 4
Agent Network Model Building
4.1 Introduction
The main motivation for individual agents to build a model of their agent network is to
obtain a better picture of their environment, through their own interactions and from the
recommendations of others. The aim is to use the agent network model to support their
future decision making. Past interaction histories and recommendations throughout
the interaction period are made up of different types of information which, if properly
extracted and analysed, can be valuable for agents. Different types of information can
be extracted from the agent network model, regarding the relationships between agents.
The information in the form of agent graphs is also useful for system architects and
human analysts who are responsible for tuning the agent system parameters to maintain
effectiveness. Agent systems can be complex, with many nodes and many more edges
among them. Visualisation tools to easily view the how agents are linked and the data
shared are increasingly becoming necessary to support human users.
The aim of this work is to easily represent and view agent networks and the rich
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set of data that have been gathered with our trust and reputation model, discussed in
Chapter 3. Human analysts can get a better understanding of how the agent network
is organised and can subsequently extract other useful information that was previously
unknown. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following subsec-
tions give an overview of the types of information discovery that can be performed on
the agent graphs. Next, we present the different types of agent graphs, built and main-
tained to represent the agent network model. We then study a number of agent graphs
that are built by agents and view the data they hold with the help of visualisation tools.
Finally, we present an example of an evaluator uses interaction and recommendation
information to build agent graphs.
4.1.1 Rediscovery of Service Providers
Agents are assumed to have access to a service directory that provides an up-to-date
listing of service providers and the services they provide. When an evaluator agent wants
to acquire a particular service, it usually looks up potential providers from the service
directory. The selection of the most appropriate provider is based on past experience, and
also recommendations. For example, an evaluator ae may have had a number of recent
unsuccessful interactions with a particular provider ap . As a result, the evaluator’s trust
in ap decreases and if the trust value goes lower than its trust threshold, ae is unlikely to
interact with ap in the future. In the case where the evaluator has a long memory of past
interactions, it might take longer to notice positive changes in ap . With the help of an
agent network model, ae can keep track of how agents in its environment are interlinked
despite not interacting with ap as a result of its untrustworthiness. Recommendations
about different services and agents may reveal that agents are interacting with ap ,
possibly arising from a change in behaviour. The evaluator may then use this information
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to resume transactions with ap sooner than it would otherwise have done.
4.1.2 Agent Interaction Discovery
Agents have direct knowledge about their own interactions. However, they can only learn
about those of other agents in the environment through communication, in particular
from recommendations. By sharing its opinion, a witness ar is effectively giving details
about its own interactions with the target agent at , or is passing on the experiences of an
intermediate witness ar ′. From recommendations, both direct and indirect, the evaluator
can learn how the agents in its neighbourhood are interlinked. For instance, an indirect
recommendation from ar to ar ′, which is then passed on to the evaluator, informs of ar
and ar ′ being possible interaction partners, due to the short recommendation chain.
4.1.3 Collusion Detection
Collusion among a set of agents can affect an evaluator agent in many ways. For
example, it may be the victim of demotion by agents acting as witnesses, or it may be
paying high prices as a result of price collusion. It is therefore important for an agent to
be able to detect such collusive behaviour and act upon it to ensure successful future
interactions. Information about how agents are interconnected, and on which level, such
as service provision or recommendation links, are useful to enable the observing agent
to analyse any particular interaction patterns or irregularities that lead to the detection
of possible collusive activity.
4.2 Agent Graphs
The conceptual graphs (provider, witness, and combined graphs) are modelled and
implemented as four types of graph, two in each of the provider and witness cate-
126
gories: service-oriented and agent-oriented provider graphs, as well as service-oriented
and agent-oriented witness graphs. We now describe these graphs in more detail, as
well as highlight some useful graph elements.
4.2.1 Service-oriented Provider Graph
A service-oriented provider graph is built and maintained by an agent to keep a record
of the providers it interacts with for particular services. An evaluator holds one service-
oriented provider graph for each of the service types it is concerned with. When the
agent is new to the environment and has no previous interactions, it uses its initial
trust to interact with other agents. The graph of agent providers initially depicts only
the direct service providers of the evaluating agent. The nodes represent agents and
the edges show the interactions between agents, including the strength of each link, in
terms of experience (number of interactions). The direct providers of the evaluator form
a star-shaped structure, with the evaluator in the centre. Figure 4.1 shows an example
of such a graph. The evaluator keeps a record of interaction information for each type
of service.
Each edge is directed from the evaluator to the provider, and the weight includes
the number of positive and negative interactions between the two agents for a particular
service, denoted as:
edge : ae → ap , count+, count− (4.1)
where there is an edge from each evaluator ae to each of the providers ap , the edge also
has values relating to the interaction, count+ being the count of positive interactions,
while count− is the count of negative interactions. The algorithm for building this graph
is presented in Algorithm 4.1, where the service-oriented provider graph is updated every
time an interaction is completed between the evaluator and a service provider.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a Service-oriented Provider Graph.
Algorithm 4.1 updates the provider agent graph for a particular service. The list
of providers the evaluator has already interacted with can be found in history His and
for each new interaction, the evaluator checks against this list. If it is a new provider, a
new edge is added, and in all cases, the count of interactions is incremented, depending
on whether they were positive or negative.
4.2.2 Agent-oriented Provider Graph
An evaluator also builds an agent-oriented provider graph to record the overall inter-
actions with different service providers, irrespective of the service type. The evaluator
maintains one agent-oriented provider graph for each service provider. An example of
such a graph is shown in Figure 4.2. Building and updating the graph is similar to that
of the service-oriented provider graph, except that the agent-oriented graph is updated
for each interaction between the evaluator and a provider, unlike the service-oriented
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Algorithm 4.1 Updating the Service-oriented Provider Graph
for all interaction is do
if ap 6∈ His then
add edge(ap , ae)
endif
if is = positive then
increment count+
else
increment count−
endif
endfor
provider graph which is updated only when there has been an interaction between the
evaluator and a provider for a particular service type.
4.2.3 Service-oriented Witness Graph
The nodes represent the witnesses (direct or indirect) and the edges specify the links
among agents, such as the type of recommendation, the number of opinions shared, and
the number of accurate and inaccurate opinions. The witness graph is updated after
the evaluator has requested and obtained the recommendation and has used it in its
decision-making process to interact with the recommended agent.
The principal or direct witnesses give their own opinions to the evaluator or
they are the first to be contacted by the evaluator if the recommendation is indirect.
They are also structured around the evaluator in a star shape, with directed edges
from the evaluator to the witness. The service-oriented witness graph concerns the
opinions the evaluator stores about a particular service type. Indirect recommendations
are represented as a chain linking the evaluator to the principal witness and another edge
between the principal witness to the secondary witness. An example of such a graph is
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Figure 4.2: Example of an Agent-oriented Provider Graph.
depicted in Figure 4.3.
In this example, the evaluator a1 received a number of direct recommendations
from two direct witnesses a2 and a3. From a2, it has received one recommendation,
which was accurate when compared to the evaluator’s subsequent interaction with the
target. Witness a3 has been giving recommendations about service type s4, with one
accurate, one inaccurate and one unused recommendation. The graph also shows that
a1 has received an indirect recommendation about service s3 from secondary witness a5,
via principal witness a2.
Each edge is directed from the recommendation requester to the witness, and
the weight includes the number of accurate and inaccurate recommendations, as well as
the number of unused recommendations.
edge : ae → ar , count+, count−, countunused (4.2)
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Figure 4.3: Example of a Service-oriented Witness Graph.
The principal witness may request the opinion of secondary witnesses and thus
form directed edges to the principal witness.
edge : ar ′ → ar , count+, count−, countunused (4.3)
The pseudocode for building the graph of witnesses is presented in Algorithms 4.2
and 4.3. For a direct recommendation, an edge is created for every new witness and
the recommendation count is incremented. If the recommendation is indirect, then the
graph needs to be updated iteratively for every indirect recommendation. An edge needs
to be created or updated from the further witness in the chain to the closer one. In
Algorithm 4.3, ar ′′ denotes the further witness in the chain.
Algorithm 4.2 updates the direct witness interactions in the witness graph. For a
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Algorithm 4.2 Updating Direct Witnesses in the Witness Graph
for all direct recommendation rd do
if ar 6∈ Hir then
add edge(ar , ae)
endif
if rd used do
increment countunused
else
// if recommendation is used for actual interaction
if r is close to actual is then
increment count+ // accurate recommendation
else
increment count− // inaccurate recommendation
endif
endif
endfor
new witness, a new link is added from the evaluator to that witness. If the evaluator does
not use the recommendation, it updates the countunused count, otherwise it updates the
successful or failed interaction counts.
Algorithm 4.3 updates the indirect witness links in the witness graph. If the
recommendation is unused, the countunused count is incremented. Otherwise, since it
is an indirect recommendation, the direct links between the secondary witness and the
target need to be updated.
4.2.4 Agent-oriented Witness Graph
An agent-oriented witness graph is maintained by an evaluator to record all the recom-
mendations it receives about agents, irrespective of service type. An example is shown
in Figure 4.4 and the graph building mirrors that for the service-oriented witness graph
presented previously.
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Algorithm 4.3 Updating Indirect Witnesses in the Witness Graph
for all indirect recommendation r i do
if ar ′ 6∈ Hir then
add edge(ar ′, ae)
endif
if r i unused do
increment countunused
else
repeat
if ar ′′ 6∈ Hir then
add edge(ar ′′, ar ′)
endif
increment countresponse
until r = rd // direct recommendation
endif
endfor
4.2.5 Combination and Extension of Graphs
From the provider and witness graphs, an agent can further extend and combine the
graphs to help in identifying agent relationships not previously known. From the graph
of witnesses, if an interaction results from the recommendation given via a chain of
witnesses, the evaluator can identify the last witness in the chain to be the effective
witness, who actually directly interacted with the target agent. As a result, the evaluator
can extend its provider graph to add the target as a service provider for the ultimate
witness.
From the witness graph, the evaluator can extend its provider graph. The addi-
tional providers are not its own direct providers, but the providers of its providers. This
information can be valuable when analysing the relationships among the agents in its
environment. Algorithm 4.4 shows the extension to the provider graph, by combining
information from the witness graph, following an indirect recommendation. Along the
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Figure 4.4: Example of an Agent-oriented Witness Graph.
recommendation chain, the ultimate witness ar ′′ provides a direct recommendation as
it has interacted with the target agent at itself.
Algorithm 4.4 Extending the Provider Graph
add edge(ar ′′, at)
update countinteraction // experience information provided by ar ′′
For an agent interaction occurring as a partial result of indirect recommendations,
an evaluator updates its provider and witness graphs as shown in Algorithm 4.5. The
term rµ is the currently processed recommendation. For a direct recommendation, an
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edge is created for each new witness and the recommendation count is incremented.
Indirect recommendations are updated recursively, with edges created or updated from
the further witness ar ′′ in the chain to a closer one ar ′. Moreover, the evaluator ac also
updates its provider graph to include the link between ar ′ and ar ′′, since ar ′ obtained a
direct recommendation from ar ′′. Every time an edge is added or updated, the number
of accurate, inaccurate or unused recommendations is incremented; this is represented
by countresponse in the algorithm.
Algorithm 4.5 Provider and Witness Graph Updates for Indirect Recommendations
for all indirect recommendation r i do
if r i .ar ′ 6∈ P ar ′ then
add edge(ar ′, ac) in ae .witnessGraph
increment countresponse
repeat
if r i .ar ′′ 6∈ P ar then
add edge(ar ′′, ar ′) in ac .providerGraph
increment countresponse
until rµ = r
d
Let us consider the example shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.3. The evaluator a1 can
extend its service-oriented provider graph from information from the service-oriented
witness graph, in this case about the interaction between a2 and a5. The extended
graph is shown in Figure 4.5.
4.2.6 Agent Graph Elememts
In this section, we discuss the various considerations of the data collection for the agent
network building process. The proposed trust and reputation model gathers sufficient
information for an agent to be able to effectively select interaction partners, purely based
on its own past interactions and the opinions of others. In order to build an extended
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Figure 4.5: Example of an Extended Service-oriented Provider Graph.
view of their environment, agents will need to gather extra information to learn about
other agents and their interactions.
4.2.6.1 Recommendations Count
Our trust and reputation model efficiently selects the most relevant recommendations
based on criteria such as length of the recommendation chain and relevant experience.
For agents to build accurate agent networks, we believe that evaluators should take
into account all the recommendations they obtain, if only to gather information on how
the different agents in its environment relate to one another. Consequently, our model
allows agents to record all the recommendations they obtain since opinions are excellent
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indicators of agent activities.
4.2.6.2 Recording Intermediate Recommendations
While the identity of witnesses along a recommendation chain is not essential for an eval-
uator who assesses mainly its principal witness, it is an important piece of information
for an evaluator building an extended view of its agent environment. Our trust and rep-
utation model keeps a record of all intermediate witnesses and their recommendations.
This is reflected in the witness graphs which show both direct and indirect recommen-
dations. The trust model incorporates the assessment of indirect witnesses for trust
evaluation. However, our evaluation considers the recommendation trust of principal
witnesses, rather than that of all witnesses, as we aim to assess the combination of
features in our model, especially the use of indirect recommendations.
4.3 Information Extraction
In this section, we demonstrate the usage of the agent network model by an evaluator to
extract useful information for decision making. We show two types, namely, discovery of
new providers, and learning about the interactions of other agents in the environment.
The third type, collusion detection, will be covered in Chapter 5. Graphs presented in
this section have been created by the visualisation tool we implemented to show the
interactions between agents.
4.3.1 Discovering New Service Providers
The discovery of new service providers refers to an evaluator re-engaging in transactions
with a service provider after a period of time, possibly due to previous unsuccessful
or inadequate interactions which have lowered the evaluator’s trust in the provider.
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It may happen that agents previously performing poorly improve and become reliable
providers. However, an agent can take longer to discover this change due to various
factors, including a long memory, which helps to assess the trustworthiness of agents,
but also causes the evaluator to keep this assessment for longer, despite the improved
trustworthiness of that agent. One way of countering the downsides of a long memory is
to make use of recommendation information to assess the recent behaviour and reliability
of the agent of interest.
Figure 4.6: Agent-oriented Provider
Graph: a3 Untrustworthy.
Figure 4.7: Agent-oriented Provider
Graph: a3 Becoming Trustworthy
As an example, let us consider a small population of five agents, with the eval-
uator being a1. Figure 4.6 shows a1’s extended agent-oriented provider graph after a
number of interactions. The number of agents is 5 in the graph while the population
size is 10. This is due to the evaluator only interacting with agents it needs to pro-
vide services and recommendations. It directly interacts with service providers a2, a3
and a4 and receives direct recommendations from a4 and indirect ones from a5. From
the interaction count, a3 is untrustworthy, with more failed interactions. As a result,
evaluator a1 starts relying more on a2 for the same service type. Provider a3 however
improves its trustworthiness at a later point and evaluator a1 can notice this change
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through the recommendations about a3 that it continues requesting. The assumption
here is that the cost of interaction failure with a3 is high, such that a1 is less likely to
decay its trustworthiness towards a3 quickly to attempt to renew a transaction in case
of a positive behaviour change. Figure 4.7 shows the graph at a later point in time,
when the witnesses are reporting an improvement in a3’s trustworthiness. For instance,
a5’s recommendation of a3 has improved from (2, 8) to (10, 10) for the pair of positive
and negative interactions, showing that a3 has been interacting more successfully since
the graph in Figure 4.6.
4.3.2 Learning about Neighbouring Agent Interactions
Figure 4.8: Agent-oriented Provider Graph. Figure 4.9: Service-oriented
Provider Graph for Service s4.
One of the limitations of decentralised multi-agent systems is that each individual
agent has only a localised view of its environment. To allow for a more thorough
understanding of its environment, an evaluator needs to gather as much information
as it can about its neighbours and their interactions. As an example, let us consider a
population of 10 agents, labelled a1 to a10, where a1 is the evaluating agent. After a
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period of interaction with other agents, for services and recommendations, a1 records
these interactions and builds a model of its agent environment. Figure 4.8 shows the
agent-oriented provider graph, while Figure 4.9 shows the service-oriented provider graph
for service type s4.
Figure 4.10: Agent-oriented Witness
Graph.
Figure 4.11: Service-oriented Witness
Graph for Service s4.
Evaluator a1 also uses its recommendations to build witness graphs and updates
the graph edges depending on the whether the recommendations are used for interac-
tions with the target agent. Where the recommendations have been used, the evaluator
compares its own interaction with the recommendation of the witness, thereby assess-
ing the accuracy of the witness. Figure 4.10 shows a1’s agent-oriented witness graph.
In this case, a1 has received a direct recommendation from a4 and it was accurate
in comparison to a1’s own interaction with the target for which the recommendation
was given. Figure 4.11 depicts the service-oriented witness graph for service type s4.
From this graph, the evaluator a1 learns about agent a2’s interactions with a4, from
the indirect recommendation a1 received from a4 through the intermediate witness a2.
Such information helps the evaluator to understand how agents in its environment are
interlinked and possibly influence its own interactions and behaviour. The edges of the
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witness graphs have two elements of information: the direct recommendations and the
indirect ones. For example, as shown in Figure 4.10, a1 has received one direct recom-
mendation from a4, but no indirect recommendations. The triple (1, 0, 0) indicates that
the recommendation was accurate, while there has been no inaccurate recommendations
or unused opinions, as described in Figure 4.4.
4.3.3 Visualisation Tool
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the ability to view the agent graphs is a useful tool
for human analysts. We have implemented a visualisation tool that enables users to
restructure the agent graphs on the screen for easier viewing of the information. We
first describe the network building process.
Trust and recommendation information is gathered in histories of interactions and
recommendations, and this is represented in Figure 4.12. An entry for an interaction
has the following format.
i sn ae ap result
where i denotes a service interaction between the evaluator ae and provider ap for a
service of type sn . The result in this example is a boolean value, 0 for a failed interaction,
and 1 for a successful one. Note that the result of the interaction looks at the success
dimension, but individual service characteristics can also be recorded for a more detailed
analysis. In Figure 4.12, Example 1 shows an example of a service interaction entry. The
letter ’i’ denotes that this is a service interaction of type s4 that the evaluator a1 has
requested provider a4 to do and the result (last column) was successful, as indicated by
the number 1.
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Figure 4.12: Example Extract of Interaction and Recommendation Histories.
Recommendation history entries have the following format.
r sn ae ar at ar ′ rtype rsuccess rfailure result
where r indicates a recommendation as requested by the evaluator ae from principal
witness ar about the target at ’s service type sn . If the recommendation is indirect, ar ′
represents the secondary witness and the recommendation type rtype reflects this. rsuccess
denotes the positive number of interactions from the witness’ opinion. rfailure gives the
number of negative interactions the witness has had with the target. A recommendation
entry is added after an evaluator has used the recommendation to interact with the target
agent. Thus, the last column result gives an indication of whether the recommendation
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was accurate compared to the actual interaction experienced by the evaluator; a value
of 1 indicates that it was accurate, while 0 suggests that the recommendation was not
accurate. In Figure 4.12, Example 2 shows a recommendation entry, identified by the
letter ’r’. It is a direct recommendation requested by a1 from a4 about target provider
a3. The opinions received consist of 3 positive interactions and 8 failed ones. The 1 in
the last column expresses similarity in the evaluator’s own experience after interacting
with a3.
In our implementation of the agent network model, an agent gathers information
about trust and reputation while interacting with others for services and recommenda-
tions. For every task, the agent records the outcomes of the interaction and recommen-
dations related to that interaction. The appropriate graphs are thus updated to reflect
the current state of the agent’s perception of its environment. The events prompting
each graph update can be represented as a collection of interaction and recommenda-
tion histories, as shown in Figure 4.12. We have developed a visualisation tool using
the JGraph1 and JGraphT2 Java graph libraries to support the agent network model,
particularly in verifying the links among agents, and discovering previously unknown
links. The tool can potentially help users to better understand the agent environment,
especially when information extraction enables retrospective analysis, for instance, for
collusion detection. Sample graphs visualisations are shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11.
Figure 4.10 shows an agent-oriented witness graph, with a directed link from agent a1
to a4, with edge information recording that a1 has received one direct recommendation
from a4 and the triple (1,0,0) shows that one was accurate, none was inaccurate, and
none was unused. Figure 4.11 depicts a service-oriented witness graph for the service
type s4. Agent a1 has requested for recommendation from three agents, a3, a2, and
1http://www.jgraph.com
2http://jgrapht.sourceforge.net
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a4. The only direct recommendation from a3 was inaccurate. Similarly, a1 received two
recommendations from a4 and both direct recommendations were inaccurate.
We include some examples of screenshots of the agent graphs, resulting from
the use of the visualisation tool. Some graphs have been restructured for the clarity of
the nodes and edge labels on the screenshots. Figure 4.13 shows the provider graph for
evaluator a1 when the population size is 1000. Showing more clearly the links between
agents, Figure 4.14 depicts the provider graph for evaluator a1 when the population size
is 10. For a population of 25, Figure 4.15 shows one the service-oriented witness graphs
for the evaluator a1.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusions
4.4.1 Related Work
Trust and reputation models, such as HISTOS [142], ReGreT [104], and FIRE [45] use a
notion of social network for recommendations. HISTOS, for instance, is a pairwise rating
system whereby users form a directed graph with the weighted edge representing the
most recent reputation rating from one user to the other. In comparison, our mechanism
makes use of service-oriented and agent-oriented provider and witness graphs to represent
various relationships among agents. We also aim to use the social network information
not only for reputation values, but also to extract other valuable information, such as
new providers and collusive agents.
4.4.2 Conclusions
Individual agents making use of trust and reputation to select the most appropriate
interaction partners can apply the information further to learn about their environment.
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Figure 4.13: Agent-Oriented Provider Graph with a Population Size of 1000.
Decentralised agents suffer from localised and limited views of their environment, which
is often insufficient to understand many of the agent interactions. With regard to
this limitation, we proposed to enable agents to extend their local view by building a
model of their agent network from information they are already gathering through agent
interaction and recommendations. The agent network model can then be analysed and
valuable information can be extracted about agent relationships and behaviours, that can
be useful for the agents’ future decision making. We have provided an approach by which
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agents can represent their agent networks from rich interaction and recommendation
information. We have also built a visualisation tool to help human analysts to more
easily view the agent population using the agent graphs and to better understand the
types of links between agents, as well as their strength. For complex graphs, the tool is
especially useful as it allows the graph structure to be restructured for better viewing.
This chapter outlined some of the types of information that can be extracted,
from re-discovery of service providers to discovering the neighbourhood of a particular
provider. The evaluator uses service-oriented and agent-oriented provider and witness
graphs to represent the information collected while assessing the trustworthiness of
agents. The agents’ social networks can be used as the basis for detecting possible
collusion, as will be described in the following chapter.
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Figure 4.14: Agent-Oriented Provider Graph with a Population Size of 10.
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Figure 4.15: Service-Oriented Witness Graph with a Population Size of 25.
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Chapter 5
Collusion Detection
5.1 Introduction
Collusion is a phenomenon where competition drives malicious agents to attempt to gain
benefits at the expense of other agents in the environment. It is yet another source of
uncertainty that self-interested agents experience when interacting in a heterogeneous
open and distributed environment. The ability of agents to detect collusion potentially
minimises further the uncertainty of interactions they face. Collusion detection is the
first step towards finding a solution to this problem, including preventing future collusion.
As introduced in Section 1.2, we aim to support collusion detection by identifying the
characteristics of collusion in the e-commerce domain, in terms of the interactions and
recommendations among agents. We also aim to use the rich set of information gathered
about other agents, as well as their social networks to extract knowledge about collusive
behaviour, by using existing data mining techniques.
The previous chapter described how building and maintaining agent network
graphs helps agents to extract previously unknown information. Collusion detection is
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one such example and this chapter aims to demonstrate how agents can detect po-
tentially collusive agents by using the information gathered from their interactions and
analysing shared information and agent relationships. Collusion has long been a hard
problem to solve in agent systems. In this work, we show how individual agents can
use information about their agent environment to inform their decision making and be
collusion-aware. Our approach aims to enable agents to identify potentially collusive
agent pairs. The information obtained is useful for a human user to analyse further or
for an agent to incorporate into its agent selection process for future interactions. We
propose two main contributions in this chapter. Firstly, we present a new taxonomy of
collusion for the e-commerce domain, which classifies collusion by type and by its char-
acteristics. Secondly, we propose to use similarity measurement — a technique which
has been commonly used in data mining — for collusion detection.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, we define collusion and
the context of its occurrence. Secondly, we describe our taxonomy of collusion in the
e-commerce domain. Next, we look at the collusion detection techniques used in agent-
based systems and in other fields. We then present our approach to collusion detection
with the use of similarity measurement for an example collusion type. This approach is
then evaluated and we conclude with findings and future work.
5.2 Defining Collusion
Collusion is defined as the cooperation among a group of agents to gain benefits at
the expense of other agents. Agents exhibiting this behaviour use deception to achieve
their goals. For example, a group of provider agents that are not performing well may
collude with other agents in the population so that they would boost their reputation
when recommendations are requested about those providers. The witnesses may benefit
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from this arrangement by benefiting from cheaper prices from the provider agents or can
expect reciprocal behaviour about recommendations. The deceived party is the agent
that has requested recommendations from the collusive witnesses and if these are used
for decision making and the collusive providers subsequently used for service provision,
the interaction will be below expectations.
Two main types of collusion discussed in the literature are tacit collusion and
explicit collusion [129, 41, 101]. Tacit collusion, also known as implicit collusion is
considered to be an agreement to collude without any communication among agents.
In auctions, for example, bids usually show the intention of the bidders and this can
be used to implicitly signal collusion, since there is no explicit communication among
bidders about their strategies, in the form of “jump-bidding”, “sniping” and withholding
bids. Vragov defines jump-bidding as submitting a bid, which is larger than the current
high bid plus two minimum increments [129]. Sniping is a phenomenon where bidders
wait until the last minutes to submit their bids. Tacit collusion however, does not
necessarily involve any collusion in the legal sense of the term, such as the antitrust laws
in Articles 101 and 102 of the EU Treaty [15, 49]. Explicit collusion refers to different
agents engaging in direct communication and obvious coordination to impact on the
price and welfare of other agents [41]. The issue here is to be able to detect agents
that are explicitly coordinating their behaviour through illegal means of communication.
In decentralised multi-agent systems, it is difficult for individual agents to be
aware of all the communications that take place among agents and detect the ones that
concern a collusive agreement. In our work, we are not seeking to have agents detect
collusion as a legal requirement, but more as an added benefit to improve the success
of their interactions. Agents, therefore do not need to differentiate between tacit and
explicit collusion and are mainly concerned about being able to detect agent behaviour
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that has similar results to collusion. As the characteristics of explicit collusion are better
defined than tacit collusion, we will focus on explicit collusion in this thesis.
5.3 Collusion Detection
The detection of explicit collusion has been studied from an economics perspective, for
example, in the work by Harrington [41], where cartels are discovered using a structural
approach or a behavioural method. The Cambridge online dictionary defines a cartel as
“a group of similar independent companies who join together to control prices and limit
competition”1. The structural approach of detection involves identifying markets with
traits thought to be conducive to collusion, such as fewer firms, more homogeneous
products and a more stable demand. In contrast, a behavioural approach involves
either observing the means by which firms coordinate or observing the end result of
that coordination. In some cases, it is the means by which companies colluded that
leads to the discovery, for instance, proof of cartel meetings, or an employee involved in
the conspiracy speaking out. Alternatively, the behavioural approach can focus on the
market impact of that coordination, for instance, suspicions can arise from the pattern
of the firms’ prices or quantities or some other aspect of the market behaviour. As
Harrington points out, governmental agencies and private corporations actively search
for illegal activity, however, there are no analogous policies when it comes to illegal
cartels. He believes that economic analysis can play a greater role in the detection of
cartels. Even though economic analysis alone might not be sufficient to detect and
prosecute cartels, it can play a more active role in identifying the industries worthy of
closer inspection.
With respect to the above discussion on collusion and its detection, we believe
1http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
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that the issue of collusion detection is still mostly unresolved in agent-based systems,
which automate their physical world counterparts. In particular, collusion detection at
the individual agent level is still an open problem. Very few interaction mechanisms
can prevent or deal with collusion [100]. For instance, Brandt [7] proposes a private
and secure auction protocol that ensures that malicious bidders that do not follow the
publicly-verifiable protocol, are detected immediately and can be excluded from the set
of bidders. However, this solution is a system-level solution, which detects collusion
based on the rules of the auction protocol. Palshikar and Apte [95] propose a graph
clustering algorithm to detect collusion sets in the stock trading domain. They then
use the Dempster-Schafer theory of evidence to combine the candidate collusion sets
detected by the individual algorithms. This solution has been designed to work on a
trading database, which can be considered as requiring a global view of the system. On
an individual level, detection of collusion by agents has been much less researched.
To be able to detect collusion, agents need to identify the characteristic be-
haviours that constitute collusion, which can be of different types. In the following
section, we propose a taxonomy of collusion to classify collusion by type and character-
istic features.
5.4 Taxonomy of Collusion
The detection of collusion necessitates the identification of the types of collusion and
their characteristics. Smed et al. [117, 118] classify collusion among multi-player online
games, such as poker and real-time strategy games, namely Age of Empires III2, accord-
ing to four main aspects related to the agreement among the colluders. The four main
aspects are: (i) consent (the agreement on collusion, whether tacit or explicit), (ii) scope
2http://www.ageofempires3.com, Age of Empires III, Microsoft Corporation, 2005
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(areas of the game affected by collusion), (iii) duration (identifies the start and end of
the collusion activity), and (iv) content (specifies what is exchanged, traded, or donated
during the collusion process). Other aspects may need to be included depending on the
domain. For example, an additional aspect in the domain of online computer games is
the role of the partakers — players and participants — in the game.
Smed et al. consider that collusion occurs only where cooperation is forbidden
by the rules of the game. In the context of the distributed multi-agent systems, agent
cooperation is essential as agents usually cannot achieve their individual goals on their
own. However, collusion also exists in these systems due to certain types of cooperation
being considered malicious, such as promoting an unreliable agent in exchange for some
benefit.
Aspects
Occurrence Role and ExchangeScope
Duration Cause
Persistent Transient Agent-
driven
Situation-
driven
Total Partial Service
characteristics
Recommendation
Direct Indirect
Target-
Witness
Witness-
Witness
Target-
Witness
Witness-
Witness
Figure 5.1: Classification of Collusion Aspects.
Drawing on the categorisation outlined by Smed et al., we present a classification
of collusion types that we believe is most suited for e-commerce, and with their particular
characteristics. Figure 5.1 shows the aspects of collusion and the sub-categories we are
considering. We are not making any distinction between tacit and explicit collusion,
hence we do not include Smed et al.’s use of the Consent aspect. We use the remaining
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three aspects of scope, duration and content, presented by Smed et al. and also their
consideration of roles in the collusion [117]. However, we adapt the aspects to the
context of agent-based systems and propose a new classification, further detailed in the
next section. Therefore, our taxonomy uses Smed et al.’s scope, duration, content and
role aspects for classifying collusion types. In our taxonomy, the scope aspect is used as
in Smed’s, while we have included the duration aspect in a wider occurrence aspect that
also takes into account the cause of the collusion. We have integrated the content and
role aspects from Smed under the heading of “role and exchange” to describe the roles
of the collusive partners and what they share during collusion in those circumstances. In
contrast to Smed, we have broken down these aspects further, as presented in Figure 5.1.
5.4.1 Aspects of Collusion
Various aspects need to be considered when categorising the types of collusion occurring
within decentralised multi-agent systems. The classification of aspects is depicted in
Figure 5.1.
5.4.1.1 Occurrence Aspect
The occurrence aspect of collusion indicates the duration of collusion within the inter-
action period, and the causes of the collusive behaviour. Under the duration sub-aspect,
two types can be identified: persistent collusion refers to an agreement that spans the
entire duration of the interaction period, while transient collusion occurs temporarily, as
agents collude, and disband afterwards.
The causes of collusion occurrence are divided into agent-driven and situation-
driven. Agent-driven collusion occurs when the agent’s intrinsic state triggers collusive
behaviour (poor performance might increase the agent’s likelihood to collude with other
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agents in exchange for a better reputation, for instance). Meanwhile, situation-driven
collusion occurs when agents identify that they can benefit from a particular set of
opportunistic events or interactions.
5.4.1.2 Scope Aspect
The scope defines the extent of the collusive behaviour. Total collusion suggests that
agents will collude in all their common areas of interest, partial collusion only concerns
some areas of interest, while the agents will compete with one another in other areas.
5.4.1.3 Impact (Role and Exchange) Aspect
This aspect concerns the roles that collusive agents play in the collusion and what gets
exchanged as part of the agreement. The service characteristics sub-aspect refers to the
agreement of agents to adopt certain levels of service, in dimensions such as success,
timeliness, cost and quality. For example, price fixing is an example of collusion in the
cost service characteristic.
Recommendation is a subcategory of the impact aspect and describes the ex-
change of opinions among agents. Since recommendations can involve both direct and
indirect opinions, the exchange of such recommendations occurs in Target-Witness (TW)
collusion and Witness-Witness (WW) collusion. TW collusion involves collaboration be-
tween the target agent (the agent being evaluated by the observing agent) and a witness
(the agent giving a recommendation about the target to the evaluator). WW collusion
occurs among witness agents, when they are giving recommendations about the target
agent to the evaluator. In both types, the nature of the agreement can be to promote
or demote the agents involved, with the view of benefiting the colluding set of agents.
Different types of collusion are characterised by different sets of aspects. In
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the following section, we will look at the different types of collusion in our domain of
interest.
5.4.2 Types of Collusion
Table 5.1 presents the different types of collusion and their corresponding set of aspects.
The label TW refers to Target-Witness collusion and WW means Witness-Witness col-
lusion. We now describe the different types of collusion, grouped by common charac-
teristics.
5.4.2.1 Recommendation Collusion
In this group, the types of collusion involve recommendations being exchanged between
witnesses and the evaluator agent, who is requesting opinions about a target agent.
Agents participate in collusive activity at various levels, with the most relevant examples
detailed below.
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Persistent Target-Witness Collusion (Persistent TW)
This type of collusion occurs between a target and a witness, where the witness promotes
or demotes the target with regards to the evaluator systematically, that is, every time
a recommendation is requested. The scope of the collusion can be partial or total in
that the witness will always have the same behaviour towards the collusive target for
some or all services. The collusion is persistent, suggesting that the collusive agreement
spans the interaction period. Let us consider an example where the witness promotes
the target. The agreement consists of promoting the target via recommendations in one
or more of the relevant service characteristics. Figure 5.2 depicts the Persistent TW
collusion based on the e-supply chain scenario. The evaluator is Customer C1, which is
already using the services of three providers, Suppliers S1, S2, and S3. Now C1 needs a
new type of service, which is offered by Supplier S4. However, C1 has never interacted
with S4 and therefore decides to request for recommendations from agents who have.
Figure 5.2(a) shows C1’s provider graph. The solid lines represent direct interactions
between two agents, while the dashed line shows the target agent that the evaluator is
considering for interaction. Agent C1’s witness graph, Figure 5.2(b) shows the witnesses
it uses, through the bold solid lines in the diagram. For instance, S1 has not interacted
directly with S4 and therefore only gives an indirect recommendation to C1, via S3.
The combination of the provider and witness graphs gives Figure 5.2(c), from
which the evaluator can extract information not previously known about certain agent
relationships. An additional provider graph edge, between S1 and S3 can be derived from
the provider and witness graphs. Since S1 has provided an indirect recommendation to
C1 and S3 is the only secondary witness, this implies that S1 and S3, have direct service
interactions. The dashed line circling S3 and S4 shows potential collusion between
the target S4 and the witness S3. The evaluator C1 requests recommendations about
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(a) Provider graph (b) Witness graph (c) Extended and combined graph
Figure 5.2: Target-Witness Collusion.
target S4 from its three service providers, S1, S2 and S3, who can be considered to be
trustworthy enough to take their opinions into consideration. From the combined graph
Figure 5.2(c), the evaluator C1 observes over a period of interaction that S1 and S3 have
similar recommendations about S4, as compared to the recommendations of S2. The
emergent information is that S1’s indirect recommendation has been obtained along a
recommendation chain of length 2, via S3. Subsequently, as the recommendations from
S3 are more positive than that of S2, and from its own initial direct interactions with S4,
C1 can suspect that S3 is colluding with S4 to promote S4 as a trustworthy provider.
Without the agent network, the evaluator, using only trust and recommenda-
tions, would eventually have a low recommendation trust in both witnesses S1 and S3,
without identifying that S3 was the dishonest agent. Recommendation trust ensures that
the evaluator can distinguish between those witnesses giving accurate opinions, when
these are compared to the actual interaction with the target, if the recommendation is
followed. However, low recommendation trust gives no indication of the reason behind
the inaccuracy, whether it is only due to differing experiences or due to malicious in-
tent. Differences in recommendations do not necessarily indicate collusion. However, an
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agent may want to be aware of the difference in agent behaviour for future interactions.
Recommendation trust will be lower for witness S3 and from the collusion detection, the
evaluator can identify that the pair of target and witness involved are S4 and S3.
Transient Target-Witness Collusion (Transient TW)
A transient collusion between a target and a witness is similar to the persistent TW
collusion, except for the duration of the agreement. In this case, the collusion group
forms, collaborates and disbands during the interaction period. The collusion may be
agent-driven as well as situation-driven, with the agreement being initiated, for example,
by the target agent to temporarily increase its reputation.
Persistent Witness-Witness Collusion (Persistent WW)
In a persistent collusion between two witnesses, the colluding agents collaborate to give
information to the requesting agent that will, for example, lower the reputation of the
target agent, and the agreement lasts throughout the interaction period. For every rec-
ommendation request that these witnesses get about the target, they will give an opinion
that will demote the target, and this can involve one or more service characteristics for
the services the target offers. Direct or indirect recommendations can be involved in this
type of collusion. An example of witness-witness collusion is described below, between
suppliers S1 and S3, as shown in Figure 5.3.
The evaluator C1 obtains direct recommendations about target S4 from witnesses
S1, S2, and S3. Again, C1 has had no past interactions with S4. Figure 5.3(a) shows
C1’s provider graph, with the solid lines representing direct service interactions and the
dashed line indicates C1’s interest to interact with S4. Figure 5.3(b) is different from
Figure 5.2(b) as the recommendations obtained are all direct recommendations about S4.
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Figure 5.3: Witness-Witness Collusion.
The extended and combined graph, Figure 5.3(c), shows the additional information that
the evaluator C1 can infer from the trust and reputation information gathered. Frequent
similarity of recommendations from S1 and S3, compared to other recommenders, could
suggest a potential case of collusion between these witnesses, especially if the opinions
are inaccurate compared to the actual agent interactions. This is depicted by the dashed
line circling S1 and S3 in Figure 5.3(c). Although S2 and S3 appear to have similar links
as S1 and S3, the comparison of their recommendations helps determine that S1 and
S3 are potentially collusive, while S2 and S3 are not considered to be in this category.
Witnesses collude, for example, to lower the trustworthiness of the target as viewed by
the evaluator to prevent the target from being swamped with interaction requests, which
could potentially increase competition for the witnesses to interact with the target as a
supplier. Again, the similarity or dissimilarity of recommendations does not necessarily
imply collusion. However, the evaluator can identify those agents that are behaving
differently early on and can act on this information to confirm or disprove the existence
of collusion.
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Transient Witness-Witness Collusion (Transient WW)
Two witnesses can agree to collude with each other in order to affect the reputation
of a target agent for a certain duration, for instance, when one or both want to limit
the target’s transactions with agents other than themselves for the services concerned.
Compared to a persistent collusion, the decision to enter a collusive agreement can arise
from an opportunity to temporarily benefit from the agent interactions. The decision
to adopt a transient strategy may also be due to the higher risk of being detected in a
longer-term agreement.
Transient Target-Witnesses Collusion (Transient TWW)
In this collusion scenario, the target agent colludes with witnesses such that these wit-
nesses promote the target during recommendations about specific services. This can be
driven by mutual benefits or by the target’s aim to increase its reputation. Exchanges
can occur in a combination of direct, indirect TW and WW agreements. Other collusion
characteristics include being transient and the scope of the collusion concerning a partial
set of services that the collusive group are involved in.
Direct Witnesses Collusion
Collusion among principal witnesses is a subset of the witness-witness and target-witness
collusion types, where recommendations are involved. The scope of the collusion can
be partial or total, the agreement persistent or transient.
5.4.2.2 Provider Collusion
Provider collusion involves the service providers, where they agree on terms that will
provide them with benefits over other service providers and have a larger share of the
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market. Two examples are price fixing and market division among competitors.
Price Fixing
Price fixing involves a group of competing provider agents agreeing to raise or maintain
the sale price of their services. In a particular scenario, the aspects of the collusion
can be as follows: the collusive set of providers agrees to apply the collusion to only
part of their overall services. For instance, the group could be selling certain services
at the same price, while for others, competition is in force as would be the norm. The
agreement spans the interaction period and is situation-driven as a result of the collusive
group wanting to have the better share of the market and hence profits.
Market Division
Also known as market allocation scheme, this type of collusion involves the competing
agents agreeing how to divide the market among themselves. They allocate specific
customers or types of customers, products or territories among themselves [92]. An
example of such a scheme, as in Table 5.1, can involve the participation of a group of
service providers either for all of their common services, or a subset.
Sa
Sb
Sc
Sd
Sb
Sc
Sa
Sd
Market division
Provider
P1
Provider
P2
Provider
P1
Provider
P2
Figure 5.4: Market Division Collusion.
Let us consider the case of two providers P1 and P2, each offering these respective
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services: P1(Sa ,Sb ,Sc), and P2(Sa ,Sc ,Sd ). In normal circumstances, both providers
would be sharing the market for services Sa and Sc , which they both offer. However, if
P1 and P2 agree to collude to divide the market for services Sa and Sc for exclusivity,
then, P1 might be the only one providing Sc , while P2 might be the only provider of Sa ,
as shown in Figure 5.4. Other characteristics of this type of collusion include a persistent
or transient agreement based on reducing the competition between the two providers
and this can be achieved for example by P1 advertising very high prices for service Sa ,
which leads to customers preferring P2. Other service characteristics besides price can
also be used to achieve market division. Witnesses could play a role in reinforcing the
positions of each provider in their respective market allocations.
5.4.2.3 Customer-involvement Collusion
This type of collusion involves the customer agent, who is interested in a particular type
of service and collaborates with witnesses and providers to achieve its goals. We now
describe two particular types of collusion where the customer agent is involved.
Customer-Provider Collusion
In the customer-provider collusion, the agreement can involve one or more service char-
acteristics for the services of interest. For instance, a colluding provider can fail in its
service provision, but the customer will lie about this, in return for other benefits.
Customer-Witness Collusion
A customer agent can collude with witnesses (to other potential customers of a particular
service) to favour a specific target instead of another, for the purpose of having the
provider free to accept service requests from the customer. If more than one witness is
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involved, there might exist WW collusion as well.
5.5 Collusion Detection Techniques
Having discussed various types of collusion, we now explore some of the collusion detec-
tion approaches and discuss the most appropriate ones. We first discuss the collusion
detection techniques used in agent-based systems, followed by the approaches used in
other related fields such as data mining and intrusion detection.
5.5.1 Agent-Based Solutions to Collusion Detection
In agent-based systems, solutions to collusion typically require an agent to have a global
view of its environment to be able to apply system-wide measures, such as in that
proposed by Jurca [52], or require the use of additional procedures, such as transaction
proofs [119]. Similarly, argumentation can confirm or contradict the occurrence of lies
in agent communication [90, 91]. Lying is a form of malicious behaviour that may
contribute to agent collusion. We describe some of these solutions below and discuss
why they are not suitable for our purposes.
Online reputation systems rely on honest feedback from users, and some self-
interested agents may find benefit in lying. Jurca [53, 52] proposed a feedback payment
scheme to ensure that users get more benefit when telling the truth compared to lying.
In P2P systems, TrustGuard [119] has been designed to be an efficient reputation
system in the face of malicious behaviour, by tackling fake transactions with transaction
proofs. An unforgeable transaction proof uses a public key cryptography-based scheme
and serves as a proof that the transaction took place when sharing feedback. Some work
has also been done in grid computing systems, where a collusion detection algorithm
has been proposed for the outcomes of votes conducted as a result of majority voting
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for the purpose of verification [121].
The solutions discussed above either require a global view of the system or need
additional processes in place to detect collusive behaviour. In our case, individual agents
need to be able to detect collusion from their local view of their environment, using
information they have gathered during interaction and recommendations for the agent
selection. We propose a solution that allows individual agents to retrospectively assess
whether collusion has occurred and to predict future behaviour on this basis. Jurca’s
incentive-compatible collusion resistant payment mechanism, as well as TrustGuard,
relies on having a mechanism in place to provide incentives for agents to comply with a
certain behaviour, or have checks in place to ensure compliance. Our approach is based
more on a form of social compliance, where agents are expected to share information
out of reciprocity, but also when punishments for malicious behaviour are applied by
individual agents. For instance, if an evaluator detects collusion among two other agents,
it may choose to stop interacting with them for a period of time, and this action is likely
to influence the reputation of these two agents in the agent population.
5.5.2 Approaches in Related Areas
Collusion detection can be viewed as an attempt to identify the underlying structure of
heterogeneous data containing collusive behaviour. One way of identifying this structure
is in the grouping of data elements, or clustering. Schaeffer [109] surveys graph clus-
tering and the methodologies commonly applied in data mining, including the similarity
measures used for clustering. Although similarity measures are used in graph clustering,
they can be used on their own to compare values, for instance, to check if two agents
are collusive.
Similarity measurement and clustering are existing data mining techniques that
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enable agents with common or differing characteristics to be identified, thus highlight-
ing their similarity or dissimilarity. Differences in experience among agents occur for
many reasons, including different priorities, goals, agent assessment mechanisms and
collusion. When collusion occurs there will be a difference in the experiences reported
by colluding agents in the form of recommendations, and those experienced directly
by the evaluator. As such, any difference in experience may be indicative of collusion.
However, irrespective of the reasons behind the differences in experience, it is desirable
for the evaluator to identify these differences and incorporate them into its reasoning
for future interactions. Therefore, similarity measurement is a suitable approach to help
identify differences in agent experience, including those that arise from certain types of
collusion.
5.5.2.1 Graph Clustering
Clustering methods are used to group elements with similar characteristics together.
A graph is a structure made up of a set of vertices and a set of edges that connect
pairs of vertices. Graph clustering is the task of grouping the vertices of a graph
into clusters taking into consideration the edge structure of the graph in such a way
that there should be many edges within each cluster and relatively few between the
clusters [109]. Although a clear definition of what constitutes a cluster has not been
agreed, clusters in graphs need to have some desirable properties. Firstly, each cluster
should be connected, where there is at least one path connecting each pair of vertices
within a cluster. Secondly, the paths should be internal to the cluster. As mentioned
in works such as [28, 57], a good cluster is a subgraph where the link density is
greater among members of the cluster than between members and the rest of the graph.
Figure 5.5 shows what constitutes the properties of a good cluster. In this diagram, the
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cluster members are drawn in black and their edges are thicker than other edges. The
cluster on the left is one of good quality, as it is dense and has more internal edges
within the cluster than links outside (referred to as being introvert). The middle cluster
is a worse cluster than the left one, as even though it has the same number of internal
edges, it has many more external links to vertices outside the cluster. The third cluster,
on the right, cannot be categorised as a good cluster as it has few external connections,
and even fewer internal links, making the internal density low.
Figure 5.5: Example Graph with Clusters [109, Figure 3].
The two main approaches to identifying clusters are: (i) computing values rele-
vant to the vertices and then classifying the vertices into clusters based on those values,
and (ii) computing a fitness measure over the set of possible clusters and choosing
among the candidate clusters those that optimise the measure used [109]. Clustering
algorithms using the first approach are based on the similarity between vertices. Dis-
tance and similarity measures (discussed in Section 5.5.2.2), form part of this approach,
as well as adjacency-based and connectivity measures. Adjacency-based measures look
at the edges between vertices, rather than the properties of the vertices themselves.
For example, vertices can be viewed as similar based on adjacency information if they
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have overlapping neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, connectivity measures use the number
of paths between each pair of vertices to determine similarity. Vertices belonging to the
same cluster should be highly connected to one another, as proposed by Hartuv and
Shamir’s Highly Connected Subgraphs algorithm [42]. The second approach concerns
the cluster fitness measures, which are functions to rate the quality of the clusterings.
The criteria used include direct density measures, and cut-based measures, which mea-
sure the connectivity with the rest of the graph. Some examples of graph clustering
algorithms include Markov clustering, minimum-cut trees, and k-means algorithms.
Graph clustering is a well-explored field in unsupervised learning in structured
domains, thus providing a way to discover groups of colluding agents. From the similarity
measure, pairs of similar agents can be found, and these can be further grouped into
sets of collusive agents through clustering techniques. Such techniques have been used
in work by Palshikar and Apte [95], where two graph clustering algorithms are used
(shared nearest neighbour and mutual nearest neighbour) [33, 50]. The algorithms
presented in their work are oriented towards detecting relatively dense subgraphs, and
will not always be able to detect sparse subgraphs.
5.5.2.2 Similarity Measurement
The graph clustering methods discussed previously make use of similarity measures.
Similarity measures are commonly used in data mining decisions [43], for example in
returning relevant documents following a search engine query. Since similarity measures
can be used to compare two objects, it is reasonable to consider that they can be used
to compare the behaviours and interactions of two agents.
Similarity and dissimilarity are used in many data mining techniques and they re-
fer to the function of the proximity between the corresponding attributes of two objects.
170
Similarity is a numerical measure of the degree to which the two objects are alike, while
dissimilarity is the measure of their difference [124]. We can apply these measures to
determine how close or far apart agents’ behaviours are. Differences in agent behaviour
can give an indication of potential collusion within a subgroup of agents, as previously
illustrated by Figure 5.2 in Section 5.4.2.1. The choice of an appropriate similarity mea-
sure is influenced by the domain, the characteristics of the data and the purpose of the
similarity measure. This is mainly due to similarity measures being suitable for particular
types of data characteristics. Tan et al. [124] present the data characteristics that need
to be considered when selecting similarity measures. Based on these characteristics,
we analyse the data characteristics in our domain and determine the most appropriate
similarity measures to use. A summary is shown in Table 5.2. In the following sections,
we first describe the main characteristics of data that are used in data mining. Sec-
ondly, we present the most commonly used similarity measurements. Finally, we analyse
the domain and the purpose of the similarity measurement for collusion detection and
motivate our choice of measurement.
Similarity
Measure
Data
Characteristic
Euclidean
distance
Mahalanobis
distance
Jaccard
Coefficient
Extended
Jaccard Cosine
Correlation
(Pearson)
Simple
Matching
Coefficient
Binary • •
Non-binary • • • • •
Sparse • • •
Dense • • •
Correlated •
Uncorrelated • • • • •
Different ranges •
Magnitude important •
Magnitude unimportant •
Table 5.2: Matching Similarity Measures to Data Characteristics.
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5.5.2.3 General Data Characteristics
In this section, we look at the general data characteristics, as listed in Table 5.2. The
objects being compared have one or more attributes. For example, the quality and price
of a product are two attributes of that product. Binary attributes only have true or
false values, represented by 1 or 0. For example, in a test, the answers to true or false
questions are binary. In comparison, non-binary data have continuous values, such as the
frequency of a word in a document. Sparse data occurs when the objects do not link to
most of the other objects in the domain. For example, if the objects being compared are
words in a document, the data is sparse as the frequency of most words in the document
is low. Dense data, in contrast, refers to large amounts of links between the objects
being compared. For example, a time series for the daily average temperature in London
has a dense characteristic. The correlation of the attributes is another characteristic to
consider. Correlation is a measure of the linear relationship between the attributes.
For instance, the proportion of correct answers for a test is perfectly correlated to the
proportion of incorrect answers, as the number of correct and incorrect answers to a test
are dependent variables (as one increases, the other decreases and vice-versa). If the
attributes have different ranges, this must be taken into account for a similarity measure
such that all attributes have an equal impact on the calculation. As an example, if age
and income are two attributes used to compare the similarity of staff, income would
have a greater impact on the measure. The importance of the magnitude of the data
needs to be taken into account as different similarity measures handle this differently.
5.5.2.4 Similarity Measurements
Table 5.2 outlines some of the most commonly-used similarity measurements and the
data characteristics for which they are more suited [124, 138]. The general data
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characteristics that match particular similarity measurements are indicated by a dot (•)
in the table.
Euclidean distance: Distance between two points x and y in one or more dimensional
space given by the equation:
Euclidean(x , y) =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
(xk − yk )2)
where n is the number of dimensions and xk and yk are, respectively, the k
th
attributes of x and y .
Mahalanobis distance: A generalisation of the Euclidean distance which normalises
the attributes using a covariance matrix, thus removing the issue of the differences
in scales of the different attributes. The distance between objects x and y is given
by:
Mahalanobis(x , y) = (x − y)Σ−1(x − y)T
where (x −y)T is a multivariate vector and ∑−1 is the inverse covariance matrix.
Jaccard coefficient: Measures the number of similar elements in two sets x and y
compared to the diversity of elements they both hold for binary attributes. The
coefficient is given by:
Jaccard(x , y) =
x ∩ y
x ∪ y
Extended Jaccard coefficient: Also known as the Tanimoto coefficient, it applies to
non-binary sets x and y and is calculated using the equation:
ExtendedJaccard(x , y) =
x · y
| x |2 + | y |2 −x · y
where x · y is the dot product of x and y and | x | is the magnitude of x .
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Cosine similarity measure: Measures similarity by calculating the cosine of the angle
between two vectors, represented by x and y , given by:
Cosine(x , y) =
x · y
| x || y |
Pearson correlation: A measure of the correlation between two objects x and y and it
reflects the degree of linear relationship between them. The correlation is defined
by the equation:
Pearson(x , y) =
covariance(x , y)
standard deviation(x ) ∗ standard devistion(y)
Simple Matching Coefficient: Measures the number of matching attribute values
compared to the total number of attributes in two objects x and y both consisting
of binary attributes. Given that p is the number of true attributes for both x and
y , q is the number true attributes for x and false for y , r is the number of false
attributes for x and true attributes for y and s is the number of false attributes
for both x and y , the coefficient is given by the equation:
SMC (x , y) =
p + s
p + q + r + s
5.5.2.5 Similarity Measurement for Collusion Detection in the E-Commerce
Domain
The previous sections have introduced some common similarity measurements and the
data characteristics for which they are more applicable. We have identified the typi-
cal characteristics of the data collected by an agent about its environment, within the
e-commerce domain. These include mainly positive and negative interactions as expe-
rienced by the agents themselves or shared as recommendations. The purpose of the
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similarity measure is to compare interaction experience between agents and dissimilari-
ties indicate possible collusion. These are now described and they are shown as shaded
rows in Table 5.2.
Non-binary: The interaction history and recommendation accuracy are non-binary val-
ues. These are counts that depend on service requirements and the number of
witness recommendations shared.
Sparse: The data is considered to be sparse as agents do not interact with every other
agent in the population.
Uncorrelated: The attributes are considered to be uncorrelated as they are counts that
are independent of each other. If the attributes were proportions instead, they
would be correlated as the division by the sum of counts makes the proportions
dependent on one another.
Similar ranges: The ranges of values for the attributes are similar. For example, the
agent-oriented graphs have edges between a customer and a provider with the
positive and negative interaction counts as the weight on the edges. If the total
number of interactions is 100, the range of positive interactions is [0,100] and that
of the negative interactions is also [0,100]. For attributes with different ranges,
the values will need to be normalised, while paying attention to any changes to
the other data characteristics. For instance, normalising the attributes may make
the attributes correlated.
Magnitude unimportant: Considering the positive and negative interaction counts,
the magnitude of those values only indicates the amount of transactions between
the agent pair. Even a small number of interactions can give an indication of
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the kind of interactions between the agents. Additionally, the interaction counts
shared depend on the size of the interaction window as used by the agent to store
past interactions, and this differs from agent to agent. Consequently, we do not
consider magnitude of the data for choosing similarity measurements for collusion
detection.
Following the analysis of the data characteristics of the domain and the differ-
ent similarity measures, the cosine similarity measure is the most appropriate with the
largest number of matching data characteristics. With reference to Table 5.2, Pearson
correlation and Extended Jaccard are the next most suitable similarity measures.
5.5.3 Cosine Similarity Measure
Based on the above analysis of similarity measures and data characteristics, the cosine
similarity measure is the most appropriate to compare the similarity of agent behaviours.
This technique is popular in the related field of intrusion detection, such as the work of
Liao and Vemuri [67], and Sharma et al. [116]. The similarity of text is the focus of these
works; however, parallels can be found with regard to the identification of characteristics
to compare. Cosine similarity has also been used as a technique for user profile-item
matching, in the area of intelligent recommender systems on the Internet [85]. The
user profile is used to recommend new items considered relevant to the user. Content-
based filtering systems use direct comparisons between the user profile and new items,
thus requiring a user profile-item matching technique. Cosine similarity can be used,
along with a number of other techniques, including standard keyword matching, nearest
neighbour, and classification.
The cosine similarity, also known as the Ochini coefficient, is a common measure
that uses the dot product and the angle between vectors to compute the similarity.
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Vector representation of data consists of one or more dimensions that are considered for
each data item. The cosine similarity between two vectors representing the behaviour
of two agents, aα = (aα,1, aα,2, . . . , aα,n) and aβ = (aβ,1, aβ,2, . . . , aβ,n) is calculated
as:
Cosine(aα, aβ) =
aα · aβ
| aα || aβ |
=
aα · aβ√√√√ n∑
k=1
(a2α,k )
√√√√ n∑
k=1
(
a2β,k
) (5.1)
The resulting measure is an angle in [0, pi), where the most dissimilar value is pi/2
and zero is the best possible similarity [109]. For agents using our mechanism, the
comparison concerns the service interactions they have had. For example, the number
of positive and negative interactions can be used for comparison, and these represent two
dimensions in the vector representation. In this case, the cosine similarity is calculated
as follows:
Cosine(aα, aβ) =
aα · aβ
| aα || aβ |
=
(x1 × x2) + (y1 × y2)√
x 21 + y
2
1
√
x 22 + y
2
2
(5.2)
where (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) are the two points representing the behaviour of two agents.
As the angle between the two vectors decreases, the cosine angle approaches 1, meaning
that the similarity increases.
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5.6 The Collusion Detection Process
As discussed earlier, the cosine similarity measure is the most suitable measurement
based on the data characteristics of the domain area. In this section, we describe the
detection process for the Persistent Target-Witness collusion type (PTW). This type of
collusion has been chosen as it includes the agent interactions that are observed by the
agents using trust and reputation as part of their decision making.
As illustrated in Table 5.1, PTW collusion occurs between a target provider agent
and a witness agent. The persistent aspect of the collusion refers to the occurrence of
the collusion in terms of its duration, which is throughout the interaction period of
the agents involved. The characteristics of this type of collusion can be summarised as
follows:
Scope → Total : The collusion occurs for all the services provided by the target.
Occurrence → Duration → Persistent : The collusion lasts throughout the interac-
tion period.
Occurrence → Cause → Situation-driven : The agents are colluding to bring benefit
to the target to increase its reputation.
Impact → Service characteristics → Success dimension : The recommendation in-
formation shared consists of the number of positive and negative interactions as
experienced by the witness.
Impact → Recommendation → Direct TW : The witness has interacted directly
with the target and is sharing its own history of interactions.
Three steps in collusion detection are needed to enable collusion detection,
namely the recording of interaction histories, the building of agent graphs and finally,
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Figure 5.6: Partial Interaction History File Generated For a Population Configuration.
collusion detection from these graphs. An agent records its past interactions with other
agents and uses interaction and recommendation information to build a model of its
agent environment. In this set of experiments, we focus on how agents use the agent
graphs to extract information. Since agents can use any model of agent interaction
for decision making, we generate interaction histories for an agent using a trust and
reputation model with direct and indirect recommendations. The components of the
three components for collusion detection are further described below.
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5.6.1 Generation of Interaction Histories
A population configuration defines the parameters of the agent population, such as
its size, the trustworthiness composition, the number of services and the number of
collusive agents. For each selected population configuration, the agents are created
and their interactions are simulated and recorded from the point of view of an evaluator
agent. These interactions include direct service interactions, as well as direct and indirect
recommendations. In our implementation, the agents are not considered to be using
any particular trust and reputation model, but can share their opinions about their own
experiences and recommendations.
An example extract of an interaction history file for the evaluating agent is
described in Figure 5.6. This file is used for an evaluator to build its agent network graphs
and detect collusion. The complete example file has been included in Appendix C.1.
In Figure 5.6 each row of the file represents the interactions of an evaluating agent.
The tab-separated elements on each row describe the particular interaction in that
row. Various types of interactions as previously described in Chapter 3 are shown. For
instance, the row identified as Example 1 is an example of a service interaction (denoted
by an A in the line shown) at time unit 38, where provider agent a4 has executed service
type s1 for customer agent a1, and this interaction was successful as denoted by 1 in
the last column. Example 2 depicts a direct service recommendation (denoted by
DS in that row) from witness a2 to evaluator a1 about the service s1 for potential
provider a6. The recommendation provided is made up of 50 successful interactions and
150 failed interactions, however the evaluator has not used this recommendation for its
decision making at that point, as denoted by -1 in the last column. The third example,
Example 3 shows an indirect agent recommendation from the secondary witness a2 to
the evaluator a1, via the principal witness a9. The recommendation of 67 successful
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interactions and 183 failed interactions concerns the provider a6.
5.6.2 Agent Graph Building
An evaluator builds agent network graphs to represent its environment through service-
oriented graphs for agents providing a particular service, and agent-oriented graphs that
show the overall performance of the agents. Provider graphs gather information about
service providers, while recommender graphs represent the opinions shared by witnesses.
These graphs are built from the history of past interactions as recorded by the evaluator,
as described in Chapter 4.
5.6.3 Collusion Detection
The agent network models maintained by an evaluator enables it to access valuable infor-
mation about potential providers of services and recommendations. Collusion detection
is an example of the result of such information extraction and it arises from analysing the
agent graphs and uncovering previously unknown information about collusive agents. In
our experiments, a list of actual collusive pairs of agents is compared to the list of pairs
that the evaluator detects.
As part of the analysis of the information extracted from an agent’s interaction
and recommendation history to detect collusion, Algorithm 5.1 outlines the partial collu-
sion detection process after target aβ has just provided service sβ following recommen-
dations. Initially, the set of potential colluders will include all the direct recommenders
for target aβ about the service sβ. This set then needs to undergo further selection to
ultimately obtain the smallest group of potential colluders. Based on this information,
the evaluator can decide on subsequent interactions with the members of the suspected
collusive group.
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Algorithm 5.1 Partial Witness and Target Collusion Detection
for all direct recommendations rd do
if (rd .at = aβ) AND (r
d .s = sβ) then
for all dimensions d ∈ rd .s do
if da < de then
add ar to P colluders
endif
endfor
endif
endfor
More specifically, for the detection of Target-Witness collusion using the cosine
similarity measure, Algorithm 5.2 outlines how the agent graphs are used to extract
relevant information.
Algorithm 5.2 Target-Witness Collusion Detection using Cosine Similarity
for each service s in serviceProviderGraph do
providerSet ← findProviders(ae , s)
customerSet ← findCustomerWitnesses(ae , ap , providerSet)
if compareService(ae , ap , ar , s) then
collusivePairs ← collusivePairs + pair(ap , ar )
endif
endfor
The evaluator ae maintains a graph structure for providers of each service type, re-
ferred to as serviceProviderGraph. For each service s, providerSet represents all
the providers of that service, as experienced by the evaluator. As well as direct interac-
tions, the evaluator may also have received recommendations about providers, potentially
along a recommendation chain, and the last witness in the chain is a customer of the
provider and these customers are stored in customerSet. Then, the evaluator’s own
direct experience with interacting with a provider is compared with a witness’ experi-
ence through the compareService function. In this case the function makes use of
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the cosine similarity measurement to compare interactions. Based on this, the pair of
agents (provider and witness) may be added to the list of possible collusive pairs for
target-witness collusion.
5.7 Evaluating Collusion Detection
This section describes the experiments we have set up to evaluate the detection of
Persistent Target-Witness collusion using the cosine similarity measurement approach.
Following the description of the setup, we describe and discuss the experimental results.
5.7.1 Experimental Setup
For the evaluation of Persistent Target-Witness collusion detection, we first describe the
experimental setup, which includes the composition of the agent population, the usage
of the cosine similarity measurement and the experimental results that are recorded.
5.7.1.1 Agent Population Parameters
In our experiments, the agent population parameters are varied in order to generate a
comprehensive range of configurations for a representative population with agents of
heterogeneous behaviours. 8,778 population configurations have been used (i.e. all the
possible population configurations that are generated) and for each configuration we
have obtained the average of 10 runs of the experiment. The population parameters are
as follows.
1. Population size (PopulationSize) indicates the total number of agents in the pop-
ulation. In our experiments, the size ranges from 5 to 200 agents in varying steps.
The set of population sizes used is 5,10,20,30,40,50,70,90,200.
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2. Trust configuration determines the proportion of the population with one of three
trust characteristics. The three proportions add up to 100% of the population
size.
• High trust suggests that an agent is likely to provide the expected outcome
between 80% and 100% of the time.
• Average trust indicates that an agent is 40% to 80% likely to provide the
expected result.
• Low trust agents are likely to match their expected outcome between 0%
and 40% of the time.
3. Number of services available ServiceCount, from (0.25∗PopulationSize) to (0.75∗
PopulationSize) in steps based on Algorithm 5.3. These steps ensure that the
number of services within the population of agents is proportional to the popula-
tion size.
Algorithm 5.3 Incremental Steps of the Service Count
if ServiceCount <10 then ServiceCount += 5
else if ServiceCount <50 then ServiceCount += 10
else if ServiceCount <100 then ServiceCount += 20
else if ServiceCount <250 then ServiceCount += 100
else if ServiceCount >250 then ServiceCount += 200
4. Number of collusive pairs, ranging from 0 to (0.5 ∗ PopulationSize), with val-
ues from 1 increasing in steps similar to Algorithm 5.3. This range of values
has been chosen such that the maximum number of collusive pairs possible is
(PopulationSize − 1) ∗ (PopulationSize − 2), which can be very large for bigger
populations.
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5.7.1.2 Applying Cosine Similarity Measurement
As described in Section 5.5.3, two agents have increasingly similar experiences when
the cosine angle between their behaviour vectors approaches 1. Conversely, the cosine
angle approaches 0 when the agents have dissimilar experiences. The evaluator needs
to decide on the point at which agent experiences are dissimilar enough to consider
potential collusion. One approach is to use a threshold value, CollusionThreshold such
that, if Cosine(aα, aβ) ≤ CollusionThreshold , then, the pair of agents (aα, aβ) belongs
to the list of potentially collusive pairs as detected by the evaluator, DetectedCollusion.
A cosine similarity value greater than the threshold will consider then agent pair to be
non-collusive. As a result of empirical experiments we have placed the threshold between
collusion and non-collusion at a cosine similarity value of 0.75. This means that cosine
similarity values of less than the threshold result in the agent detecting collusion. Cosine
similarity measures range from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning complete similarity, and 1 meaning
complete dissimilarity. We discuss the choice of other cosine similarity thresholds later
in this chapter (Section 5.7.2.4).
TRUE FALSE
TRUE True PositiveCount (TP)
False Positive
Count (FP)
FALSE False NegativeCount (FN)
True Negative
Count (TN)
Correct Result
(Actual Collusion)
Predicted Result
(Detected Collusion)
Figure 5.7: Classification Matrix.
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5.7.1.3 Metrics for Collusion Detection
Each interaction history is generated based on a time length of 2000 units (in each unit
of time, agents can execute part of a service task). After the agent graphs are built
and analysed for collusion, the experimental results are stored. For each population
configuration we have obtained an average from 10 runs.
The aim of these experiments is to assess whether an agent can accurately
identify collusive pairs of agents from the population of agents within which it evolves.
The actual list of collusive agent pairs is denoted as ActualCollusionList and the list
of detected agent pairs by the evaluator is referred to as DetectedCollusionList . The
4 types of outcomes can be represented as a classification matrix [93], adapted to the
collusion detection process, as shown in Figure 5.7. The correct decisions made are
represented by the numbers along the diagonal from upper-left to lower-right. The
other two numbers are the errors in collusion detection.
• True positive count (TP) is the number of collusive agent pairs correctly de-
tected, such that TP = ActualCollusionList ∩DetectedCollusionList
• False positive count (FP) is the number of non-collusive agent pairs wrongly
detected, such that FP = DetectedCollusionList \ActualCollusionList
• False negative count (FN) is the number of collusive agent pairs not detected,
such that FN = ActualCollusionList \DetectedCollusionList
• True negative count (TN) is the number of non-collusive agent pairs correctly
not detected, such that TN = (ActualCollusionList ∩DetectedCollusionList)′
Two commonly used performance measures are precision and recall. We use
these two performance measures to assess our approach to collusion detection using
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information gathered from agent interactions.
• Precision is the proportion of correctly detected pairs out of all the pairs identified
by the evaluator, defined as:
Precision(P) =
TP
TP + FP
• Recall is the proportion of correctly detected pairs out of all the actual collusive
pairs in the population, defined as:
Recall(R) =
TP
TP + FN
5.7.1.4 Experimental Approach
After the collusion detection process, the interaction history file (see Figure 5.6) is
appended to add the collusion detection information, as shown in Figure 5.8 to illustrate
the collusion detection information for a particular population configuration run. In
this example, there is one pair of collusive agents for the PTW collusion type, between
potential target agent a2 and witness a5. The number of agent pairs in the actual
collusion list is denoted as ActualCollusionCount. The evaluator has detected 4 pairs of
agents, one of which is the correct pair. The number of agent pairs detected as collusive
by the evaluator is referred to as DetectedCollusionCount.
Each population configuration is run 10 times and the results are averaged over
the 10 runs. The collusion detection results file contains the following elements per
population configuration (row).
1. The six population characteristics described in Section 5.7.1.1.
2. Average true positive count (average number of detected collusive pairs that are
actually collusive over the 10 runs).
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Target
agent
Witness
agent
Figure 5.8: Partial Interaction History File with Collusion Detection Information.
3. Average false positive count (average number of non-collusive pairs wrongly de-
tected as collusive).
4. Average false negative count (average number of collusive pairs that have not
been detected as collusive).
5. Average precision over 10 runs.
6. Average recall over 10 runs.
An example of a partial output file for one population configuration of size 10 is
shown in Figure 5.9 to illustrate the values recorded. The complete output file is given in
Appendix C.2. Figure 5.9 divides the elements in two groups. The first group consists
of the population configuration parameters (first 6 columns) shown by the grey box.
The remaining elements concern the collusion detection measures. As an illustration,
the elements of this group are annotated in Figure 5.9 for the population configuration
in the last row.
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Population
configuration
paramaters Collusion detection performance measures
Figure 5.9: Partial Result File For a Population Configuration With 10 Agents.
5.7.2 Experimental Results
We evaluate the cosine similarity collusion detection approach, described in Section
5.5.2.2, for the Persistent Target-Witness collusion type. The aim is to assess the
collusion detection performance of an agent using our trust-informed approach. For
PTW collusion detection, an evaluating agent can identify the pairs of potential providers
(targets) and witnesses involved. The complete set of results, a sample of which is shown
in Figure 5.9, includes 8,778 rows of values (i.e. all configurations of the population
parameters). Five trust configurations have been selected to illustrate the spectrum of
trustworthiness that a population can exhibit. A trust configuration consists of a triple
in the form (High,Average,Low) to represent the proportions of agents in the population
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with these behaviours.
• (0,100,0) (100% of the the agents have average trust).
• (10,0,90) (10% of the population have high trust and 90% have low trust).
• (10,70,20) (10% of the population have high trust, 70% average and 20% low
trust).
• (30,40,30) (30% of the population have high trust, 40% have average trust, while
30% have low trust).
• (90,0,10) (90% of the population have high trust and 10% have low trust).
5.7.2.1 The Effect of Population Size
Precision and recall values for each of the five trust configurations have been plotted
against population size, as shown in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.12 respectively. These
graphs are presented to show the relationship between precision and recall of collusion
detection with the population size. The statistical software package PASW Statistics
(SPSS Statistics) 18 has been used to draw the graphs and process the results.
Figure 5.10 shows that the average precision for the five trust configurations is
higher for smaller and larger population sizes, while precision is lower for medium-sized
populations of 20 to 50 agents. The maximum precision for the most efficient collusion
detection is 1 and this value is reached in two ways. Firstly, when there is no collusion
in the population (TP = 0) and no non-collusive agents have been wrongly detected
(FP = 0). Secondly, precision is 1 when the agent has correctly detected all the col-
lusive agent pairs and only the actual collusive pairs (TP = ActualCollusionCount ,
TP > 0 and FP = 0). From Figure 5.10, the precision is higher for two trust config-
urations, namely (0,100,0) and (10,0,90). The proportion of agents in average or low
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Figure 5.10: Average Precision with Increase in Population Size.
trust is higher in both these trust configurations, which suggests that an evaluator has
higher probability of detecting collusion efficiently for trust configurations with lower
proportions of high trust.
Each line on Figure 5.10 is an average of all the individual population configura-
tions for that particular trust configuration at various population sizes. Let us consider
one of those lines — trust configuration (0,100,0) — to further explore the values that
are represented. Figure 5.11 shows a boxplot for the range of values that precision can
have. The mean precision for the trust configuration (0,100,0) is larger than the mean
recall by 0.407 (Table 5.3).
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Figure 5.11: Boxplot of Precision for Trust Configuration (0,100,0).
A box plot is a graphical display that simultaneously describes several important
features of the data set, such as the minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and
maximum values for the precision values at each population size. Additionally, it displays
the distribution of the precision variable, with the T-bars (whiskers) extending from the
box to show where approximately 95% of the data lies for a normal distribution. Outliers
are denoted by circles and extreme outliers are shown as crosses, and they show cases
where the data is beyond a whisker but is within three times the height of the box or
more than 3 times the interquartile range from the box respectively [86].
Figure 5.12 shows the average recall for the five trust configurations for different
population sizes. The average recall is higher for the small population sizes and then
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N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance
Precision 133 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.431 0.330 0.109
Recall 133 0.367 0.000 0.367 0.024 0.063 0.004
Results for Trust Configuration 0-100-0 (High-Average-Low)
Table 5.3: Precision and Recall Results for Trust Configuration (0,100,0).
decreases with larger population sizes. The maximum recall for the widest breadth of
accurate collusion detection is 1 and this value is also reached in two ways. The first case
occurs when there is no collusion in the agent population (TP = 0) and hence there are
no collusive pairs to be correctly detected by the evaluator (FN = 0). As division by 0
is undefined, the largest value that recall can have is 1. The second case arises when the
evaluator accurately detects all the collusive agent pairs (TP = ActualCollusionCount
and FN = 0). In the graph (Figure 5.12), as the population size increases, the evaluator
is less able to detect only the relevant collusive agent pairs. Even if it detects the
actual collusive pairs, it is also detecting many other agent pairs incorrectly as being
collusive. Of the five trust configurations, (10-0-90) performs slightly worse than the
other configurations for small to medium population sizes. This trust configuration
consists of a higher proportion of low trust agents (90% of the population). Therefore,
the evaluator performs less well on collusion detection recall when a higher proportion
of the population are less trustworthy.
5.7.2.2 The Impact of the Extent of Collusion
Next, we analysed the impact of the extent of collusion by looking at average precision
and recall of collusion detection by the evaluator agent a1 with respect to an increase in
the number of collusive agent pairs in the population. Again, the best scores for average
precision and recall over 10 runs is P = 1 and R = 1.
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Figure 5.12: Average Recall with Increase in Population Size.
Figure 5.13 shows the average precision with an increasing number of collusive
pairs for each of the five trust configurations. The average precision increases as the
number of collusive agent pairs increases in the population. As the experiments have
been set up such that the range of collusive pairs that can be generated reflects the
population size, it is not surprising that the precision increases with a larger number of
collusive pairs. This is due to the number of possible collusive pairs in the population
increasing quadratically with the population size, as shown by the quadratic graph in
Figure 5.14. This function applied for population sizes greater than 1, since we need at
least two agents for a pair and for population size 2, the number of possible collusive
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Figure 5.13: Average Precision with Increase in Collusive Agent Pairs.
pairs is 0 as the evaluator is neither a target nor a witness.
We next consider how the average recall of collusion detection varies with respect
to the number of collusive agent pairs in the population. Figure 5.15 presents the plots
for the five trust configurations. The average recall for all five trust configurations is
low for all the collusive pair counts when there is at least one collusive pair, with the
maximum average recall being 0.058 for one collusive pair. The low recall values suggest
that the evaluator is not detecting a high proportion of the actual collusive pairs. As with
the average precision shown in Figure 5.13, the number of collusive pairs is proportional
to the population size and as the population increases, the number of possible collusive
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Figure 5.14: Plot of the Quadratic Function y = x 2 − 3x + 2, for x > 1.
pairs increases quadratically.
5.7.2.3 Balancing Precision and Recall
High values for both precision and recall for collusion detection indicate that the collusion
detection mechanism is performing as desired, such that an evaluator detects most of
the collusive agents in the population and not the non-collusive agents. From the
experiments carried out and described in the previous sections, the precision and recall
for the experimental setup and collusion detection technique vary significantly and recall
especially is relatively low. We now analyse for which population configurations both
the precision and recall are sufficiently high for accurate collusion detection. We are
assuming in this analysis that both precision and recall have equal weight in collusion
detection. In certain cases, the balance between precision and recall can be different.
196
Collusive Pairs Count
91715141312111610
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
ec
al
l
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Average Recall for 5 Trust Configurations for Different Collusive Pair Count
90-0-10
30-40-30
10-70-20
10-0-90
0-100-0
90-0-10
30-40-30
10-70-20
10-0-90
0-100-0
Trust Configurations 
(High-Average-Low)
Page 1
Figure 5.15: Average Recall with Increase in Collusive Agent Pairs.
For instance, in a domain where an evaluator needs to detect relevant collusive agents
in as few searches as possible, the precision needs to be high. This means that a high
proportion of the detected pairs are among the correct collusive pairs in the population.
However, in a more critical situation where the collusive agent pairs need to be found,
the recall needs to be high, such that a high proportion of the actual collusive pairs are
found by the agent.
Table 5.4 presents the population configurations containing collusion when both
the precision and recall are ≥ 0.25. Note that the number of collusive pairs is ≥ 1
because we want analyse the precision and recall when there is collusion. We can
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Population
Size
High
Trust
Average
Trust
Low
Trust
Service
Count
Collusive
Pair
Average
TP
Average
FP
Average
FN
Average
Precision
Average
Recall
Run
Count
5 0 90 10 1 1 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.61667 0.7 10
5 20 50 30 1 1 0.6 1.3 0.4 0.46667 0.6 10
5 80 0 20 1 1 0.6 2.2 0.4 0.30333 0.6 10
5 40 60 0 1 1 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.775 0.5 10
5 20 10 70 1 1 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.70833 0.5 10
5 30 30 40 1 1 0.5 1.7 0.5 0.38333 0.5 10
5 50 40 10 1 1 0.5 1.8 0.5 0.28333 0.5 10
Table 5.4: Population Configurations where (P ≥ 0.25) AND (R ≥ 0.25)
observe that the population configurations in this set involve small populations sizes, as
well as small numbers of collusive pairs. Larger populations, an increasing number of
services, and an increasing number of collusive pairs lead to lower precision and recall.
While some population configurations achieve higher precision or higher recall, both high
precision and high recall are not achieved together in these configurations.
5.7.2.4 The Effect of the Cosine Similarity Measurement Threshold
In the previous results we used a cosine similarity measurement threshold of 0.75 in our
experiments, determined by empirical evaluation, as discussed in Section 5.7.1.2. For
the purposes of comparison and validation of this threshold we have also run another
set of experiments with other threshold values to assess whether there is any statistical
significance among these values and if so, which values are more suitable. Our aim is to
determine whether or not the precision and recall of collusion detection using a cosine
similarity threshold value of 0.75 is different from the performance measures obtained
for other threshold values.
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Experimental Setup and Approach to Testing Significance
Three threshold values of 0.25, 0.50, 0.95 are compared to the threshold of 0.75 used
in our previous experiments. The population configuration has been set up with the
following parameters, with only the cosine similarity threshold being different in each
set of runs.
• Trust configurations (High,Average,Low): (0,100,0), (10,0,90), (10,70,20), (30,40,30),
(90,0,10).
• Service count: 5.
• Collusive pair count: 2.
• Number of runs for each population configuration: 5.
• Population size: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50.
To measure the statistical significance of the differences in precision and recall
when using different cosine similarity thresholds, paired t-tests can be used with pairs
of thresholds. The paired t-test is appropriate as we use the following assumptions.
• The value pairs are independent: the experiments have been set up to run with
the same configurations, with only the threshold changing and the two sets of
experiments giving the two sets of values are run separately.
• The sample data is drawn from a normal population. We can reasonably make
this assumption as the population configuration selected for this set of experi-
ments is representative of the population. The t-test also performs well when this
assumption is violated [44].
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The test procedure involves analysing the differences between precision and recall using
each cosine similarity threshold value. If there is no difference between the performance
measures (precision and recall), then the mean of the differences should be 0.
Let (X11,X21), (X12,X22), . . ., (X1n ,X2n) be a set of n pairs where we assume
that the mean and variance of the population X1 are µ1 and σ
2
1, and the mean and
and variance of the population X2 are µ2 and σ
2
2. The difference between each pair of
performance measures is defined as Dj = X1j−X2j , where j = 1, 2, . . . ,n. A hypothesis
for the threshold T takes the following form.
HTαz : µD = µMt1 −µMt2 = 0
where α is the hypothesis identifier, z is 0 or 1 for null or alternative hypothesis and M
is the performance measure (precision or recall). Each population XPt represents the
set of precision values for when the threshold is value t , and population XRt represents
the set of recall values with threshold t . Our list of null hypotheses for precision are as
follows.
HTa0: µD = µP0.75−µP0.05 = 0
HTb0: µD = µP0.75−µP0.25 = 0
HTc0: µD = µP0.75−µP0.5 = 0
HTd0: µD = µP0.75−µP0.95 = 0
Similarly, our null hypotheses for recall are listed below.
HTe0: µD = µR0.75−µR0.05 = 0
HTf 0: µD = µR0.75−µR0.25 = 0
HTg0: µD = µR0.75−µR0.5 = 0
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HTh0: µD = µR0.75−µR0.95 = 0
The alternative hypotheses for precision and recall can also be described and the valid-
ity of those hypotheses would indicate that there is a difference between performance
measures when different cosine similarity thresholds are used. The following is the set
of hypotheses that we will be investigating.
HTa1: µD = µP0.75−µP0.05 6= 0
HTb1: µD = µP0.75−µP0.25 6= 0
HTc1: µD = µP0.75−µP0.5 6= 0
HTd1: µD = µP0.75−µP0.95 6= 0
HTe1: µD = µR0.75−µR0.05 6= 0
HTf 1: µD = µR0.75−µR0.25 6= 0
HTg1: µD = µR0.75−µR0.5 6= 0
HTh1: µD = µR0.75−µR0.95 6= 0
Results and Discussion
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the hypotheses results for precision and recall of collusion
detection respectively. In the tables, the t-statistic value is the standardised sample
mean, the degrees of freedom (df) is the number of independent comparisons made
from the sample, while the mean value is the average difference between performance
measures with two different cosine similarity thresholds. Finally, the P-value is the
probability of obtaining the t-statistic whose absolute value is equal to or greater than
the t-statistic value obtained. As we assume a confidence of 95%, a significance value
201
for a difference in the use of two threshold is less than 0.05. Complete results are shown
in Appendices C.3 and C.4
Hypothesis t-statistic df Mean P
HTa1 -8.137 49 -0.402 0.000
HTb1 -5.339 49 -0.192 0.000
HTc1 -2.425 49 -0.066 0.019
HTd1 1.016 49 0.020 0.315
Table 5.5: Hypotheses Results for Precision
From Table 5.5, we can observe that for hypotheses HTa1, HTb1 and HTc1,
P < 0.05, which suggests that we can reject the null hypotheses HTa0, HTb0 and
HTc0. Thus, we can conclude that there is a difference in precision between using a
cosine similarity threshold of 0.75 and thresholds 0.05, 0.25 and 0.5. However, there
is no significant difference in precision when using a threshold of 0.75 and one of 0.95.
Despite there being a significance for three of the thresholds, they all resulted in higher
precision than with threshold 0.75. However, we should also consider recall in the choice
of threshold.
Hypothesis t-statistic df Mean P
HTe1 5.429 49 0.156 0.000
HTf1 4.543 49 0.136 0.000
HTg1 2.794 49 0.092 0.007
HTh1 -4.128 49 -0.184 0.000
Table 5.6: Hypotheses Results for Recall
The results of the hypothesis testing in Table 5.6 show that for all the four
hypotheses, P < 0.05, which indicates that as we reject the null hypotheses, there
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is a significant difference between recall values when one of the four cosine similarity
thresholds 0.05, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.95 are used compared to the recall values using a
threshold value of 0.75. Of these four thresholds, only the value of 0.95 resulted in a
higher recall than for threshold 0.75.
As we can see from the above results, precision and recall are conflicting. A lower
cosine similarity threshold favours higher precision of collusion detection, while a higher
cosine similarity threshold is needed for a higher recall for this population configuration
set. To achieve both high precision and recall, we need to find the right balance for the
cosine similarity threshold. In light of the hypothesis testing results, we consider that
the choice of the threshold value 0.75 is appropriate for our investigation, as it results
in both precision and recall to be >0.1, despite the overall low recall values. If a better
precision is needed at the expense of recall, then a lower threshold could be used.
5.7.2.5 Summary of Results
The results show that the precision of collusion detection is higher for small and large
populations, while recall decreases with population size. A similar trend has been ob-
served for the extent of collusion in the agent population. Precision of detection increases
with an increase in collusion agents, while recall decreases. As both precision and recall
need to be high for effective collusion detection, based on our results, we have observed
that population configurations that achieve both a precision and recall of ≥ 0.25 consist
of small population sizes and small number of collusive agents.
We have carried out the experiments based on a cosine similarity measurement
threshold of 0.75, determined by empirical evaluation. Since the cosine similarity mea-
surement threshold is determinant in the calculation of precision and recall, we have also
evaluated precision and recall of collusion detection for several other threshold values.
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The statistical significance tests show that precision and recall are conflicting — a lower
threshold gives higher precision, while a higher threshold results in a higher precision.
From our results, we have shown that a threshold of 0.75 is appropriate for balancing
precision and recall as it allows both values to be > 0.1.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have addressed some of the issues of collusion detection in agent-
based systems. Firstly, we proposed a new taxonomy of collusion to classify the relevant
aspects of collusion in agent-based systems. The taxonomy has been inspired by the
collusion characteristics identified by Smed et al. [117, 118] for the field of online gaming.
With reference to the taxonomy, we have also outlined several types of collusion that
can occur among heterogeneous, communicating agents in such domains as e-commerce
and e-supply chains. We have discussed various collusion detection techniques that
can be used to identify potential collusive pairs and collusive sets and the choice of
cosine similarity measurement as the most appropriate to use for the domain under
consideration.
The evaluation of the PTW collusion detection using cosine similarity highlighted
the potential of this technique for collusion detection. However, precision and recall
values were relatively low, suggesting that many combined factors in the population
configuration may be affecting the performance of the evaluating agent. Low recall is
the result of a large false positive count in many cases, that is, the evaluator is wrongly
detecting non-collusive agents. In our current implementation, there is no upper limit
for the number of collusive pairs that the evaluator can detect. Limiting the number of
pairs detected and ensuring that the most relevant pairs are kept in the collusion list
could increase the recall for collusion detection.
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In Section 5.7.2.4, we performed an experiment to test the significance of the
cosine similarity threshold that has been used to differentiate the possibility of existence
or absence of collusion. The assumption was that we want to maximise both the pre-
cision and recall of collusion detection. The findings indicate that precision and recall
are conflicting and there is a need to choose a suitable cosine similarity threshold to
balance them. Further work is necessary to discover whether a different approach to the
threshold, such as a fuzzy logic would help in achieving this balance.
In this work, we have shown the detection of one type of collusion, namely the
Persistent Target-Witness collusion. For some population configurations, the detection
works well and the evaluator agent benefits from being able to identify the target-
witness pairs that are behaving in a similar way as in PTW collusion. Some of the
interesting challenges that need further research include the identification of the most
appropriate collusion detection mechanism that applies for different types of collusion
and for different population configurations. These will result in the collusion detection
process being more adaptive to the different situations that agents may face.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
Agent-based systems are increasingly being used in various domains due to their robust-
ness, flexibility of structure, and capability of supporting complex processes involving
the consideration of many factors. In many cases, agents would be used more often
and more effectively to autonomously perform tasks on behalf of their users if the un-
certainty involved in agent interactions in open, distributed systems could be better
managed. Trust and reputation have been proposed as solutions to the issue of agent
interaction uncertainty. They enable agents to assess the trustworthiness of potential
interaction partners, before selecting the most suitable agent to perform a task towards
the achievement of their goals.
In this thesis, we started off with a number of research objectives and in light of
these objectives, we have made the following contributions:
• We proposed a trust and reputation model that allows agents to collect a rich
set of routine interaction and recommendation information, to support further
analysis of their social networks. Our model also improves trust assessment in
certain cases, and it performs as well as other trust and reputation models in
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other cases.
• We represented agents’ social networks using graphs and described how agents
can use the interaction and recommendation information gathered to build and
maintain social network models. We also provided visualisation tools to enable
further reasoning about agent relationships by human analysts.
• As a first step to collusion detection, we identified the types of collusion that
exist in the e-commerce domain and presented a taxonomy to characterise them
in terms of agent interactions and recommendations.
• We have shown how cosine similarity measurement can be used to detect target-
witness collusion by identifying pairs of collusive agents in the evaluator’s social
network. Collusion detection is supported by knowledge of the agent’s social
network and rich interaction and recommendation information.
Despite there being many widely adopted trust models, there are still areas of
uncertainty in agent interactions that make it difficult for agents to be used more widely.
• The complexity of agent interactions is largely due to the number of agents in the
population, the different services being requested and offered, and the complex
relationships among agents for the roles of provider of services and witness of
information. This often makes it difficult for system architects to easily understand
agent systems and identify clear patterns of behaviour, which are often necessary
to tune system parameters.
• Malicious behaviour, such as collusion, remains an issue in agent-based systems,
especially in decentralised systems, as we have discussed in Sections 2.8.2.2 and
5.5.1. In systems where individual agents have to deal with collusion themselves
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(compared to collusion being detected and punished by an appointed authority),
it is difficult for these agents to individually identify malicious behaviour and use
this information in their future interactions.
These two key issues led us to investigate how to support both human ana-
lysts, such as system architects responsible for developing and managing agent systems,
and agents themselves to more effectively handle malicious behaviour with a minimum
amount of overhead. This question has been subdivided into more specific questions
which have been answered in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Agents using a trust model to represent the trustworthiness of other agents
already collect some information about their environment as a result of their interactions,
as we have seen in Chapter 3. We explored how agents can collect additional information
during their interactions to acquire a more complete view of their environment, as well
as to better inform their agent selection decisions. Information from direct interactions
with provider agents is as valuable as recommendations from witnesses. Although less
accurate than direct service interactions, due to some degree of subjectivity, direct and
indirect recommendations have their place in trust models as they provide crucial agent
relationship information. The accuracy of trustworthiness evaluations is enhanced by
taking into account the aspects of trust and reputation in individual service dimensions,
considering the recency of interactions, and assessing the relevance of witnesses when
using their recommendations. We have incorporated the above considerations into our
trust and reputation model as the basis for gathering a richer set of information about
the agent environment and for more accurately assessing agent trustworthiness.
A related issue is the representation of the information gathered and how to
support the understanding of complex agent systems by system architects who are re-
sponsible for fine-tuning parameters for the best performance. Given the complexity of
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the interactions between agents, especially in large dynamic environments, it is difficult
for human analysts to analyse the vast amounts of data that are represented in the
agent interaction histories. Tools to support users to better understand agent systems
are essential for maintenance and analysis. As we have seen in Chapter 4, agent graphs,
built and maintained by agents, together with visualising tools, allow for an easier way
of understanding how agents are interconnected and what information they share. Con-
sequently, a better understanding of the agent environment leads to the extraction of
previously unknown information that can be useful for decision making, both for system
architects and the agents themselves. We have identified the link between the repre-
sentation of the richer set of interaction data and the extraction of previously unknown
information, such as identifying malicious behaviour.
In Chapter 5, we further explored the issue of malicious behaviour by looking
more closely at collusion. While the evaluation of trust by agents can filter out poor
performing agents, using trust alone does not allow for the more complex analysis of
which agents are colluding and the type of collusion involved. Towards this end, we
proposed a taxonomy of collusion characteristics that helps in identifying particular types
of collusion occurring in multi-agent systems in the e-commerce domain. Additionally,
we have proposed and evaluated a novel way of using similarity measurement to detect
collusion, based on the information gathered by agents during their interactions with
other agents.
In the remainder of this chapter we consider our contributions in turn, and discuss
the limitations of our approach and identify areas for future extension.
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6.1 Trust and Reputation Model
6.1.1 Summary of Contributions
In Section 2.3 we identified the essential characteristics of an effective trust model,
namely trust information sources (trust, direct and indirect recommendations), con-
sideration of trust and reputation at service-level and in different service dimensions,
recency of interactions, and relevance of recommendations. Based on these characteris-
tics, we proposed a trust and reputation model in Chapter 3. Using this model, agents
gather a richer set of information that in previous trust models, allowing for a more
accurate trust assessment and supporting a richer range of reasoning and analysis both
by agents and humans. We have shown that our model performs at least as well as
other trust models and in some cases it performs better (Section 3.5.2). This richer set
of information enables further information discovery, notably for collusion detection.
6.1.2 Limitations
There are a number of limitations to our proposed trust model implementation and eval-
uation. Firstly, the principal witness will request recommendations from an agent that
has previously directly interacted with the target agent. For simplicity we have restricted
our implementation, to use only two degrees of separation between the evaluator and
the secondary witness to provide a proof of concept that indirect recommendations have
a positive impact on trust assessment.
Secondly, in our evaluation, we have demonstrated that our trust and reputation
model works well for small to medium population sizes (10 to 50 individuals). Due to
the extensive number of population configurations generated (over 8500), it was not
practical to evaluate complete experimental sets for larger population sizes. We have
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carried out initial experiments on larger population sizes, considering 10 to 100 agents in
10 agent increments for Behaviour A for three population configurations (Population 1,
Population 2, Population 3). The paired t-test results we obtained, gave similar results
to those in Section 3.5.2, and are included Appendix B.2.
6.1.3 Future Directions
In Section 2.6, we introduced some of the existing work related to trust propagation and
the notion of six degrees of separation in small world networks. One area of importance
that has not been fully explored is the impact of the number of links between two agents
in a network for sharing recommendations. The effect of longer recommendation chains
needs to be further investigated in order to identify the optimal chain length in such
networks.
For technologists aiming to improve the performance of agents using trust and
reputation, one potential direction is to investigate the adaptation of agents to more
dynamic changes in agent behaviours. As demonstrated by the evaluation of our model,
an agent population has a number of parameters that affect an evaluator’s ability to
accurately assess the trustworthiness of another agent. An important research topic is
how different combinations of population parameters impact on the evaluator’s perfor-
mance and the ways that it can adapt its trust evaluation to take these parameters into
account.
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6.2 Agent Graphs and Visualisation Tool
6.2.1 Summary of Contributions
In Section 1.2.2, we hypothesised that agents should be more fully equipped to gain
a better understanding of their environment by capturing the data gathered through
agent interactions in a clear and systematic way. We have shown in Chapter 4 how
an agent can more expressively represent its agent interactions and relationships in the
form of agent graphs. Four types of graph can be built and maintained by an evaluator
to understand the distribution of providers and witnesses, as well as the relationships
between agents in terms of service provision or general agent interactions. We also
discussed several examples of new information that agents can extract from the agent
graphs, such as collusion, and the re-discovery of service providers after a period of them
being untrustworthy,
To facilitate the representation of the agent population to human analysts, we
have provided a visualisation tool for viewing the status of an agent’s view of the envi-
ronment. The graph nodes show the agents involved and the edges linking the nodes
provide information on how agents are linked, whether by service provision or by recom-
mendation sharing. The visualisation tool enables users to rearrange the agent graph to
make it easier and convenient to read.
6.2.2 Limitations
The agent graphs are intended to represent a snapshot of an agent’s view of its envi-
ronment. The scope of this snapshot includes history of the agent’s own interactions
at that time along with the recommendations being received by the agent. Snapshots
of the agent’s environment at regular intervals are not taken and recorded. Agents will
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refer to the current state of the graphs when they need to analyse their environment.
However, information on the evolution of the environment may be of importance.
Another limitation is that the graphs contain information from the point of view
of only one agent and from the recommendations it receives. Human analysts may need
to view the entire population or groups of agents.
The graphs and the visualisation tool only show the current state of agents’
interactions. They do not show any interpretation of agent behaviours that can be
extracted from the data. Annotations by human users about agent relationships cannot
currently be added to the graphs to increase the quality and accuracy of the data that
the agent holds.
6.2.3 Future Directions
Information about the evolution of an agent’s environment may provide vital clues in
understanding its interactions and decision making over time. A future development
for the agent graphs is to include a feature to enable human analysts to visualise the
agent population as a whole, rather than from an individual agent’s point of view, to
give a richer understanding of how the agents in the population are working together.
Similarly, enhanced visualisation can be developed to highlight particular agent activities
of interest, such as clusters of high agent interactions.
6.3 Collusion Detection
6.3.1 Summary of Contributions
Malicious behaviour in agent populations, such as collusion, increases the risk associated
with agent interactions, as discussed in Section 1.2.4. Collusion detection begins with the
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identification of the characteristics of collusion among agents. We proposed a taxonomy
of collusion characteristics to identify collusion and associate collusion types occurring
in e-commerce systems with their characteristics. Furthermore, we presented a novel
way of using similarity measurement for the detection of persistent collusion between a
witness agent and the target agent being assessed by the evaluator. We have shown
in Section 5.7 that cosine similarity measurement works well in some circumstances for
detecting collusion of this type. Evaluator agents are able to detect pairs of colluding
target and witness agents, which is an additional benefit to only identifying that these
two agents are untrustworthy, but with no cause for their untrustworthiness.
6.3.2 Limitations
In our work, we assessed only one type of collusion, persistent target-witness collusion.
We chose this collusion type as a proof of concept for using cosine similarity for collusion
detection in agent systems. Additionally, the agent relationships necessary for detection
are also well represented in the agent graphs.
According to the literature [124, 138], cosine similarity measurement is the
most appropriate measure for service-oriented domains, including e-commerce. We used
cosine similarity measurement in our approach, but we did not compare it with other
techniques. A complete validation would have involved extensive work for the evaluation
sets and we chose to extensively evaluate the cosine similarity measurement since our
aim was to assess whether similarity measurement could be used to detect collusion.
In our approach, we do not limit the number of potentially collusive agent pairs
that the evaluator can detect. We argue that it is useful for an evaluator to identify
all the potentially collusive agent pairs in its environment. In some cases the number
of detected pairs can be large and taking note of all the potentially collusive pairs may
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not be as useful as applying a ranking according to the likelihood of the pairs being
collusive.
6.3.3 Future Directions
Different types of collusion may occur in service-oriented agent systems, as we have
seen in Section 5.4.2 for the e-commerce domain. Immediate future work will consist
of investigating the occurrence of those types of collusion and how agents can use
their interaction data and agent graphs to detect them. It is highly likely that different
collusion detection mechanisms would suit different types of collusion better. Interesting
challenges include the identification of other suitable collusion detection mechanisms
that make use of the data already gathered from agent interactions. The aim is to
enhance the ability of individual agents to detect collusion themselves.
To improve on accurate collusion detection, a confidence value can be attached
to the detected collusive pair, such that a ranking method can be used to help an
evaluator manage its list of detected collusive pairs. The motivation is to enable agents
to act on the collusion detection information to influence future decision making. If
the list of potentially collusive agent pairs is long, it will be difficult for an evaluator to
effectively prevent or manage the effects of future collusion without a limited ordered
list of which collusive agent pairs to prioritise for punishment.
As mentioned previously, collusion detection is the essential precursor to collusion
prevention and management. It is therefore necessary to consider ways in which agents
can use collusion detection information to inform their trust assessment mechanism for
agent selection. Techniques, such as machine learning could be used to improve collusion
detection and subsequently improve trust assessment.
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6.4 Final Conclusions
Throughout this thesis, based on literature, implementation and evaluation, we have
shown that the uncertainty of agent interactions in open, distributed, and heterogeneous
systems can be reduced with a combination of approaches to improve trust assessment,
to better represent an agent’s environment, and to detect collusion. Our work has shown
that an individual agent can reduce its number of failed interactions with other agents
in this way, through more effectively using the data gathered during its interactions.
Our proposed model of trust and reputation facilitates both the trust assessment
of potential interaction partners and the gathering of a richer set of data for additional
information extraction. While our model performs as effectively as some of the other
trust models, it has the added benefit of ensuring that the evaluator has sufficient
information about its environment for analysis. Our use of multiple trust dimensions,
indirect recommendations, recency of interactions and relevance of witnesses contributes
to this richer data set and in some cases helps to improve trust assessment. A number of
agent population parameters influence the way in which agent interactions take place.
Evaluator agents need to be able to identify the parameter combinations that apply
and also the dynamic changes in agent behaviour. Future work into these themes will
ensure that agents can assess the trustworthiness of other agents quickly and efficiently
to inform their decision making.
In terms of analysing the interaction data gathered from the service interactions,
we have shown that the data can be effectively represented as graphs which, when used
individually or in combination, helps human analysts to better understand the underlying
interactions within a multi-agent system. The agent graphs are represented further by
way of a visualisation tool that assists users in restructuring the graphs for ease of access.
Further work in this area should focus on presenting complete information to the user,
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such as snapshots of the agent environment over time. Enabling the user to highlight
particular agent behaviour, such as confirming or rejecting detected collusion, can be
a means to allow the user to incorporate verified information into the agent selection
process.
Collusion among agents is one of the sources of uncertainty in agent interactions.
Very little work has previously been done in giving more power to the agents themselves
to detect collusion with little overhead. Using Kleinberg’s argument [57] that a partial
view of the agent environment may be sufficient to extract collusion information, we
have built on the interaction data gathered and the agent graphs to detect collusion.
Similarity measurement techniques are suited for collusion detection since similarity or
dissimilarity between particular behaviours indicates a high probability of collusion or
malicious behaviour that results in similar effects as collusion. We have demonstrated
that using cosine similarity measurement for collusion detection is effective in some
cases for persistent target-witness collusion. The important next steps in this research
need to focus on ensuring that an evaluator agent can detect this type of collusion
accurately every time it occurs in its environment. The agent population configuration
influences the detection process but it is not yet clear how and hence requires to be
further investigated.
In the future, collusion detection needs to be included within the trust assess-
ment so that the information can be used to inform future interactions. With collusion
detection being a complex process, the role of human analysts will be crucial in helping
the agent system to learn to detect collusion more accurately.
To conclude, we can say that a trust model with a richer set of interaction data
can help individual agents to better represent their agent environment and subsequently
extract previously unknown information, including that relating to collusion, with the
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aim of reducing the uncertainty in agent interactions. Tools to support human analysts
to better understand agent systems can greatly help towards improving the way agents
can truly become autonomous and used more widely. Hence, further research needs to
take both the agent and human components into account to resolve some of the more
complex issues within agent-based systems.
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Appendix A
Review of Trust Model
Characteristics
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Appendix B
Trust and Reputation Model
Evaluation
B.1 Paired t-Tests for Population Sizes 10 to 50 for Be-
haviour Profiles A–D
B.1.1 Hypotheses Results for Failed Task Ratios
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_FU_ratio 0.350 3000 0.146 0.003
TRID_FU_ratio 0.266 3000 0.129 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.289 3000 0.115 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.266 3000 0.129 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.283 3000 0.113 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.266 3000 0.129 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.350 3000 0.146 0.003
T_FU_ratio 0.289 3000 0.115 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.350 3000 0.146 0.003
TRD_FU_ratio 0.283 3000 0.113 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.289 3000 0.115 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.283 3000 0.113 0.002
HFe1
HFf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HFa1
HFb1
HFc1
HFd1
Table B.1: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HFa1 C_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 -0.116 0.000
HFb1 T_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 -0.187 0.000
HFc1 TRD_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 -0.174 0.000
HFd1 C_FU_rate & T_FU_rate 3000 0.616 0.000
HFe1 C_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.602 0.000
HFf1 T_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.796 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.2: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_FU_ratio 0.344 3000 0.145 0.003
TRID_FU_ratio 0.284 3000 0.112 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.291 3000 0.113 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.284 3000 0.112 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.285 3000 0.113 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.284 3000 0.112 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.344 3000 0.145 0.003
T_FU_ratio 0.291 3000 0.113 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.344 3000 0.145 0.003
TRD_FU_ratio 0.285 3000 0.113 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.291 3000 0.113 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.285 3000 0.113 0.002
HFf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HFa1
HFb1
HFc1
HFd1
HFe1
Table B.4: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile B (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HFa1 C_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.608 0.000
HFb1 T_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.778 0.000
HFc1 TRD_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.795 0.000
HFd1 C_FU_rate & T_FU_rate 3000 0.628 0.000
HFe1 C_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.626 0.000
HFf1 T_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.771 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.5: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile B (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_FU_ratio 0.569 3000 0.106 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.482 3000 0.100 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.097 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.482 3000 0.100 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.098 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.482 3000 0.100 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.569 3000 0.106 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.097 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.569 3000 0.106 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.098 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.097 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.483 3000 0.098 0.002
HFf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HFa1
HFb1
HFc1
HFd1
HFe1
Table B.7: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile C (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HFa1 C_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.380 0.000
HFb1 T_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.526 0.000
HFc1 TRD_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.524 0.000
HFd1 C_FU_rate & T_FU_rate 3000 0.381 0.000
HFe1 C_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.379 0.000
HFf1 T_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.535 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.8: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile C (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_FU_ratio 0.559 3000 0.104 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.473 3000 0.098 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.475 3000 0.097 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.473 3000 0.098 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.476 3000 0.099 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.473 3000 0.098 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.559 3000 0.104 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.475 3000 0.097 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.559 3000 0.104 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.476 3000 0.099 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.475 3000 0.097 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.476 3000 0.099 0.002
HFf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HFa1
HFb1
HFc1
HFd1
HFe1
Table B.10: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile D (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HFa1 C_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.384 0.000
HFb1 T_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.519 0.000
HFc1 TRD_FU_rate & TRID_FU_rate 3000 0.515 0.000
HFd1 C_FU_rate & T_FU_rate 3000 0.363 0.000
HFe1 C_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.381 0.000
HFf1 T_FU_rate & TRD_FU_rate 3000 0.525 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.11: Failed Tasks Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile D (Correlations)
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B.1.2 Hypotheses Results for Overspend Ratios
Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_overspend_ratio 0.306 3000 0.125 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.249 3000 0.090 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.253 3000 0.091 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.249 3000 0.090 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.250 3000 0.089 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.249 3000 0.090 0.002
C_overspend_ratio 0.306 3000 0.125 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.253 3000 0.091 0.002
C_overspend_ratio 0.306 3000 0.125 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.250 3000 0.089 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.253 3000 0.091 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.250 3000 0.089 0.002
Paired Samples Statistics
HOf1
HOa1
HOb1
HOc1
HOd1
HOe1
Table B.13: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HOa1 C_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.489 0.000
HOb1 T_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.698 0.000
HOc1 TRD_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.692 0.000
HOd1 C_overspend_rate & T_overspend_rate 3000 0.497 0.000
HOe1 C_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.494 0.000
HOf1 T_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.698 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.14: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_overspend_ratio 0.371 3000 0.104 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.316 3000 0.084 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
C_overspend_ratio 0.371 3000 0.104 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.316 3000 0.084 0.002
C_overspend_ratio 0.371 3000 0.104 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
T_overspend_ratio 0.316 3000 0.084 0.002
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.315 3000 0.084 0.002
HOf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HOa1
HOb1
HOc1
HOd1
HOe1
Table B.16: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile B (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HOa1 C_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.421 0.000
HOb1 T_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.595 0.000
HOc1 TRD_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.575 0.000
HOd1 C_overspend_rate & T_overspend_rate 3000 0.434 0.000
HOe1 C_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.406 0.000
HOf1 T_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.581 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.17: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile B (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_overspend_ratio 0.207 3000 0.080 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.065 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
C_overspend_ratio 0.207 3000 0.080 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.065 0.001
C_overspend_ratio 0.207 3000 0.080 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.065 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.176 3000 0.063 0.001
HOf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HOa1
HOb1
HOc1
HOd1
HOe1
Table B.19: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile C (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HOa1 C_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.578 0.000
HOb1 T_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.734 0.000
HOc1 TRD_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.720 0.000
HOd1 C_overspend_rate & T_overspend_rate 3000 0.589 0.000
HOe1 C_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.590 0.000
HOf1 T_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.727 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.20: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile C (Correlations)
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error
Mean
C_overspend_ratio 0.232 3000 0.077 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.195 3000 0.063 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.196 3000 0.063 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.195 3000 0.063 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.197 3000 0.064 0.001
TRID_overspend_ratio 0.195 3000 0.063 0.001
C_overspend_ratio 0.232 3000 0.077 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.196 3000 0.063 0.001
C_overspend_ratio 0.232 3000 0.077 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.197 3000 0.064 0.001
T_overspend_ratio 0.196 3000 0.063 0.001
TRD_overspend_ratio 0.197 3000 0.064 0.001
HOf1
Paired Samples Statistics
HOa1
HOb1
HOc1
HOd1
HOe1
Table B.22: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile D (Statistics)
Hypothesis Comparison Pair N Correlation Sig.
HOa1 C_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.542 0.000
HOb1 T_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.686 0.000
HOc1 TRD_overspend_rate & TRID_overspend_rate 3000 0.679 0.000
HOd1 C_overspend_rate & T_overspend_rate 3000 0.561 0.000
HOe1 C_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.542 0.000
HOf1 T_overspend_rate & TRD_overspend_rate 3000 0.692 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Table B.23: Overspend Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile D (Correlations)
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B.2 Paired t-Tests on Failed Task Ratios for Population
Sizes 10 to 100
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
C_FU_ratio 0.364 7377 0.178 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.265 7377 0.141 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.269 7352 0.140 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.266 7352 0.141 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.266 7353 0.140 0.002
TRID_FU_ratio 0.266 7353 0.141 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.365 7378 0.178 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.268 7378 0.141 0.002
C_FU_ratio 0.364 7388 0.178 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.265 7388 0.141 0.002
T_FU_ratio 0.269 7355 0.141 0.002
TRD_FU_ratio 0.266 7355 0.140 0.002
Pair 5
Pair 6
Paired Samples Statistics
Comparison Pairs
Pair 1
Pair 2
Pair 3
Pair 4
Table B.25: Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A, Population 1, Population 2,
Population 3, Population Sizes 10 to 100 (Statistics)
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 C_FU_ratio & TRID_FU_ratio 7377 0.486 0.000
Pair 2 T_FU_ratio & TRID_FU_ratio 7352 0.802 0.000
Pair 3 TRD_FU_ratio & TRID_FU_ratio 7353 0.801 0.000
Pair 4 C_FU_ratio & T_FU_ratio 7378 0.494 0.000
Pair 5 C_FU_ratio & TRD_FU_ratio 7388 0.487 0.000
Pair 6 T_FU_ratio & TRD_FU_ratio 7355 0.800 0.000
Paired Samples Correlations
Comparison Pairs
Table B.26: Hypotheses Results for Behaviour Profile A, Population 1, Population 2,
Population 3, Population Sizes 10 to 100 (Correlations)
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Appendix C
Collusion Detection Source Files
C.1 Interaction History File Example
Agent interaction history file and collusion detection information for population config-
uration (PopulationSize=10, HighTrust=0%, AverageTrust=0%, LowTrust=100% ).
1 DS 18 s1 a1 a3 a4 252 648 -1
2 DS 18 s1 a1 a8 a4 272 528 -1
3 DA 18 a1 a2 a4 80 320 -1
4 DA 18 a1 a5 a7 16 254 -1
5 DS 18 s1 a1 a6 a7 178 632 -1
6 DS 18 s1 a1 a6 a8 72 198 -1
7 DA 18 a1 a2 a10 210 490 0
8 DS 18 s1 a1 a8 a10 32 48 0
9 A 18 s1 a1 a10 1
10 DS 38 s1 a1 a4 a7 140 260 -1
11 DS 38 s1 a1 a8 a7 105 375 -1
12 DS 38 s1 a1 a10 a7 20 60 -1
13 A 38 s1 a1 a4 1
14 DS 52 s1 a1 a4 a3 41 59 0
15 A 52 s1 a1 a3 1
16 DS 59 s1 a1 a4 a6 50 150 -1
17 DS 59 s1 a1 a3 a6 328 472 -1
18 IA 59 a1 a9 a2 a6 67 183 -1
19 DS 59 s1 a1 a4 a8 154 546 0
20 DA 59 a1 a5 a8 75 225 0
21 A 59 s1 a1 a8 0
22 DA 78 a1 a9 a3 50 130 -1
23 DA 78 a1 a5 a6 21 129 0
24 DS 78 s1 a1 a6 a7 296 334 -1
240
25 DA 78 a1 a5 a7 93 207 -1
26 DS 78 s1 a1 a8 a7 230 490 -1
27 DS 78 s1 a1 a7 a10 6 13 -1
28 A 78 s1 a1 a6 1
29 A 95 s1 a1 a10 0
30 IS 112 s1 a1 a9 a7 a8 9 41 -1
31 DS 112 s1 a1 a6 a10 225 675 -1
32 A 112 s1 a1 a7 0
33 DS 126 s1 a1 a10 a3 0 20 1
34 DS 126 s1 a1 a6 a3 118 242 1
35 DS 126 s1 a1 a8 a6 153 87 -1
36 DS 126 s1 a1 a10 a6 4 16 -1
37 DA 126 a1 a5 a7 36 264 -1
38 DA 126 a1 a2 a7 69 231 -1
39 DA 126 a1 a9 a7 50 370 -1
40 DA 126 a1 a9 a10 39 321 -1
41 DA 126 a1 a2 a10 119 581 -1
42 DS 126 s1 a1 a6 a10 233 397 -1
43 A 126 s1 a1 a3 0
44 DS 143 s1 a1 a6 a3 180 540 1
45 DA 143 a1 a2 a6 56 144 -1
46 DS 143 s1 a1 a8 a6 184 616 -1
47 IS 143 s1 a1 a9 a7 a6 18 82 -1
48 DS 143 s1 a1 a6 a10 42 48 -1
49 DS 143 s1 a1 a8 a10 23 57 -1
50 DS 143 s1 a1 a3 a10 189 711 -1
51 A 143 s1 a1 a3 0
52 DS 150 s1 a1 a3 a6 135 765 -1
53 DS 150 s1 a1 a7 a6 0 10 -1
54 DS 150 s1 a1 a8 a7 134 506 -1
55 A 150 s1 a1 a3 0
56 DS 157 s1 a1 a3 a10 80 420 -1
57 DA 157 a1 a5 a10 16 104 -1
58 DA 157 a1 a9 a10 113 427 -1
59 A 157 s1 a1 a7 1
60 A 168 s1 a1 a4 0
61 DS 187 s1 a1 a3 a6 140 360 -1
62 DA 187 a1 a5 a6 55 185 -1
63 DA 187 a1 a5 a7 9 51 1
64 A 187 s1 a1 a7 1
65 DS 194 s1 a1 a10 a3 1 59 -1
66 DA 194 a1 a9 a3 33 207 -1
67 DA 194 a1 a2 a3 210 790 -1
68 DA 194 a1 a2 a7 252 648 1
69 DS 194 s1 a1 a8 a7 216 264 1
70 DA 194 a1 a5 a7 19 221 1
71 DS 194 s1 a1 a6 a8 171 729 -1
72 DS 194 s1 a1 a3 a8 234 666 -1
73 A 194 s1 a1 a7 0
74 DA 200 a1 a5 a3 33 207 -1
75 DS 200 s1 a1 a10 a3 3 37 -1
76 DS 200 s1 a1 a7 a3 4 26 -1
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77 DA 200 a1 a2 a7 140 560 1
78 DS 200 s1 a1 a4 a8 108 292 -1
79 A 200 s1 a1 a7 1
80 DA 219 a1 a9 a3 75 285 -1
81 IS 219 s1 a1 a9 a3 a6 200 600 -1
82 DS 219 s1 a1 a7 a6 23 47 -1
83 DS 219 s1 a1 a4 a6 19 81 -1
84 DA 219 a1 a5 a7 9 111 -1
85 DS 219 s1 a1 a6 a7 239 391 -1
86 DA 219 a1 a2 a7 238 462 -1
87 DS 219 s1 a1 a6 a10 184 266 -1
88 DS 219 s1 a1 a8 a10 105 135 -1
89 DA 219 a1 a2 a10 110 890 -1
90 A 219 s1 a1 a8 1
91 DS 233 s1 a1 a3 a4 155 345 1
92 DS 233 s1 a1 a6 a4 178 362 1
93 DA 233 a1 a5 a10 6 54 -1
94 A 233 s1 a1 a4 1
95 DA 252 a1 a2 a3 297 603 -1
96 DA 252 a1 a9 a3 43 197 -1
97 DS 252 s1 a1 a7 a3 2 18 -1
98 A 252 s1 a1 a8 1
99 DA 263 a1 a9 a3 40 200 1
100 DS 263 s1 a1 a4 a3 88 112 1
101 DS 263 s1 a1 a8 a3 91 149 1
102 DS 263 s1 a1 a4 a7 144 456 -1
103 DA 263 a1 a9 a7 126 474 -1
104 DS 263 s1 a1 a7 a10 6 23 -1
105 A 263 s1 a1 a3 0
106 DA 270 a1 a5 a6 55 185 -1
107 DA 270 a1 a2 a6 100 300 -1
108 A 270 s1 a1 a7 1
109 DS 279 s1 a1 a10 a3 6 54 -1
110 DS 279 s1 a1 a6 a3 52 128 -1
111 DA 279 a1 a9 a3 52 428 -1
112 DA 279 a1 a5 a8 9 81 -1
113 DS 279 s1 a1 a10 a8 3 27 -1
114 A 279 s1 a1 a4 0
115 DA 299 a1 a9 a3 10 170 -1
116 DS 299 s1 a1 a10 a3 1 89 -1
117 DS 299 s1 a1 a7 a4 2 48 -1
118 DS 299 s1 a1 a4 a6 80 920 -1
119 DS 299 s1 a1 a7 a6 5 35 -1
120 DA 299 a1 a2 a6 103 347 -1
121 DS 299 s1 a1 a6 a7 117 333 -1
122 DA 299 a1 a2 a7 161 539 -1
123 DS 299 s1 a1 a4 a8 80 120 1
124 DA 299 a1 a5 a8 2 208 1
125 DS 299 s1 a1 a10 a8 1 9 1
126 DA 299 a1 a5 a10 39 171 -1
127 DA 299 a1 a9 a10 162 438 -1
128 DS 299 s1 a1 a6 a10 86 274 -1
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129 A 299 s1 a1 a8 0
130 DS 305 s1 a1 a7 a4 2 28 -1
131 DA 305 a1 a5 a4 48 222 -1
132 DS 305 s1 a1 a10 a6 4 66 1
133 DS 305 s1 a1 a3 a6 160 840 1
134 DS 305 s1 a1 a6 a10 210 600 -1
135 DS 305 s1 a1 a7 a10 8 8 -1
136 A 305 s1 a1 a6 0
137 DS 315 s1 a1 a7 a4 17 73 -1
138 DA 315 a1 a5 a4 21 159 -1
139 DS 315 s1 a1 a6 a4 75 285 -1
140 DS 315 s1 a1 a8 a6 14 66 1
141 A 315 s1 a1 a6 1
142 DS 333 s1 a1 a7 a3 8 92 -1
143 DS 333 s1 a1 a6 a3 26 64 -1
144 DA 333 a1 a5 a3 27 183 -1
145 IA 333 a1 a9 a5 a8 10 260 -1
146 DA 333 a1 a2 a8 70 430 -1
147 DS 333 s1 a1 a7 a8 7 93 -1
148 DS 333 s1 a1 a8 a10 259 461 -1
149 DS 333 s1 a1 a4 a10 28 172 -1
150 A 333 s1 a1 a6 0
151 DA 343 a1 a5 a4 16 164 -1
152 DS 343 s1 a1 a8 a4 190 370 -1
153 DS 343 s1 a1 a10 a6 2 78 1
154 A 343 s1 a1 a6 0
155 DS 350 s1 a1 a10 a3 10 90 1
156 DS 350 s1 a1 a8 a7 28 52 -1
157 DS 350 s1 a1 a3 a7 248 552 -1
158 DA 350 a1 a5 a7 42 258 -1
159 A 350 s1 a1 a3 0
160 DS 365 s1 a1 a6 a4 23 67 -1
161 DS 365 s1 a1 a7 a4 0 30 -1
162 DS 365 s1 a1 a8 a6 151 409 1
163 DS 365 s1 a1 a7 a6 3 47 1
164 DS 365 s1 a1 a3 a6 48 352 1
165 DS 365 s1 a1 a4 a7 48 352 -1
166 DS 365 s1 a1 a3 a7 102 198 -1
167 DA 365 a1 a5 a8 75 225 -1
168 A 365 s1 a1 a6 1
169 DS 375 s1 a1 a8 a3 201 279 -1
170 DS 375 s1 a1 a10 a3 8 52 -1
171 DS 375 s1 a1 a10 a4 8 92 -1
172 DA 375 a1 a9 a4 21 159 -1
173 A 375 s1 a1 a6 0
174 DS 391 s1 a1 a8 a4 40 200 -1
175 DS 391 s1 a1 a10 a4 3 37 -1
176 DA 391 a1 a5 a4 6 24 -1
177 IS 391 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 54 546 -1
178 DA 391 a1 a2 a8 59 291 -1
179 DS 391 s1 a1 a7 a10 12 22 -1
180 DA 391 a1 a5 a10 6 24 -1
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181 DA 391 a1 a2 a10 27 73 -1
182 A 391 s1 a1 a7 0
183 DS 408 s1 a1 a6 a3 309 411 -1
184 DS 408 s1 a1 a8 a3 24 56 -1
185 DA 408 a1 a9 a3 120 480 -1
186 DA 408 a1 a5 a7 14 166 -1
187 DS 408 s1 a1 a6 a7 171 729 -1
188 DA 408 a1 a2 a10 108 292 -1
189 DS 408 s1 a1 a8 a10 73 247 -1
190 A 408 s1 a1 a4 0
191 DA 421 a1 a9 a4 43 317 -1
192 DS 421 s1 a1 a8 a4 36 44 -1
193 DS 421 s1 a1 a10 a4 2 18 -1
194 DS 421 s1 a1 a3 a8 52 148 -1
195 DS 421 s1 a1 a6 a10 324 576 -1
196 DS 421 s1 a1 a7 a10 0 5 -1
197 A 421 s1 a1 a6 1
198 DA 441 a1 a9 a7 97 443 -1
199 A 441 s1 a1 a10 0
200 DA 460 a1 a5 a4 5 55 -1
201 DA 460 a1 a2 a4 216 684 -1
202 DS 460 s1 a1 a3 a4 150 350 -1
203 A 460 s1 a1 a8 1
204 DS 476 s1 a1 a8 a3 132 268 -1
205 DS 476 s1 a1 a4 a3 168 532 -1
206 DS 476 s1 a1 a8 a7 184 376 -1
207 DS 476 s1 a1 a4 a7 132 168 -1
208 DA 476 a1 a2 a7 52 348 -1
209 DS 476 s1 a1 a6 a8 201 519 1
210 IS 476 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 215 285 1
211 A 476 s1 a1 a8 0
212 A 485 s1 a1 a10 0
213 A 490 s1 a1 a7 0
214 DA 504 a1 a5 a7 10 260 -1
215 DS 504 s1 a1 a3 a7 24 76 -1
216 DS 504 s1 a1 a10 a7 0 30 -1
217 DS 504 s1 a1 a6 a10 81 369 1
218 DA 504 a1 a2 a10 200 600 1
219 DS 504 s1 a1 a4 a10 126 474 1
220 A 504 s1 a1 a10 0
221 DS 523 s1 a1 a8 a4 79 161 -1
222 DA 523 a1 a5 a4 10 140 -1
223 DS 523 s1 a1 a4 a6 216 384 -1
224 A 523 s1 a1 a8 0
225 DA 542 a1 a5 a4 16 194 -1
226 DS 542 s1 a1 a8 a4 108 292 -1
227 DS 542 s1 a1 a6 a4 91 449 -1
228 DS 542 s1 a1 a10 a6 0 10 -1
229 DA 542 a1 a2 a6 60 140 -1
230 A 542 s1 a1 a7 0
231 DA 552 a1 a5 a3 8 112 -1
232 DA 552 a1 a9 a3 9 231 -1
244
233 DS 552 s1 a1 a7 a3 14 86 -1
234 DS 552 s1 a1 a7 a6 11 49 -1
235 DA 552 a1 a5 a6 9 141 -1
236 DA 552 a1 a5 a8 19 41 1
237 DS 552 s1 a1 a7 a8 1 19 1
238 A 552 s1 a1 a8 1
239 DS 565 s1 a1 a8 a3 86 234 -1
240 DS 565 s1 a1 a4 a3 180 720 -1
241 DA 565 a1 a2 a7 164 236 -1
242 DS 565 s1 a1 a3 a7 189 711 -1
243 DS 565 s1 a1 a4 a7 35 65 -1
244 DS 565 s1 a1 a6 a8 25 155 -1
245 DS 565 s1 a1 a4 a8 312 488 -1
246 DS 565 s1 a1 a10 a8 16 64 -1
247 A 565 s1 a1 a6 0
248 DS 583 s1 a1 a3 a4 203 497 -1
249 DS 583 s1 a1 a8 a4 168 392 -1
250 DS 583 s1 a1 a6 a4 11 79 -1
251 DA 583 a1 a2 a6 45 205 -1
252 DA 583 a1 a5 a6 5 265 -1
253 DS 583 s1 a1 a3 a6 120 480 -1
254 IA 583 a1 a9 a2 a8 32 368 -1
255 DS 583 s1 a1 a7 a8 5 75 -1
256 DS 583 s1 a1 a8 a10 50 670 -1
257 DA 583 a1 a9 a10 30 570 -1
258 A 583 s1 a1 a3 1
259 DA 600 a1 a2 a3 160 240 -1
260 DS 600 s1 a1 a10 a4 3 47 -1
261 DS 600 s1 a1 a6 a4 194 166 -1
262 DA 600 a1 a9 a4 8 112 -1
263 A 600 s1 a1 a8 0
264 DS 620 s1 a1 a6 a3 104 256 -1
265 DS 620 s1 a1 a8 a7 20 60 1
266 DS 620 s1 a1 a4 a7 102 198 1
267 DS 620 s1 a1 a6 a7 72 108 1
268 A 620 s1 a1 a7 0
269 DS 639 s1 a1 a6 a3 226 404 -1
270 DS 639 s1 a1 a4 a3 98 602 -1
271 DS 639 s1 a1 a10 a4 13 47 -1
272 DS 639 s1 a1 a4 a6 104 296 -1
273 DS 639 s1 a1 a8 a7 224 416 -1
274 DA 639 a1 a9 a10 24 276 -1
275 DA 639 a1 a5 a10 10 140 -1
276 A 639 s1 a1 a8 1
277 DS 656 s1 a1 a4 a3 195 305 -1
278 DA 656 a1 a2 a4 72 828 -1
279 DS 656 s1 a1 a10 a4 5 45 -1
280 DS 656 s1 a1 a8 a4 74 166 -1
281 DA 656 a1 a2 a6 8 392 -1
282 IS 656 s1 a1 a9 a7 a6 13 67 -1
283 DS 656 s1 a1 a3 a6 20 380 -1
284 DA 656 a1 a2 a10 24 576 -1
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285 A 656 s1 a1 a7 1
286 DA 674 a1 a2 a3 200 600 -1
287 DS 674 s1 a1 a8 a4 96 384 -1
288 DS 674 s1 a1 a6 a7 105 165 -1
289 A 674 s1 a1 a6 0
290 DS 686 s1 a1 a10 a3 9 61 -1
291 DS 686 s1 a1 a7 a3 2 68 -1
292 DA 686 a1 a2 a3 90 210 -1
293 DA 686 a1 a5 a10 3 27 1
294 A 686 s1 a1 a10 0
295 DS 706 s1 a1 a10 a7 0 10 -1
296 DS 706 s1 a1 a4 a7 84 516 -1
297 DS 706 s1 a1 a3 a7 63 237 -1
298 DS 706 s1 a1 a4 a8 74 126 1
299 DA 706 a1 a2 a8 56 294 1
300 DS 706 s1 a1 a6 a8 27 63 1
301 A 706 s1 a1 a8 1
302 A 712 s1 a1 a10 0
303 DA 731 a1 a5 a4 9 81 -1
304 DS 731 s1 a1 a6 a4 129 231 -1
305 DS 731 s1 a1 a4 a7 155 345 -1
306 DS 731 s1 a1 a6 a7 252 378 -1
307 DS 731 s1 a1 a7 a10 8 8 -1
308 DA 731 a1 a9 a10 19 41 -1
309 DA 731 a1 a5 a10 3 27 -1
310 A 731 s1 a1 a3 0
311 DA 749 a1 a9 a3 14 106 -1
312 DS 749 s1 a1 a10 a3 3 47 -1
313 DS 749 s1 a1 a8 a4 31 209 1
314 DS 749 s1 a1 a10 a6 7 33 -1
315 DS 749 s1 a1 a3 a10 66 534 -1
316 A 749 s1 a1 a4 0
317 DS 756 s1 a1 a10 a4 3 77 -1
318 DA 756 a1 a9 a4 52 428 -1
319 DS 756 s1 a1 a3 a4 13 87 -1
320 A 756 s1 a1 a8 0
321 DS 763 s1 a1 a8 a3 230 490 1
322 DA 763 a1 a9 a3 11 49 1
323 DS 763 s1 a1 a4 a7 68 332 -1
324 DA 763 a1 a9 a7 84 516 -1
325 DA 763 a1 a2 a7 15 85 -1
326 DA 763 a1 a9 a10 30 150 -1
327 DS 763 s1 a1 a6 a10 36 144 -1
328 DS 763 s1 a1 a7 a10 4 14 -1
329 A 763 s1 a1 a3 0
330 DA 771 a1 a2 a10 56 744 -1
331 DS 771 s1 a1 a7 a10 20 30 -1
332 DS 771 s1 a1 a4 a10 272 528 -1
333 A 771 s1 a1 a3 1
334 DA 789 a1 a5 a3 10 50 1
335 DA 789 a1 a2 a3 48 352 1
336 A 789 s1 a1 a3 1
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337 DA 805 a1 a9 a4 7 53 -1
338 A 805 s1 a1 a3 0
339 DA 818 a1 a5 a3 29 61 -1
340 DA 818 a1 a2 a3 110 390 -1
341 DS 818 s1 a1 a7 a3 9 91 -1
342 DS 818 s1 a1 a7 a4 8 82 -1
343 DS 818 s1 a1 a10 a4 19 81 -1
344 IS 818 s1 a1 a9 a8 a6 30 50 -1
345 DA 818 a1 a2 a6 60 140 -1
346 DA 818 a1 a5 a6 19 161 -1
347 DA 818 a1 a5 a7 46 134 -1
348 DS 818 s1 a1 a4 a10 210 290 1
349 A 818 s1 a1 a10 0
350 DS 826 s1 a1 a10 a8 3 67 -1
351 IA 826 a1 a9 a5 a8 3 27 -1
352 DA 826 a1 a5 a8 6 84 -1
353 DA 826 a1 a2 a10 258 342 -1
354 DA 826 a1 a5 a10 10 80 -1
355 DS 826 s1 a1 a4 a10 273 427 -1
356 A 826 s1 a1 a6 0
357 DA 832 a1 a5 a4 40 230 -1
358 IA 832 a1 a9 a2 a8 4 96 1
359 A 832 s1 a1 a8 1
360 DA 843 a1 a5 a4 37 233 -1
361 DS 843 s1 a1 a6 a8 36 144 -1
362 DS 843 s1 a1 a4 a8 27 273 -1
363 DS 843 s1 a1 a4 a10 33 267 -1
364 A 843 s1 a1 a3 1
365 DS 863 s1 a1 a6 a4 220 410 -1
366 DA 863 a1 a2 a4 126 574 -1
367 DA 863 a1 a9 a4 37 383 -1
368 DA 863 a1 a2 a6 64 136 -1
369 DS 863 s1 a1 a7 a6 11 69 -1
370 DA 863 a1 a5 a10 3 87 -1
371 DS 863 s1 a1 a6 a10 130 320 -1
372 A 863 s1 a1 a7 0
373 DS 869 s1 a1 a3 a10 96 504 -1
374 DA 869 a1 a9 a10 67 413 -1
375 A 869 s1 a1 a3 1
376 DA 884 a1 a2 a3 105 195 -1
377 DS 884 s1 a1 a6 a3 25 65 -1
378 DS 884 s1 a1 a3 a6 84 216 1
379 DS 884 s1 a1 a3 a10 57 243 -1
380 DA 884 a1 a2 a10 39 261 -1
381 DS 884 s1 a1 a4 a10 294 406 -1
382 A 884 s1 a1 a6 1
383 DS 889 s1 a1 a10 a8 17 73 1
384 DS 889 s1 a1 a8 a10 108 292 -1
385 DS 889 s1 a1 a6 a10 186 624 -1
386 A 889 s1 a1 a8 1
387 DS 899 s1 a1 a10 a6 5 75 -1
388 DS 899 s1 a1 a4 a6 204 396 -1
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389 DS 899 s1 a1 a8 a6 140 180 -1
390 DS 899 s1 a1 a7 a10 4 9 1
391 A 899 s1 a1 a10 1
392 DA 906 a1 a2 a3 390 610 -1
393 DA 906 a1 a5 a3 27 123 -1
394 DS 906 s1 a1 a4 a6 56 144 -1
395 DA 906 a1 a5 a6 14 166 -1
396 DA 906 a1 a5 a7 24 246 -1
397 DA 906 a1 a2 a7 220 780 -1
398 DS 906 s1 a1 a8 a10 153 487 -1
399 A 906 s1 a1 a8 0
400 DS 915 s1 a1 a4 a10 93 207 1
401 DS 915 s1 a1 a8 a10 81 159 1
402 A 915 s1 a1 a10 1
403 DS 930 s1 a1 a8 a3 129 591 -1
404 DS 930 s1 a1 a10 a3 2 38 -1
405 DS 930 s1 a1 a3 a10 550 450 -1
406 DA 930 a1 a5 a10 32 88 -1
407 DA 930 a1 a9 a10 79 341 -1
408 A 930 s1 a1 a6 1
409 DA 947 a1 a5 a4 2 118 -1
410 DS 947 s1 a1 a8 a4 156 404 -1
411 DS 947 s1 a1 a3 a4 48 352 -1
412 DS 947 s1 a1 a6 a8 43 137 -1
413 DS 947 s1 a1 a10 a8 5 55 -1
414 DS 947 s1 a1 a4 a8 140 360 -1
415 A 947 s1 a1 a6 0
416 DA 965 a1 a5 a10 45 135 -1
417 DS 965 s1 a1 a7 a10 2 24 -1
418 DS 965 s1 a1 a8 a10 33 207 -1
419 A 965 s1 a1 a4 1
420 DS 973 s1 a1 a3 a4 112 588 -1
421 DS 973 s1 a1 a3 a10 160 840 1
422 DA 973 a1 a5 a10 35 235 1
423 A 973 s1 a1 a10 0
424 DA 980 a1 a9 a7 24 96 -1
425 DS 980 s1 a1 a10 a7 2 38 -1
426 DA 980 a1 a2 a7 77 623 -1
427 A 980 s1 a1 a8 1
428 DS 989 s1 a1 a4 a3 189 711 -1
429 DA 989 a1 a9 a3 0 300 -1
430 DS 989 s1 a1 a8 a3 128 272 -1
431 DA 989 a1 a2 a4 64 736 -1
432 DS 989 s1 a1 a10 a4 3 27 -1
433 DA 989 a1 a5 a4 6 24 -1
434 DS 989 s1 a1 a3 a6 14 86 1
435 DA 989 a1 a5 a6 16 164 1
436 DS 989 s1 a1 a8 a7 44 116 -1
437 DS 989 s1 a1 a10 a7 3 37 -1
438 DA 989 a1 a9 a10 12 108 -1
439 A 989 s1 a1 a6 1
440 DA 1008 a1 a5 a7 5 25 -1
248
441 DS 1008 s1 a1 a4 a7 70 130 -1
442 DS 1008 s1 a1 a6 a7 214 416 -1
443 A 1008 s1 a1 a3 1
444 DS 1019 s1 a1 a4 a3 78 222 -1
445 DS 1019 s1 a1 a3 a4 84 216 -1
446 DS 1019 s1 a1 a8 a4 137 183 -1
447 DA 1019 a1 a5 a6 10 170 -1
448 DS 1019 s1 a1 a4 a6 44 156 -1
449 DS 1019 s1 a1 a3 a8 60 440 1
450 DS 1019 s1 a1 a7 a8 4 16 1
451 A 1019 s1 a1 a8 0
452 DS 1025 s1 a1 a7 a6 6 24 -1
453 DS 1025 s1 a1 a10 a8 22 68 -1
454 DA 1025 a1 a5 a8 10 110 -1
455 A 1025 s1 a1 a4 1
456 A 1037 s1 a1 a10 0
457 A 1057 s1 a1 a4 0
458 A 1067 s1 a1 a6 0
459 DS 1075 s1 a1 a10 a6 28 72 -1
460 DA 1075 a1 a2 a6 60 440 -1
461 DS 1075 s1 a1 a10 a7 7 73 1
462 DA 1075 a1 a5 a10 3 27 -1
463 A 1075 s1 a1 a7 1
464 DS 1082 s1 a1 a10 a4 4 46 1
465 DS 1082 s1 a1 a6 a4 119 511 1
466 DA 1082 a1 a5 a6 1 29 -1
467 IA 1082 a1 a9 a2 a6 23 77 -1
468 DA 1082 a1 a2 a6 3 47 -1
469 DS 1082 s1 a1 a6 a8 104 256 -1
470 A 1082 s1 a1 a4 0
471 DS 1097 s1 a1 a6 a3 223 497 -1
472 DA 1097 a1 a2 a4 48 552 1
473 DA 1097 a1 a9 a4 93 207 1
474 DS 1097 s1 a1 a3 a4 182 518 1
475 DS 1097 s1 a1 a8 a7 80 320 -1
476 DA 1097 a1 a5 a8 45 195 -1
477 DA 1097 a1 a2 a8 17 33 -1
478 IS 1097 s1 a1 a9 a7 a8 12 18 -1
479 A 1097 s1 a1 a4 0
480 A 1113 s1 a1 a7 1
481 DS 1128 s1 a1 a6 a4 372 438 -1
482 DS 1128 s1 a1 a8 a4 216 504 -1
483 DS 1128 s1 a1 a3 a4 161 539 -1
484 IS 1128 s1 a1 a9 a7 a8 18 72 -1
485 A 1128 s1 a1 a6 0
486 DS 1134 s1 a1 a10 a8 4 36 -1
487 DS 1134 s1 a1 a3 a8 26 174 -1
488 A 1134 s1 a1 a10 0
489 DS 1150 s1 a1 a7 a3 9 41 -1
490 DA 1150 a1 a5 a3 3 177 -1
491 DS 1150 s1 a1 a6 a3 167 373 -1
492 DS 1150 s1 a1 a10 a6 7 53 -1
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493 DS 1150 s1 a1 a4 a6 90 210 -1
494 A 1150 s1 a1 a10 1
495 DS 1166 s1 a1 a7 a3 1 9 -1
496 DS 1166 s1 a1 a8 a3 48 112 -1
497 DS 1166 s1 a1 a10 a3 3 17 -1
498 DA 1166 a1 a2 a4 5 495 -1
499 DS 1166 s1 a1 a8 a4 40 760 -1
500 DS 1166 s1 a1 a10 a6 3 27 -1
501 DS 1166 s1 a1 a3 a10 400 600 -1
502 A 1166 s1 a1 a7 1
503 DA 1171 a1 a9 a3 147 273 -1
504 DA 1171 a1 a5 a3 27 183 -1
505 DS 1171 s1 a1 a4 a3 231 569 -1
506 DS 1171 s1 a1 a7 a6 1 9 -1
507 DS 1171 s1 a1 a4 a6 250 250 -1
508 DS 1171 s1 a1 a8 a6 128 192 -1
509 DS 1171 s1 a1 a3 a7 170 830 -1
510 DA 1171 a1 a9 a7 62 418 -1
511 DS 1171 s1 a1 a4 a7 130 370 -1
512 DS 1171 s1 a1 a8 a10 44 276 1
513 A 1171 s1 a1 a10 1
514 DS 1181 s1 a1 a4 a3 252 448 -1
515 DA 1181 a1 a5 a6 54 156 -1
516 DS 1181 s1 a1 a10 a7 9 81 1
517 DS 1181 s1 a1 a4 a7 240 760 1
518 DS 1181 s1 a1 a8 a10 240 320 -1
519 DA 1181 a1 a5 a10 3 177 -1
520 DS 1181 s1 a1 a3 a10 48 152 -1
521 A 1181 s1 a1 a7 1
522 DA 1189 a1 a2 a3 387 513 -1
523 DS 1189 s1 a1 a6 a3 170 640 -1
524 DS 1189 s1 a1 a7 a3 12 78 -1
525 DA 1189 a1 a9 a4 67 173 1
526 DA 1189 a1 a5 a7 1 29 -1
527 DA 1189 a1 a9 a7 58 362 -1
528 DS 1189 s1 a1 a3 a7 115 385 -1
529 DS 1189 s1 a1 a4 a10 360 540 -1
530 DA 1189 a1 a5 a10 4 56 -1
531 A 1189 s1 a1 a4 0
532 DS 1195 s1 a1 a6 a3 162 738 -1
533 DS 1195 s1 a1 a8 a3 100 380 -1
534 DS 1195 s1 a1 a7 a6 3 27 1
535 DS 1195 s1 a1 a4 a6 36 64 1
536 IS 1195 s1 a1 a9 a8 a6 136 264 1
537 A 1195 s1 a1 a6 1
538 DS 1200 s1 a1 a8 a3 136 264 -1
539 A 1200 s1 a1 a8 0
540 DA 1214 a1 a2 a4 93 207 -1
541 IS 1214 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 160 340 -1
542 DA 1214 a1 a5 a8 3 27 -1
543 DA 1214 a1 a5 a10 40 230 1
544 DS 1214 s1 a1 a3 a10 145 355 1
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545 DA 1214 a1 a2 a10 25 75 1
546 A 1214 s1 a1 a10 0
547 IS 1223 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 110 890 -1
548 DA 1223 a1 a5 a8 12 78 -1
549 A 1223 s1 a1 a6 1
550 DA 1242 a1 a2 a6 47 203 -1
551 DS 1242 s1 a1 a3 a6 49 651 -1
552 DS 1242 s1 a1 a8 a10 44 356 -1
553 A 1242 s1 a1 a4 0
554 DS 1254 s1 a1 a7 a3 2 8 -1
555 DA 1254 a1 a5 a3 9 51 -1
556 DS 1254 s1 a1 a8 a3 396 324 -1
557 A 1254 s1 a1 a7 0
558 DS 1261 s1 a1 a10 a6 2 18 -1
559 DS 1261 s1 a1 a7 a8 4 36 -1
560 DS 1261 s1 a1 a10 a8 9 61 -1
561 A 1261 s1 a1 a4 0
562 DS 1271 s1 a1 a3 a6 222 378 -1
563 DA 1271 a1 a5 a6 4 146 -1
564 DS 1271 s1 a1 a7 a6 0 20 -1
565 DS 1271 s1 a1 a6 a8 43 227 1
566 DA 1271 a1 a5 a8 3 297 1
567 A 1271 s1 a1 a8 1
568 DS 1285 s1 a1 a6 a3 19 161 -1
569 DA 1285 a1 a9 a3 142 278 -1
570 DS 1285 s1 a1 a8 a3 235 325 -1
571 DS 1285 s1 a1 a7 a6 1 59 -1
572 DS 1285 s1 a1 a3 a6 120 380 -1
573 DS 1285 s1 a1 a10 a7 2 18 -1
574 DS 1285 s1 a1 a4 a8 99 201 1
575 DS 1285 s1 a1 a8 a10 105 375 -1
576 A 1285 s1 a1 a8 1
577 DA 1296 a1 a2 a4 46 154 -1
578 IS 1296 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 276 324 -1
579 DS 1296 s1 a1 a3 a8 104 696 -1
580 DS 1296 s1 a1 a8 a10 316 404 -1
581 DS 1296 s1 a1 a6 a10 124 416 -1
582 DA 1296 a1 a9 a10 14 166 -1
583 A 1296 s1 a1 a3 1
584 DA 1307 a1 a5 a7 37 143 -1
585 A 1307 s1 a1 a3 1
586 DS 1320 s1 a1 a4 a3 69 231 -1
587 DS 1320 s1 a1 a8 a3 338 382 -1
588 DS 1320 s1 a1 a3 a4 45 455 -1
589 DA 1320 a1 a2 a4 25 75 -1
590 A 1320 s1 a1 a6 1
591 DA 1328 a1 a2 a4 76 324 -1
592 DS 1328 s1 a1 a7 a6 8 52 1
593 DA 1328 a1 a9 a7 39 141 -1
594 DS 1328 s1 a1 a10 a7 2 8 -1
595 DA 1328 a1 a2 a7 115 285 -1
596 DS 1328 s1 a1 a3 a8 240 760 -1
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597 DS 1328 s1 a1 a10 a8 0 10 -1
598 A 1328 s1 a1 a6 0
599 DS 1334 s1 a1 a4 a6 84 116 -1
600 DS 1334 s1 a1 a7 a6 7 43 -1
601 DA 1334 a1 a9 a7 135 405 1
602 DA 1334 a1 a2 a10 154 546 -1
603 DS 1334 s1 a1 a8 a10 237 483 -1
604 DS 1334 s1 a1 a7 a10 2 29 -1
605 A 1334 s1 a1 a7 1
606 DS 1350 s1 a1 a4 a6 280 520 -1
607 DS 1350 s1 a1 a8 a6 165 555 -1
608 DS 1350 s1 a1 a7 a6 11 89 -1
609 A 1350 s1 a1 a3 1
610 DS 1368 s1 a1 a3 a6 80 320 -1
611 DA 1368 a1 a2 a6 81 369 -1
612 DA 1368 a1 a5 a6 37 233 -1
613 DA 1368 a1 a5 a7 18 102 -1
614 DS 1368 s1 a1 a8 a7 128 272 -1
615 DS 1368 s1 a1 a3 a7 208 592 -1
616 A 1368 s1 a1 a10 0
617 DS 1385 s1 a1 a8 a4 179 461 -1
618 DA 1385 a1 a5 a4 10 170 -1
619 DS 1385 s1 a1 a6 a4 54 216 -1
620 IA 1385 a1 a9 a5 a6 8 262 1
621 DS 1385 s1 a1 a7 a6 2 18 1
622 DA 1385 a1 a5 a6 14 166 1
623 DA 1385 a1 a2 a7 26 74 -1
624 A 1385 s1 a1 a6 1
625 DS 1392 s1 a1 a4 a3 190 810 -1
626 DA 1392 a1 a2 a3 150 850 -1
627 A 1392 s1 a1 a4 0
628 DS 1399 s1 a1 a4 a8 330 670 1
629 DA 1399 a1 a2 a8 87 263 1
630 A 1399 s1 a1 a8 0
631 DS 1404 s1 a1 a10 a3 7 43 -1
632 DS 1404 s1 a1 a7 a10 16 11 -1
633 DA 1404 a1 a2 a10 30 170 -1
634 DA 1404 a1 a5 a10 15 45 -1
635 A 1404 s1 a1 a8 0
636 DS 1421 s1 a1 a8 a3 112 288 1
637 DA 1421 a1 a2 a3 70 630 1
638 DS 1421 s1 a1 a3 a4 60 540 -1
639 DS 1421 s1 a1 a7 a4 4 36 -1
640 DA 1421 a1 a2 a6 55 195 -1
641 DA 1421 a1 a2 a10 162 738 -1
642 DS 1421 s1 a1 a7 a10 30 37 -1
643 DS 1421 s1 a1 a8 a10 67 173 -1
644 A 1421 s1 a1 a3 0
645 DS 1428 s1 a1 a6 a4 16 74 -1
646 DS 1428 s1 a1 a7 a4 3 27 -1
647 DS 1428 s1 a1 a10 a7 2 48 -1
648 DS 1428 s1 a1 a10 a8 4 36 -1
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649 DS 1428 s1 a1 a3 a8 85 415 -1
650 DA 1428 a1 a2 a10 44 356 -1
651 A 1428 s1 a1 a6 0
652 DS 1442 s1 a1 a8 a6 84 156 -1
653 DS 1442 s1 a1 a6 a7 157 293 -1
654 DS 1442 s1 a1 a10 a7 3 67 -1
655 DA 1442 a1 a5 a8 0 30 1
656 IA 1442 a1 a9 a5 a8 7 83 1
657 DS 1442 s1 a1 a3 a8 390 610 1
658 A 1442 s1 a1 a8 1
659 DA 1462 a1 a2 a4 50 450 -1
660 DS 1462 s1 a1 a6 a4 66 114 -1
661 DS 1462 s1 a1 a4 a7 258 342 1
662 A 1462 s1 a1 a7 1
663 DS 1481 s1 a1 a4 a3 297 603 -1
664 DS 1481 s1 a1 a7 a3 6 54 -1
665 DS 1481 s1 a1 a7 a4 3 37 -1
666 DA 1481 a1 a9 a4 10 110 -1
667 DS 1481 s1 a1 a8 a4 32 48 -1
668 DA 1481 a1 a9 a7 3 357 -1
669 DS 1481 s1 a1 a3 a7 180 720 -1
670 DS 1481 s1 a1 a6 a8 27 63 -1
671 DS 1481 s1 a1 a3 a8 90 510 -1
672 DS 1481 s1 a1 a3 a10 26 74 1
673 DA 1481 a1 a5 a10 9 81 1
674 DA 1481 a1 a9 a10 21 519 1
675 A 1481 s1 a1 a10 1
676 DS 1493 s1 a1 a7 a8 7 63 -1
677 DS 1493 s1 a1 a3 a8 55 445 -1
678 DS 1493 s1 a1 a3 a10 42 258 -1
679 DA 1493 a1 a2 a10 175 525 -1
680 DS 1493 s1 a1 a8 a10 192 448 -1
681 A 1493 s1 a1 a6 0
682 DA 1505 a1 a2 a3 81 819 -1
683 DA 1505 a1 a9 a3 67 413 -1
684 DS 1505 s1 a1 a7 a3 13 47 -1
685 DS 1505 s1 a1 a4 a10 66 234 -1
686 DA 1505 a1 a9 a10 36 564 -1
687 A 1505 s1 a1 a7 1
688 DS 1511 s1 a1 a10 a4 0 20 -1
689 DA 1511 a1 a2 a7 150 350 -1
690 DS 1511 s1 a1 a4 a8 168 432 -1
691 DA 1511 a1 a5 a10 19 221 -1
692 DA 1511 a1 a9 a10 10 50 -1
693 A 1511 s1 a1 a3 0
694 DA 1525 a1 a2 a4 35 465 -1
695 DS 1525 s1 a1 a3 a6 30 270 -1
696 DS 1525 s1 a1 a7 a6 1 49 -1
697 A 1525 s1 a1 a8 1
698 DS 1545 s1 a1 a10 a4 12 28 -1
699 DS 1545 s1 a1 a7 a4 7 63 -1
700 DS 1545 s1 a1 a8 a6 150 170 -1
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701 DA 1545 a1 a5 a6 1 149 -1
702 DS 1545 s1 a1 a8 a7 187 293 1
703 A 1545 s1 a1 a7 1
704 DA 1563 a1 a5 a4 56 154 -1
705 DS 1563 s1 a1 a6 a4 201 519 -1
706 DS 1563 s1 a1 a10 a8 18 62 1
707 A 1563 s1 a1 a8 1
708 DA 1580 a1 a9 a4 12 228 1
709 DS 1580 s1 a1 a6 a4 72 378 1
710 DS 1580 s1 a1 a8 a4 139 341 1
711 DS 1580 s1 a1 a10 a6 10 80 -1
712 IS 1580 s1 a1 a9 a4 a6 245 255 -1
713 DS 1580 s1 a1 a8 a6 288 432 -1
714 DS 1580 s1 a1 a10 a8 13 67 -1
715 DS 1580 s1 a1 a7 a8 1 49 -1
716 DS 1580 s1 a1 a7 a10 18 25 -1
717 DA 1580 a1 a2 a10 168 532 -1
718 DA 1580 a1 a5 a10 4 26 -1
719 A 1580 s1 a1 a4 0
720 DA 1595 a1 a9 a3 4 56 -1
721 DS 1595 s1 a1 a10 a7 18 42 -1
722 A 1595 s1 a1 a6 0
723 DA 1605 a1 a2 a7 90 810 -1
724 DS 1605 s1 a1 a10 a7 10 80 -1
725 A 1605 s1 a1 a6 0
726 DA 1619 a1 a2 a7 200 800 -1
727 DS 1619 s1 a1 a8 a7 72 328 -1
728 DS 1619 s1 a1 a6 a7 32 148 -1
729 DA 1619 a1 a2 a8 170 330 -1
730 DA 1619 a1 a9 a10 33 207 -1
731 DS 1619 s1 a1 a6 a10 423 477 -1
732 DA 1619 a1 a2 a10 57 243 -1
733 A 1619 s1 a1 a6 0
734 DS 1633 s1 a1 a10 a3 5 95 1
735 DA 1633 a1 a9 a3 36 204 1
736 DS 1633 s1 a1 a8 a4 91 149 -1
737 DS 1633 s1 a1 a3 a7 280 520 -1
738 A 1633 s1 a1 a3 0
739 DS 1640 s1 a1 a4 a8 188 212 -1
740 DS 1640 s1 a1 a3 a8 21 79 -1
741 A 1640 s1 a1 a4 1
742 DA 1658 a1 a2 a8 69 231 -1
743 DS 1658 s1 a1 a3 a8 122 178 -1
744 DS 1658 s1 a1 a6 a8 296 334 -1
745 A 1658 s1 a1 a10 0
746 DA 1671 a1 a5 a3 5 25 -1
747 DS 1671 s1 a1 a10 a6 4 16 -1
748 DS 1671 s1 a1 a7 a6 0 50 -1
749 DA 1671 a1 a2 a6 9 41 -1
750 DS 1671 s1 a1 a3 a8 38 162 -1
751 IA 1671 a1 a9 a2 a8 76 324 -1
752 A 1671 s1 a1 a7 1
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753 DS 1687 s1 a1 a3 a6 21 79 -1
754 IA 1687 a1 a9 a2 a6 57 193 -1
755 DA 1687 a1 a2 a6 63 237 -1
756 DA 1687 a1 a2 a8 91 259 1
757 IA 1687 a1 a9 a2 a8 32 168 1
758 DS 1687 s1 a1 a10 a8 15 85 1
759 A 1687 s1 a1 a8 1
760 A 1699 s1 a1 a6 0
761 DA 1717 a1 a2 a6 65 185 1
762 DS 1717 s1 a1 a10 a6 1 9 1
763 IS 1717 s1 a1 a9 a4 a6 200 600 1
764 DS 1717 s1 a1 a3 a7 216 684 -1
765 A 1717 s1 a1 a6 1
766 DS 1733 s1 a1 a8 a4 121 199 -1
767 DS 1733 s1 a1 a10 a4 13 67 -1
768 DA 1733 a1 a9 a4 96 324 -1
769 DS 1733 s1 a1 a3 a10 210 790 1
770 DA 1733 a1 a5 a10 3 117 1
771 DS 1733 s1 a1 a8 a10 121 199 1
772 A 1733 s1 a1 a10 1
773 DS 1752 s1 a1 a8 a3 22 58 -1
774 IA 1752 a1 a9 a5 a8 33 267 -1
775 DS 1752 s1 a1 a4 a8 168 532 -1
776 DS 1752 s1 a1 a7 a8 14 76 -1
777 A 1752 s1 a1 a10 0
778 DS 1761 s1 a1 a7 a3 5 15 -1
779 DA 1761 a1 a5 a3 60 240 -1
780 DS 1761 s1 a1 a10 a6 3 27 -1
781 A 1761 s1 a1 a8 1
782 DA 1774 a1 a5 a3 54 246 1
783 DS 1774 s1 a1 a4 a8 23 77 -1
784 DS 1774 s1 a1 a6 a8 405 495 -1
785 A 1774 s1 a1 a3 1
786 DS 1779 s1 a1 a6 a7 351 549 -1
787 DS 1779 s1 a1 a8 a7 172 468 -1
788 DS 1779 s1 a1 a3 a8 210 490 -1
789 A 1779 s1 a1 a3 0
790 DS 1795 s1 a1 a10 a6 13 87 -1
791 IS 1795 s1 a1 a9 a8 a6 62 178 -1
792 DS 1795 s1 a1 a4 a6 80 420 -1
793 A 1795 s1 a1 a8 1
794 DA 1806 a1 a2 a3 104 296 -1
795 DS 1806 s1 a1 a7 a4 2 38 -1
796 DA 1806 a1 a2 a4 108 792 -1
797 DS 1806 s1 a1 a4 a6 108 192 -1
798 DA 1806 a1 a2 a7 87 213 -1
799 DS 1806 s1 a1 a4 a7 243 657 -1
800 DS 1806 s1 a1 a10 a7 18 42 -1
801 DA 1806 a1 a5 a10 42 168 -1
802 DA 1806 a1 a2 a10 135 765 -1
803 A 1806 s1 a1 a8 0
804 DS 1816 s1 a1 a8 a3 201 359 1
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805 DA 1816 a1 a5 a3 4 56 1
806 DS 1816 s1 a1 a6 a3 52 128 1
807 DS 1816 s1 a1 a8 a6 73 87 -1
808 DA 1816 a1 a5 a8 1 89 -1
809 DS 1816 s1 a1 a10 a8 0 10 -1
810 DS 1816 s1 a1 a6 a8 129 411 -1
811 A 1816 s1 a1 a3 1
812 DS 1830 s1 a1 a3 a6 45 855 1
813 DS 1830 s1 a1 a4 a7 330 670 -1
814 DS 1830 s1 a1 a7 a8 17 83 -1
815 A 1830 s1 a1 a6 0
816 DA 1843 a1 a2 a3 24 76 -1
817 DA 1843 a1 a9 a3 18 102 -1
818 DS 1843 s1 a1 a10 a4 9 81 -1
819 DS 1843 s1 a1 a4 a6 50 150 -1
820 DS 1843 s1 a1 a10 a7 6 44 1
821 DS 1843 s1 a1 a6 a7 118 242 1
822 DS 1843 s1 a1 a8 a7 128 192 1
823 DS 1843 s1 a1 a6 a8 50 670 -1
824 DA 1843 a1 a5 a8 27 243 -1
825 A 1843 s1 a1 a7 0
826 DA 1863 a1 a9 a3 70 470 -1
827 DS 1863 s1 a1 a6 a4 189 351 1
828 DS 1863 s1 a1 a10 a4 16 44 1
829 DS 1863 s1 a1 a8 a10 56 344 -1
830 DS 1863 s1 a1 a3 a10 75 225 -1
831 DS 1863 s1 a1 a6 a10 135 315 -1
832 A 1863 s1 a1 a4 0
833 DA 1872 a1 a2 a4 105 595 -1
834 DS 1872 s1 a1 a6 a4 34 56 -1
835 DS 1872 s1 a1 a10 a4 0 40 -1
836 A 1872 s1 a1 a6 1
837 DS 1879 s1 a1 a7 a3 3 27 1
838 DA 1879 a1 a9 a3 126 174 1
839 DS 1879 s1 a1 a8 a3 153 487 1
840 DA 1879 a1 a5 a4 1 59 -1
841 DS 1879 s1 a1 a7 a6 6 24 -1
842 DS 1879 s1 a1 a8 a6 257 303 -1
843 DA 1879 a1 a5 a8 46 134 -1
844 IS 1879 s1 a1 a9 a6 a8 216 504 -1
845 A 1879 s1 a1 a3 0
846 A 1888 s1 a1 a10 1
847 DS 1896 s1 a1 a6 a3 208 512 -1
848 DA 1896 a1 a9 a3 62 418 -1
849 DA 1896 a1 a2 a3 130 370 -1
850 DS 1896 s1 a1 a10 a4 3 57 -1
851 A 1896 s1 a1 a6 0
852 DA 1914 a1 a2 a4 174 426 -1
853 DS 1914 s1 a1 a7 a4 1 79 -1
854 DA 1914 a1 a5 a7 14 166 -1
855 IS 1914 s1 a1 a9 a7 a8 4 76 -1
856 DS 1914 s1 a1 a4 a8 144 456 -1
256
857 DA 1914 a1 a5 a8 0 30 -1
858 A 1914 s1 a1 a10 0
859 DS 1931 s1 a1 a10 a3 9 31 -1
860 DS 1931 s1 a1 a6 a3 43 497 -1
861 DS 1931 s1 a1 a4 a10 384 416 -1
862 DA 1931 a1 a2 a10 144 756 -1
863 A 1931 s1 a1 a7 0
864 DS 1938 s1 a1 a7 a6 14 86 -1
865 IS 1938 s1 a1 a9 a3 a8 85 415 -1
866 A 1938 s1 a1 a4 0
867 DS 1954 s1 a1 a3 a4 38 162 -1
868 DA 1954 a1 a2 a4 18 582 -1
869 DS 1954 s1 a1 a6 a7 201 519 -1
870 DA 1954 a1 a2 a7 220 280 -1
871 DS 1954 s1 a1 a3 a8 108 492 1
872 A 1954 s1 a1 a8 1
873 DA 1959 a1 a5 a6 29 241 -1
874 DS 1959 s1 a1 a4 a7 182 518 -1
875 DS 1959 s1 a1 a8 a7 64 256 -1
876 DS 1959 s1 a1 a4 a10 189 511 -1
877 DA 1959 a1 a5 a10 29 241 -1
878 DS 1959 s1 a1 a8 a10 40 200 -1
879 A 1959 s1 a1 a8 0
880 DA 1974 a1 a2 a8 95 405 -1
881 DS 1974 s1 a1 a3 a8 39 61 -1
882 DS 1974 s1 a1 a6 a8 99 171 -1
883 A 1974 s1 a1 a4 1
884 DS 1980 s1 a1 a10 a4 2 28 -1
885 DS 1980 s1 a1 a8 a4 224 416 -1
886 DA 1980 a1 a2 a4 170 830 -1
887 IS 1980 s1 a1 a9 a7 a6 7 73 1
888 DS 1980 s1 a1 a7 a6 9 61 1
889 DS 1980 s1 a1 a3 a6 390 610 1
890 DS 1980 s1 a1 a4 a8 140 560 -1
891 DA 1980 a1 a2 a8 96 204 -1
892 IA 1980 a1 a9 a5 a8 58 152 -1
893 A 1980 s1 a1 a6 0
894 DS 1993 s1 a1 a4 a3 33 67 1
895 DA 1993 a1 a2 a3 216 584 1
896 DA 1993 a1 a5 a6 30 150 -1
897 DS 1993 s1 a1 a6 a8 210 600 -1
898 DS 1993 s1 a1 a7 a8 6 74 -1
899 DS 1993 s1 a1 a6 a10 105 705 -1
900 DS 1993 s1 a1 a4 a10 72 128 -1
901 A 1993 s1 a1 a3 0
902 DA 1999 a1 a2 a3 198 702 -1
903 DA 1999 a1 a9 a3 96 204 -1
904 DS 1999 s1 a1 a4 a3 440 560 -1
905 DS 1999 s1 a1 a3 a8 36 64 -1
906 A 1999 s1 a1 a6 0
907 IS 2019 s1 a1 a9 a4 a8 308 392 -1
908 DS 2019 s1 a1 a6 a8 162 198 -1
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909 A 2019 s1 a1 a4 0
910 Actual collusion
911 a10 a7 PTW
912 Detectable PTW collusion
913 a10 a7
914 Detected PTW collusion
915 Precision
916 1.0
917 Recall
918 0.0
C.2 Collusion Detection Results File Example
For an agent population of size 10, 132 population configurations have been gener-
ated and for which collusion detection has been applied from the point of view of one
evaluating agent. The first two lines of the file is the header row.
1 population_size,trust_high,trust_ave,trust_low,service_count,collusive_pairs_count,
2 aveTruePositive,aveFalsePositive,aveFalseNegative,avePrecision,aveRecall,runCount
3 10,0,0,100,2,1,0.1,0.1,0.9,0.9,0.1,10
4 10,0,10,90,2,1,0.3,1.2,0.7,0.5666666666666667,0.3,10
5 10,0,20,80,2,1,0.0,0.8,1.0,0.4,0.0,10
6 10,0,30,70,2,1,0.1,3.6,0.9,0.10909090909090909,0.1,10
7 10,0,40,60,2,1,0.1,3.4,0.9,0.12,0.1,10
8 10,0,50,50,2,1,0.1,4.8,0.9,0.21000000000000002,0.1,10
9 10,0,60,40,2,1,0.2,3.4,0.8,0.33111111111111113,0.2,10
10 10,0,70,30,2,1,0.1,3.9,0.9,0.2111111111111111,0.1,10
11 10,0,80,20,2,1,0.4,5.0,0.6,0.25928571428571423,0.4,10
12 10,0,90,10,2,1,0.2,2.6,0.8,0.3,0.2,10
13 10,0,100,0,2,1,0.0,2.1,1.0,0.6,0.0,10
14 10,10,0,90,2,1,0.0,2.3,1.0,0.5,0.0,10
15 10,10,10,80,2,1,0.2,5.5,0.8,0.1325,0.2,10
16 10,10,20,70,2,1,0.2,3.3,0.8,0.27,0.2,10
17 10,10,30,60,2,1,0.4,4.0,0.6,0.16588235294117648,0.4,10
18 10,10,40,50,2,1,0.1,5.8,0.9,0.10909090909090909,0.1,10
19 10,10,50,40,2,1,0.2,3.6,0.8,0.16999999999999998,0.2,10
20 10,10,60,30,2,1,0.4,7.2,0.6,0.1403943278943279,0.4,10
21 10,10,70,20,2,1,0.4,4.9,0.6,0.2796703296703297,0.4,10
22 10,10,80,10,2,1,0.4,8.6,0.6,0.06337662337662338,0.4,10
23 10,10,90,0,2,1,0.5,6.0,0.5,0.17678571428571427,0.5,10
24 10,20,0,80,2,1,0.2,5.6,0.8,0.11526315789473685,0.2,10
25 10,20,10,70,2,1,0.2,4.3,0.8,0.0375,0.2,10
26 10,20,20,60,2,1,0.0,7.7,1.0,0.0,0.0,10
27 10,20,30,50,2,1,0.1,6.9,0.9,0.01,0.1,10
28 10,20,40,40,2,1,0.3,7.8,0.7,0.12969827586206897,0.3,10
29 10,20,50,30,2,1,0.1,4.1,0.9,0.01111111111111111,0.1,10
30 10,20,60,20,2,1,0.3,5.6,0.7,0.16428571428571428,0.3,10
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31 10,20,70,10,2,1,0.2,5.8,0.8,0.11101190476190477,0.2,10
32 10,20,80,0,2,1,0.4,7.7,0.6,0.1754312251216276,0.4,10
33 10,30,0,70,2,1,0.0,9.6,1.0,0.0,0.0,10
34 10,30,10,60,2,1,0.3,7.6,0.7,0.04236111111111111,0.3,10
35 10,30,20,50,2,1,0.1,5.5,0.9,0.11428571428571428,0.1,10
36 10,30,30,40,2,1,0.4,9.0,0.6,0.029066576698155645,0.4,10
37 10,30,40,30,2,1,0.1,7.1,0.9,0.004545454545454545,0.1,10
38 10,30,50,20,2,1,0.2,9.7,0.8,0.014814814814814814,0.2,10
39 10,30,60,10,2,1,0.3,8.3,0.7,0.0313960113960114,0.3,10
40 10,30,70,0,2,1,0.2,5.2,0.8,0.06999999999999999,0.2,10
41 10,40,0,60,2,1,0.5,11.7,0.5,0.0710989010989011,0.5,10
42 10,40,10,50,2,1,0.2,9.3,0.8,0.11114285714285714,0.2,10
43 10,40,20,40,2,1,0.1,11.6,0.9,0.004545454545454545,0.1,10
44 10,40,30,30,2,1,0.4,11.6,0.6,0.027122518286311386,0.4,10
45 10,40,40,20,2,1,0.2,10.0,0.8,0.0625,0.2,10
46 10,40,50,10,2,1,0.2,9.3,0.8,0.10883458646616542,0.2,10
47 10,40,60,0,2,1,0.1,5.4,0.9,0.20909090909090908,0.1,10
48 10,50,0,50,2,1,0.3,14.5,0.7,0.02013888888888889,0.3,10
49 10,50,10,40,2,1,0.0,5.8,1.0,0.0,0.0,10
50 10,50,20,30,2,1,0.3,14.0,0.7,0.03333333333333334,0.3,10
51 10,50,30,20,2,1,0.2,12.0,0.8,0.12954545454545455,0.2,10
52 10,50,40,10,2,1,0.1,8.8,0.9,0.10714285714285714,0.1,10
53 10,50,50,0,2,1,0.2,9.6,0.8,0.14166666666666666,0.2,10
54 10,60,0,40,2,1,0.3,17.7,0.7,0.015049019607843139,0.3,10
55 10,60,10,30,2,1,0.4,13.5,0.6,0.02626573617952928,0.4,10
56 10,60,20,20,2,1,0.1,11.0,0.9,0.0125,0.1,10
57 10,60,30,10,2,1,0.3,7.7,0.7,0.029548872180451123,0.3,10
58 10,60,40,0,2,1,0.3,11.1,0.7,0.032454212454212455,0.3,10
59 10,70,0,30,2,1,0.4,14.6,0.6,0.025302840434419382,0.4,10
60 10,70,10,20,2,1,0.3,11.7,0.7,0.02786037491919845,0.3,10
61 10,70,20,10,2,1,0.1,12.2,0.9,0.0040,0.1,10
62 10,70,30,0,2,1,0.2,8.9,0.8,0.12678571428571428,0.2,10
63 10,80,0,20,2,1,0.3,12.1,0.7,0.11611061352440663,0.3,10
64 10,80,10,10,2,1,0.3,10.2,0.7,0.03042780748663102,0.3,10
65 10,80,20,0,2,1,0.3,8.1,0.7,0.029761904761904757,0.3,10
66 10,90,0,10,2,1,0.2,5.5,0.8,0.36,0.2,10
67 10,90,10,0,2,1,0.4,10.6,0.6,0.12879901960784312,0.4,10
68 10,100,0,0,2,1,0.3,9.7,0.7,0.125,0.3,10
69 10,0,0,100,2,0,0.0,0.1,0.0,0.9,0.0,10
70 10,0,10,90,2,0,0.0,0.2,0.0,0.8,0.0,10
71 10,0,20,80,2,0,0.0,3.9,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
72 10,0,30,70,2,0,0.0,2.1,0.0,0.6,0.0,10
73 10,0,40,60,2,0,0.0,5.4,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
74 10,0,50,50,2,0,0.0,3.1,0.0,0.3,0.0,10
75 10,0,60,40,2,0,0.0,5.1,0.0,0.3,0.0,10
76 10,0,70,30,2,0,0.0,3.9,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
77 10,0,80,20,2,0,0.0,5.7,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
78 10,0,90,10,2,0,0.0,1.3,0.0,0.5,0.0,10
79 10,0,100,0,2,0,0.0,3.7,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
80 10,10,0,90,2,0,0.0,2.1,0.0,0.5,0.0,10
81 10,10,10,80,2,0,0.0,5.6,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
82 10,10,20,70,2,0,0.0,4.2,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
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83 10,10,30,60,2,0,0.0,6.1,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
84 10,10,40,50,2,0,0.0,6.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
85 10,10,50,40,2,0,0.0,5.2,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
86 10,10,60,30,2,0,0.0,7.6,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
87 10,10,70,20,2,0,0.0,4.5,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
88 10,10,80,10,2,0,0.0,2.5,0.0,0.3,0.0,10
89 10,10,90,0,2,0,0.0,3.6,0.0,0.3,0.0,10
90 10,20,0,80,2,0,0.0,7.9,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
91 10,20,10,70,2,0,0.0,5.5,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
92 10,20,20,60,2,0,0.0,8.2,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
93 10,20,30,50,2,0,0.0,6.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
94 10,20,40,40,2,0,0.0,8.3,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
95 10,20,50,30,2,0,0.0,7.5,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
96 10,20,60,20,2,0,0.0,4.7,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
97 10,20,70,10,2,0,0.0,4.4,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
98 10,20,80,0,2,0,0.0,4.7,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
99 10,30,0,70,2,0,0.0,6.1,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
100 10,30,10,60,2,0,0.0,6.5,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
101 10,30,20,50,2,0,0.0,6.9,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
102 10,30,30,40,2,0,0.0,8.8,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
103 10,30,40,30,2,0,0.0,6.8,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
104 10,30,50,20,2,0,0.0,7.2,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
105 10,30,60,10,2,0,0.0,9.1,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
106 10,30,70,0,2,0,0.0,8.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
107 10,40,0,60,2,0,0.0,10.3,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
108 10,40,10,50,2,0,0.0,8.8,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
109 10,40,20,40,2,0,0.0,12.8,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
110 10,40,30,30,2,0,0.0,6.0,0.0,0.2,0.0,10
111 10,40,40,20,2,0,0.0,9.6,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
112 10,40,50,10,2,0,0.0,7.1,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
113 10,40,60,0,2,0,0.0,9.8,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
114 10,50,0,50,2,0,0.0,9.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
115 10,50,10,40,2,0,0.0,11.2,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
116 10,50,20,30,2,0,0.0,9.3,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
117 10,50,30,20,2,0,0.0,12.1,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
118 10,50,40,10,2,0,0.0,7.2,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
119 10,50,50,0,2,0,0.0,11.2,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
120 10,60,0,40,2,0,0.0,13.8,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
121 10,60,10,30,2,0,0.0,9.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
122 10,60,20,20,2,0,0.0,11.2,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
123 10,60,30,10,2,0,0.0,11.0,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
124 10,60,40,0,2,0,0.0,10.4,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
125 10,70,0,30,2,0,0.0,12.8,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
126 10,70,10,20,2,0,0.0,7.1,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
127 10,70,20,10,2,0,0.0,10.7,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
128 10,70,30,0,2,0,0.0,11.6,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
129 10,80,0,20,2,0,0.0,15.3,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
130 10,80,10,10,2,0,0.0,13.5,0.0,0.1,0.0,10
131 10,80,20,0,2,0,0.0,11.4,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
132 10,90,0,10,2,0,0.0,12.3,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
133 10,90,10,0,2,0,0.0,12.9,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
134 10,100,0,0,2,0,0.0,9.4,0.0,0.0,0.0,10
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C.3 Paired t-Tests on Cosine Similarity Thresholds for Dif-
ferences in Precision
Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Precision_0.75T 0.111 50 0.273 0.039
Precision_0.05T 0.513 50 0.369 0.052
Precision_0.75T 0.111 50 0.273 0.039
Precision_0.25T 0.303 50 0.361 0.051
Precision_0.75T 0.111 50 0.273 0.039
Precision_0.5T 0.177 50 0.292 0.041
Precision_0.75T 0.111 50 0.273 0.039
Precision_0.95T 0.092 50 0.241 0.034
Paired Samples Statistics for Precision
HTa1
HTb1
HTc1
HTd1
Table C.1: Hypotheses Results for Precision (Statistics)
Lower Upper
HTa1
Precision_0.75T -
Precision_0.05T -0.402 0.349 0.049 -0.501 -0.303 -8.137 49 0.000
HTb1
Precision_0.75T -
Precision_0.25T -0.192 0.255 0.036 -0.265 -0.120 -5.339 49 0.000
HTc1
Precision_0.75T -
Precision_0.5T -0.066 0.192 0.027 -0.120 -0.011 -2.425 49 0.019
HTd1
Precision_0.75T -
Precision_0.95T 0.020 0.136 0.019 -0.019 0.058 1.016 49 0.315
95% Confidence Interval
of the DifferenceHypothesis Difference
Paired Samples Test for Precision
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std.Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Table C.2: Hypotheses Results for Precision (t-Test)
C.4 Paired t-Tests on Cosine Similarity Thresholds for Dif-
ferences in Recall
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Hypothesis Comparison Pair Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Recall_0.75T 0.172 50 0.185 0.026
Recall_0.05T 0.016 50 0.055 0.008
Recall_0.75T 0.172 50 0.185 0.026
Recall_0.25T 0.036 50 0.088 0.012
Recall_0.75T 0.172 50 0.185 0.026
Recall_0.5T 0.080 50 0.140 0.020
Recall_0.75T 0.172 50 0.185 0.026
Recall_0.95T 0.356 50 0.247 0.035
Paired Samples Statistics for Recall
HTe1
HTf1
HTg1
HTh1
Table C.3: Hypotheses Results for Recall (Statistics)
Lower Upper
HTe1
Recall_0.75T -
Recall_0.05T 0.156 0.203 0.029 0.098 0.214 5.429 49 0.000
HTf1
Recall_0.75T -
Recall_0.25T 0.136 0.212 0.030 0.076 0.196 4.543 49 0.000
HTg1
Recall_0.75T -
Recall_0.5T 0.092 0.233 0.033 0.026 0.158 2.794 49 0.007
HTh1
Recall_0.75T -
Recall_0.95T -0.184 0.315 0.045 -0.274 -0.094 -4.128 49 0.000
Std. Error
Mean
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Paired Samples Test for Recall
Hypothesis Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std.Deviation
Table C.4: Hypotheses Results for Recall (t-Test)
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Appendix D
Glossary of Notations
The following notations are used throughout this thesis:
Category Notation Description
Agent: An autonomous computational entity.
ae An evaluator assessing agent behaviour.
ap A service provider that can execute particular
tasks.
at A target agent is a potential service provider,
being assessed by the evaluator.
ar A recommender (witness) agent which can give
recommendations to the requester.
ar ′ An intermediate witness.
ar ′′ With respect to an intermediate witness, it
refers to a further witness along the recommen-
dation chain.
ard A direct recommender.
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Category Notation Description
Agent:
ar i An indirect recommender.
ar i′ A further indirect recommender along the rec-
ommender chain.
Confidence: The amount of certainty.
STc The confidence in the situational trust value.
RTc The confidence in the recommendation trust
value.
Count: A tally.
count+ The number of positive interactions.
count− The number of negative interactions.
counts The number of service types.
counttotal The total number of interactions.
Dimension: d A service characteristic.
dtype The service characteristic denoted by type.
Disposition: An indication of an agent behaviour’s be-
haviour.
dispositionpass Behaviour indication as a result of a success.
dispositionfail Behaviour indication as a result of a failure.
History: A record of past events.
His A history of past service interactions.
Hir A history of recommendations received.
Interaction: A transaction event between two agents.
is An interaction about the execution of a service.
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Category Notation Description
Interaction:
ir An interaction relating to a recommendation
request.
ird A direct recommendation interaction.
ir i An indirect recommendation interaction.
Performance
value:
PV The result of the calculation of an agent’s trust-
worthiness from trust and reputation.
Recommendation:r The opinion of a witness.
rd A direct recommendation.
r i An indirect recommendation.
Service type: s The type of service offered by a provider, or
needed by an evaluator.
Time: t A point in time.
tcurr The current time.
Trust: The assessment of the likelihood that an agent
will fulfil its commitments.
ST Situational trust - trust in a specific context.
GT General trust - the overall trustworthiness of an
agent.
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Category Notation Description
Trust:
RT Recommendation trust - the trustworthiness of
a witness in giving opinions.
initialT Initial trust - the trust value that an agent has
in another, even without having interacted with
it.
Witness reputa-
tion:
WR Trust information originating from third par-
ties.
maxWI The maximum number of interactions that the
witnesses have used when giving recommenda-
tions.
totalWI The total number of interactions actually used
in that recommendation.
Weight: ω The amount of influence an entity has.
ωHis Recency weight applied to the interaction his-
tory.
ωWR The influence of witness reputation.
ωRTc The influence of the confidence in the recom-
mendation trust.
ωWRR The weight of of witness reputation relevance.
µf The weight of the performance evaluation fac-
tors.
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Appendix E
Abbreviations
MAS multi-agent systems
MCDA multiple criteria decision analysis
MDT multidimensional trust
P2P peer-to-peer
PD Prisoners’ Dilemma
PTW Persistent Target-Witness collusion type
TW Target-Witness collusion
WW Witness-Witness collusion
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